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Abstract 
WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT ILLNESS REPRESENTATIONS OF CANCER 
By 
IAN Z. PERVIL 
Advisor: Tracey A. Revenson, Ph.D. 
For people who have illnesses with vague or diffuse symptoms, such as systemic cancers 
that lack solid masses or tumors (e.g. leukemia), the process of adjustment appears more difficult 
than for those with clearly-defined symptoms. Dual systems theory attempts to understand this 
phenomenon by contending that individuals rely upon two modes of cognitive processing when 
conceptualizing illnesses: implicit, System 1 processes and explicit, System 2 processes. Those 
with illnesses whose symptoms lack specificity may rely more heavily on System 1 processing 
and have greater difficulty adjusting. 
This study tested whether illness representations mediate the relationship between cancer 
patients’ tumor status (whether or not they have masses/tumors) or thinking style (levels of 
System 1 and System 2 processing) and psychological adjustment (depressive symptoms, cancer-
related distress, body image, and post-traumatic growth). A national sample of 305 men and 
women diagnosed with cancer completed an online survey; a subsample of 99 individuals 
completed an optional measure asking them to draw their cancer at time of diagnosis and in the 
present. 
The hypotheses were partially supported. Tumor status was unrelated to illness 
representations, thinking style, or psychological adjustment. The illness representations of 
(greater) identity, consequences, chronicity, cyclicality, and emotional representations were 
related to reporting more depressive symptoms and cancer-related distress, and worse body 
 v 
image. Attributing a locus of control to self or to treatment and greater illness coherence were 
related to less depression and distress, better body image, and more post-traumatic growth.  
The relationship between System 1 thinking and post-traumatic growth was mediated by 
a combined factor of illness representations that captured locus of control and acuteness of 
illness. System 2 thinking was correlated with depressive symptoms, but no hypothesized factors 
were mediators. Drawings of participants with greater System 1 thinking were more likely to be 
rated abstract and contain fewer people.  
Results suggest that, despite the range of illness representations of cancer, a shared 
understanding of “cancer” underlies all representations. Having a solid cancer does not appear to 
be an essential component of survivors’ ability to adapt; however, thinking style, particularly as 







Someone or another wrote that no man is an island. Actually it was John Donne, and he 
composed the lines in 1623 after he was suddenly struck with a life-threatening illness. The 
circumstances of his writing (i.e. making sense of illness) as well as his particular sentiments 
resonate deeply as I reflect on the numerous individuals who helped me along the way. 
 I am grateful to the faculty and staff of the City University of New York for teaching me, 
challenging me, and inspiring me. First and foremost, Dr. Tracey A. Revenson believed in me. 
She showed me that the road ahead was neither easy nor direct, but that it was a trip worth 
taking, and she was right. In the years that she invested considerable time and energy in my 
work, she taught me how to be a stronger thinker and a better researcher. 
  My aim to bring various psychological perspectives together in conversation seemed to 
dovetail with the ideas of Dr. Maureen O’Connor, and so I am lucky and thankful to have found 
a kindred spirit, an ardent supporter, and a great academic scholar and mentor in her. My ideas 
became infinitely more nuanced during regular conversations with Dr. Lissa Weinstein, whose 
brilliance is matched only by the kindness she has shown me. I would not have had a solid 
foundation to begin with had Dr. Elliot Jurist not taken a chance on me. His dedicated efforts 
helped me reflect on myself and find the way forward, particularly in the earliest stages of my 
graduate career. I never would have found that way, or any of the paperwork I needed to file, 
without the guidance and loving wisdom of Maria-Helena Reis.  
 In addition to those mentioned above, I am thankful to the other members of the 
dissertation committee, who brought balance, breadth, and depth to the table. In particular, Dr. 
Lisa Rubin helped me hone my skills as a researcher with a clinical heart. Dr. Denise Hien 
 vii 
provided me with sanity, stability, and wit. Dr. Joel Erblich inspired me in new directions and 
helped me get my numbers in order. 
 This project simply would not have been possible without the gracious, unflinching, 
generous support of the organization Stupid Cancer, led by its tireless, charismatic leader, 
Matthew Zachary. He is an inspiration not only to those with cancer, but also to countless others 
like me. He and his team gave and gave (and gave again) in order to help me bring my ideas to 
fruition. My academic career would not have begun without the support of Ronnie and Jayme 
Stewart, who put my dreams above their needs and encouraged me to take a leap.  
 I was lucky to work with such an incredible lab team: Amanda Marin-Chollom, Aliza 
Panjwani, Andres Salazar, and Nell McKenna always made work feel like fun and kept the 
wheels greased and moving. 
 Finally, I would like to thank my family and loved ones – Alan, Sunny, Abby, Dan, Seth, 
Lenny, Lala, Rona, Jerry, and Matt – for years of immense, immeasurable support. Some of you 
were not here when I began. Some of you were not here when I ended. Together, you remind me 
that I am not an island, you give me meaning, and you make the journey worth taking. 
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Kamal1, a soft-spoken but sincere 49-year-old immigrant from Algeria recalls visiting his 
doctor for a routine check-up just before beginning a new job. Excited about the work he was 
starting, he says he felt “perfectly healthy” on that day, just like all the days before it. After the 
doctor noted irregularities in a blood test, he instructed Kamal to go to the hospital. Several days 
later, after a bone-marrow biopsy and much waiting, Kamal was diagnosed with chronic 
myelogenous leukemia (CML), a form of hematological (blood) cancer that causes an abnormal 
proliferation of white blood cells. If left untreated, CML can lead to joint pain, fatigue, 
infections, hemorrhages, and ultimately, death (ACS, 2015). 
Since receiving his diagnosis, Kamal has worked hard to make sense of his illness. In 
many ways, his experience seems to have defied his previously-held expectations of what cancer 
means: he says that he has few, if any, symptoms from the illness and does not have a tumor. 
Furthermore, he notes that he does not require conventional treatments like radiation or 
chemotherapy. Perhaps because little has materially changed in either his habits or his routine, 
Kamal has abundant difficulty thinking about cancer. He speaks haltingly but deliberately when 
describing it: 
Well, cancer is something that stops you. You know, leukemia… You know, I guess I 
haven’t… It’s the same thing, but it doesn’t… I guess I’m more comfortable saying I 
have leukemia than I, I have cancer. I guess. And, yeah, you know, I would say that, 
yeah, I feel better… I feel comfortable more saying more like I have leukemia, even 
though I am saying the same thing. 
 
																																								 																					
1 Name changed to preserve anonymity. 
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As Kamal struggles to make sense of “cancer,” he not only has difficulty using the word itself, 
but additionally defining all that cancer seems to represent for him. It is unclear why he finds 
great difference between the terms “leukemia” and “cancer,” even though both describe his 
illness, and to his rational mind, both are “saying the same thing.” Yet, there is reason to believe 
that for Kamal “leukemia” and “cancer” do not mean the same thing, as indicated by his 
preference of one word over the other. This collection of unfiltered ideas and feelings about the 
disease seems to reside in a place beyond language, a place where words fail him, but where 
things are known nonetheless. 
 In Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag attempts to fathom the possible meanings that may 
be attached to the word cancer in an effort to demystify the illness and sap it of its power. 
Through metaphor, she conceives of cancer as a riddle, a punisher, a warrior, betrayer, or a 
drama acted on the stage (Sontag, 1978). Though the images she evokes are indeed powerful and 
poignant, they may do little to achieve her ultimate goal; to some like Kamal, the word cancer 
still seems to evoke mystery and power. To Suleika Jaouad, a 26-year-old blogger for The New 
York Times who was diagnosed with leukemia at 22, metaphor has come to provide little solace. 
In her column, “Life, Interrupted,” she writes, “I am realizing that ‘beating’ cancer isn’t about 
winning or losing. I wish it were, but it just isn’t. I’ve decided that the real battle I need to fight 
is against this win-lose mentality” (Jaouad, 2012). Constrained by commonly-expressed 
metaphors of war that permeate society, Jaouad has found that they do not sufficiently or 
adequately describe her own feelings about her illness. Nonetheless, she finds herself engaged in 
a different kind of fight with regard to cancer. 
 At issue in these examples are the ways in which individuals make sense of their 
illnesses, a process that seems to become particularly complicated when illnesses do not match 
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individuals preconceived notions or commonly-held beliefs. Kamal does not feel right calling his 
leukemia by the name of cancer, Sontag struggles to find the right way to explain cancer in 
words, and Jaouad does not personally connect to a widely-held metaphor about cancer. Yet, in 
spite of these individual difficulties, each of them has attempted to represent and understand 
cancer in their own ways. 
 Sontag recounts psychiatrist Karl Menninger’s advice to doctors to abandon “names” and 
“labels” when describing cancer (Sontag, 1978); however, research suggests that names and 
labels are instrumental in helping patients cope with cancer. Leventhal et al. (2012) explain that 
individuals generally create cognitive representations of their illness that influence their ability to 
regulate emotions and cope. This process is aided by the presence of palpable symptoms 
(Leventhal et al., 2012; Petrie & Weinman, 2006). For people with vague or diffuse symptoms, 
such as those who have systemic cancers that lack solid masses or tumors (e.g. leukemia, as is 
the case for both Kamal and Jaouad), the process of adjustment may be more difficult than for 
those with clearly-defined symptoms. As a result, the ways in which they attempt to speak and 
write about their illnesses may strike some as ironic or irrational. There are others, however, who 
argue for a logical explanation for these seeming inconsistencies. 
Dual-systems theory may explain the discrepancy between facts and feelings by 
contending that two different modes of cognitive processing are in conflict (Epstein, 1990; Evans 
& Over, 1996). The first mode is characterized as affective, effortless, and nonconscious, called 
implicit, experiential or System 1 thinking; the second is characterized as analytic, effortful, and 
conscious, called explicit, rational or System 2 thinking (Epstein, 1994; Frankish & Evans, 2009; 
Stanovich, 1999). The extent to which individuals use either System 1 or System 2 thinking 
affects the beliefs they hold and the decisions they make, either in accordance with or in spite of 
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rational comprehension. This explanation seems to account for Kamal’s denial of his own 
“cancer” even has he accepts “leukemia,” and Jaouad’s refusal to engage in a war against cancer, 
even as she fights a battle. 
Increases in cognitive load cause individuals to use less System 2 thinking and rely more 
heavily on System 1 processes (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Therefore, individuals with cancer, 
who experience high levels of cognitive distress, may have greater difficulty coping with and 
adjusting to illness than others with less distress (Peters, Diefenbach, Hess, & Västfjäll, 2008). In 
particular, individuals who have been diagnosed with hematological malignancies (HM) like 
leukemia or lymphoma might rely even more on System 1 processing than those with other types 
of cancer because HM often presents with symptoms lacking in specificity or consistency 
(McCoyd & Gruener, 2011). This may be one reason why individuals diagnosed with HM 
showed significantly less posttraumatic growth than those with either breast or prostate cancers 
(Morris & Shakespeare-Finch, 2011). 
Current models of adaptation to illness often emphasize the role of System 2 thinking. In 
Leventhal’s common sense model (CSM; Leventhal et al., 2012), individuals are thought of as 
“self-regulating systems” that use both active problem-solving strategies and emotional 
regulation strategies to cope with the stressors caused by the illness and to minimize emotional 
distress. During a crucial step in the process, individuals develop cognitive or “common-sense” 
representations of their illness that are related to psychosocial adjustment and medical outcomes, 
including recovery time and future disability (Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 1985: Petrie & 
Weinman, 2006). 
Leventhal’s early fear studies (e.g. Leventhal, 1970) illustrated how these constantly 
shifting representations, particularly when paired with action plans, can lead to changes in 
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behavior. Perhaps because the model is merely a template that may be applied to a wide range of 
illnesses, Leventhal et al. (2012) do not precisely explain how one comes to understand a 
particular illness, other than to say that the process is dynamic and follows various heuristics. 
Within the CSM, the formation of illness representations is largely based upon System 2 
thinking. Yet those with illness have complicated and elaborate implicit understandings of their 
symptoms that have been far less studied but which influence how people perceive of and cope 
with illness (Epstein, 1994). Therefore, work needs to be done to conceptualize how System 1 
thinking is involved in the formation of illness representations in cancer populations and to 
consider the extent to which System 1 thinking relates to subsequent health actions, coping and 
adjustment. 
The current study considers the ways individuals with cancer think about their illness, 
including the extent to which the form of cancer (e.g. no tumor/mass or tumor) and thinking style 
(System 1/System 2) are related, independently and together, to the development of particular 
illness representations. First it compares cancer patients who have visible masses or tumors to 
those who do not on the extent to which they use System 1 and System 2 thinking. Then, it 
examines the associations among form of cancer, thinking style, and illness representations to 





Review of the Literature 
Health Behavior Models 
Cognitive representations of illness. Individuals create cognitive illness representations 
in order to make sense of their illnesses and to gain meaning. These representations come from 
various sources of information, including previous experiences, cultural knowledge, their social 
environment, and their current experience with the illness (Leventhal et al., 2012). Multiple 
studies, using both qualitative and quantitative methods, derived five dimensions of cognitive 
representations from Leventhal’s early models (e.g. Bishop, 1991; Bishop & Converse, 1986; 
Lau, Bernard, & Hartmann, 1989; Meyer et al., 1985): identity, cause, timeline, consequences, 
and controllability. Here, identity refers to symptoms of an illness, cause represents the factors 
that are responsible for bringing about the illness, timeline suggests factors such as onset and 
duration of an illness, consequences have to do with an individual’s beliefs about the impact of 
the illness on lifestyle or function, and controllability refers to beliefs about treatment efficacy 
and coping behaviors. A meta-analysis of research focused on illness representations has found 
them to be a meaningful predictor of multiple coping strategies, and also related to psychological 
well-being, social functioning, and vitality, among other outcomes (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). 
Early theories of health behavior. Illness representations were not always central to the 
prevailing theories of health behavior; early models of health behavior did little to recognize the 
importance of cognitive representations of illness. Instead, they advocated a “medical model” 
that “reinforced a rather mechanistic view of the body as a complicated machine that can be 
repaired” (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996, p. 13). This schema placed the disease at the center of 
the model, with patients subordinated, serving merely as victims of illness and recipients of 
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medical treatment. The medical system was one in which blind compliance was expected and 
failures to comply were presumed to be the fault of the patient. To Diefenbach and Leventhal 
(1996), these aspects of the medical model hint at its chief shortcoming: its ignorance of patients’ 
psychological processes in the evaluation and understanding of their own illness.  
 One of the first systematic approaches to explain individual differences in health 
behaviors (Becker, 1974; Rosenstock, 1974), the Health Belief Model (HBM) placed greater 
emphasis on the individual than on the disease. The original HBM suggested that health 
behaviors result from four cognitive factors: perceived susceptibility or risk of getting the illness, 
perceived severity of illness, perceived barriers to adopting the behavior, and perceived benefits 
from the behavior. This risk/reward model, which suggests an internal accounting of probability 
in decision-making, took into account the mind of the patient. Though the HBM has found great 
empirical support (Janz & Becker, 1984), it is not without criticism (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 
1996). Detractors question the large number of variables at play in the model, how uniformly the 
factors are operationalized in various studies, the lack of social variables, and the difficulty 
placing moderator variables, among other shortcomings (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996). 
 The Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), an outgrowth of the Theory of Reasoned 
Action (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), attempted to locate individuals within the social context. It 
theorized that an individual’s intentions and behaviors are the product of attitude, social norms, 
and perceived control and that personality and demographic variables are less meaningful factors 
in decision making than societal beliefs and intentions. Though some studies have found strong 
support for the model in health settings (e.g. Miller, Wikoff & Hiatt, 1992), others suggest that 
intention is only a moderately useful predictor, noting that attitude plays a greater role than social 
norms do in determining intention. Nonetheless, they worry about the laborious process of 
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categorizing actions as subjective and normative, and the model’s failure to conceptualize health 
variables (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996). 
 Each of the previous health behavior models placed greater and greater emphasis on the 
patient’s cognitive processes, and resultantly, each moved closer to understanding how 
individuals cope and adapt to illness. It was not until Leventhal developed the first “parallel 
process model,” which evolved into the Common Sense Model (CSM; Leventhal, 1970) that 
cognitive representations of illness became central to health behavior theory. 
Representations in the parallel process model. Leventhal (1970) first began to consider 
the parts of an alternate health behavior framework when he was studying fear. Testing the Fear-
Drive model (Dollard & Miller, 1950) in real-world situations, subjects were shown messages 
and photos describing and depicting particular health threats low in fear (e.g. black and white 
photos, scientific language) and high in fear (e.g. graphic color photos of blackened lungs, 
personal language) conditions. Leventhal, Singer, and Jones (1965) hypothesized that when 
participants were shown high as opposed to low fear messages, they would be more likely to 
change their attitudes and enact action plans for avoiding health threats. Findings did not support 
the initial hypothesis of an interaction effect (for the Fear-Drive model), but showed that, 
regardless of condition (high or low), subjects altered their attitudes in response to fear messages, 
although the effects only lasted one or two days. Furthermore, both high and low threat groups 
enacted action plans to reduce exposure to health threats, even days and weeks after exposure to 
the threat message. These findings contrasted those subjects who had not been exposed to threats 
and did not change their behavior. 
These early studies led Leventhal (1970) to develop the first “parallel process model,” 
that argues health threats generate both an emotional state of fear as well as a cognitive 
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representation of that threat along two separate pathways; each of these, in turn, spur the need for 
procedures to manage the emotions/threats. Finally, these procedures lead to parallel actions that 
are recursively assessed for their effectiveness at reducing negative emotions caused by health 
threats (called fear control) or reducing the threats themselves (called danger control). The 
model makes it clear that individuals need both a fear response as well as an action plan in order 
to make behavioral change (Leventhal et al., 2012); neither alone is sufficient. Evidence from 
previous studies about fear interpretation (Johnson, 1975; Johnson & Leventhal, 1974) reinforces 
the idea that health threats are represented both semantically as cognitive understanding and 
perceptually and emotionally in lived experience. 
The earliest parallel process model took into account both semantic and perceptual 
representations of illness. Leventhal (1970) closely examined conflicting responses to fear, but 
found conflicting results in efforts to understand how fear affects attitudes and behaviors 
(Leventhal et al., 2012). Millar and Millar (1996) and Diefenbach, Miller, and Daly (1999) both 
found that fear encourages disease-prevention behaviors; however, Millar and Millar also found 
that fear inhibits those behaviors designed to detect disease threats. Leventhal et al. (2012) 
ultimately reconciled these differences with the acknowledgement that fear has differing effects 
depending on its relationship to either the perceptual/cognitive pathway of the model or the 
procedural/performance pathway. This acknowledgement recognizes and accepts the critical 
importance of two types of representations in the model.  
The shared role of both cognitions and experiences applies to outcomes like health 
behaviors as well. Leventhal, Brissette and Leventhal (2003) wondered, “If fear per se is not the 
source of motivation for health-promoting action, what aspect or specific content of the message 
is responsible for activating plans of action?” (p. 46). This question could potentially be 
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answered by considering either unconscious or conscious processes, automatic reactions or 
effortful contemplations, experiences or cognitions. Leventhal et al.’s initial deductions treated 
both types of perception equally when they concluded that the motivational effects for illness 
representations (as well as for fear) came from both the individual’s experiences and the way in 
which those experiences were understood and interpreted (Leventhal et al., 2003). 
Lived experiences in particular can play a unique and vital role in the parallel process 
model. Leventhal and his colleagues (2012) recognized another critical link between procedural 
processes and health behaviors: “experience (symptoms and functional changes) are often the 
main drivers of behavior. For example, concrete, symptomatic experiences are consistent and 
powerful predictors of utilization of health care” (p. 8).  
An emphasis on thinking in the Common Sense Model. As the parallel process model 
evolved into the Common Sense Model (CSM), the role of cognitive representations of illness 
was emphasized and the parallel pathways from the earlier model were subordinated and recast 
as necessary sources of information that led to the formation of illness representations. Leventhal 
et al. (2012) describe the center of the CSM as a “core control unit,” (p. 5) that operates as a 
feedback loop, facilitating self-regulation processes in response to health threats. This unit is 
made up of at least three factors: a representation of the health problem; procedures and action 
plans for controlling health threats; and appraisals of coping efforts. In the CSM, individuals 
generate mental representations of their illness by incorporating information from cognitive and 
procedural information sources that are shaped by social and cultural contexts. They then 
interpret this information as they make decisions that help them cope with or adapt to their 
illness. The entire process becomes recursive when awareness of representations, interpretations, 
and decisions are reassessed through cognitive appraisals, dynamically altering the model and 
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allowing the process to begin anew. A diagram of the early parallel processing model, which 
eloquently illustrates the core structure, could be applied to many different diseases and contexts 
(Figure 1); by contrast, the current model of the CSM serves as a dynamic framework rather than 
a static structure, so unique diagrams often represent the CSM in various disease contexts.  
Superficially at least, the CSM seems to take into account both types of information in 
the formation of illness representations, just as in the parallel processing model. Leventhal et al. 
(2012) seem to give equal weight to the dimensions when they elaborate: 
Representations have structure; they are both abstract and concrete. For example, such 
words as cancer and heart attack are labels for the abstract concepts that enrich the 
meaning of these diseases, and the symptoms and functional changes are their concrete, 
experienced features. Thus, the identity of a heart attack, cancer or migraine headache 
involves an integration of abstract and experienced symptoms… (p. 8). 
However, in contrast to the parallel processing model, the CSM accounts for experiences only by 
way of cognitive processes. In the formation of illness representations, experience elicits emotion 
through a “bottom-up influence,” where interpreted feelings activate beliefs. Cognitive 
information influences feelings by exerting a “top-down influence,” in effect, redefining 
symptoms. Left out of this analysis are the direct influence that experiences might have on 
emotions such as fear and the influence of fear on representations that remain uninterpreted by 
the individual. In the CSM, unconscious, unprocessed, uninterpreted feelings are overlooked in 
favor of those experiences that have been brought to light through conscious understanding and 
interpretation. This CSM’s emphasis on conscious processes does not negate its utility; it merely 
suggests that potentially important factors have been omitted. There is no mention of what may 
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become of unprocessed assessments of fear, or how that may influence adaptation and behavioral 
change. 
The CSM seems to suggest that these experiential sources of information can only exert 
influence upon decision-making when coupled with cognitive, rational understanding. Leventhal 
and colleagues (2012) define this as the “symmetry rule”: the presence of symptoms causes 
individuals to search for labels for them; conversely, labels cause individuals to search for 
symptoms. Work has been done to categorize the links between understanding and experiences 
within illness dimensions (Leventhal et al., 2012), an effort that overlooks the moments when 
those processes are not consciously linked. The symmetry rule does not allow for those 
experiential processes that are not consciously evoked, considered, and processed. There may be 
experiential thoughts or feelings that do not directly (consciously) connect to labels, but that still 
may influence the development of illness representations. 
The CSM’s emphasis on cognitively-processed knowledge overemphasizes evaluation of 
symptoms rather than emotions as the driving forces that motivate action plans and coping 
strategies. For example, Leventhal et al. (2012) explain how the sudden onset of chest pain and 
breathlessness are likely to be experienced as possible symptoms of a heart attack or how a lump 
in the breast may evoke representations of breast cancer. Yet, there is little room for the ways in 
which unconscious thoughts or emotions might factor into these representations in the current 
CSM, and in turn, how they might directly affect outcomes. There is almost no discussion of 
how fear, fantasy, or anxiety might motivate behavior, unless they stem from or are attached to 
symptoms. 
Despite early versions of the CSM that recognize the importance of unconscious 
processes and experiences (Leventhal et al., 2003), the latest model places greater emphasis on 
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conscious process. As currently conceived, appraisal is an a priori first step in the CSM 
(Leventhal et al., 2012). Thus, the role of experience, which might also influence the same 
behaviors, is transformed into that which is quantifiable. Within the CSM framework, 
experiences are thought of as “symptoms” and “functional changes,” because they are generally 
explored after they have been interpreted. While perceptions continue to be acknowledged as 
essential and important, they factor into the CSM only once they have become representations of 
illness and may not be fully accounted for by the model.  
Empirical studies of the CSM. Researchers have found the CSM a useful framework 
through which to better understand illness and to design behavioral interventions (de Ridder, 
Theunissen & van Dulmen, 2007; Donovan et al., 2007; Dracup et al., 2009; Phillips, Leventhal 
& Leventhal, 2011; Ward et al., 2009). Hagger and Orbell (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 
45 studies from 1977-2002 using the CSM to consider how individuals cope with a variety of 
illnesses (e.g. Alzheimers, asthma, cancer, HIV/AIDs, rheumatoid arthritis, myocardial 
infarction). The vast majority of studies in the meta-analysis relied on a several established 
quantitative measures including the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman, Petrie, 
Moss-Morris & Horne, 1996), the Revised Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R; Moss-
Morris et al. 2002), and the Injury Management Inquiry (IMIQ; Turk et al. 1986). 
The meta-analysis supported the idea that the IPQ, IPQ-R, and IMIQ tap dimensions of 
illness representations. Empirical relationships were found between illness representations, 
coping strategies, and health outcomes (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). For example, the consequences, 
identity, and timeline dimensions were positively inter-correlated, and higher scores on these 
dimensions were generally associated with worse psychological adjustment and well-being. In 
contrast, the control and illness coherence dimensions were found to be negatively associated 
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with consequences, identity and timeline, and positively associated with better psychological 
adjustment and well-being (Hagger & Orbell, 2003).  
Efforts to improve the IPQ led to the creation of the IPQ-R, which reconceives several of 
the cognitive dimensions and adds an “emotional representations” dimension (Moss-Morris et 
al., 2002). This change is a strong acknowledgement of the limitations of the original IPQ. Yet 
even this change only begins to approach underlying beliefs, either conscious or unconscious. As 
a result, the IPQ, IPQ-R, and IMIQ do not examine “cognitive associations made between 
symptoms and the illness which would be necessary to assess identity beliefs” (Hagger & Orbell, 
2003, p. 172). Because experiential processes are more likely to underlie these cognitive 
associations, they remain largely unaccounted for by current measurement instruments. 
The lack of incorporation of experiences or implicit processes does not undermine the 
validity of the CSM; perhaps these processes, largely missing from traditional measures of the 
CSM, play a larger role in understanding the links between illness and coping. Findings by 
Hagger and Orbell (2003) suggest this may be the case. Their meta-analysis concluded that the 
illness controllability dimension was significantly correlated with both generic and specific 
problem-focused coping, cognitive reappraisal, and seeking social support, as predicted; 
however, they did not find the same (inverse) correlations with avoidance/denial, expressing 
emotions, and doctor’s visits (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). A greater understanding of the role of 
these processes in influencing various coping styles may help account for the disparity. 
Dual-Process Models  
Much of what has been overlooked by the CSM in terms of experiences can be better 
explained by locating the CSM within the realm of dual-process theories in cognitive 
psychology. Frankish and Evans (2009) describe dual-process theories of mind as those that 
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theorize two distinct mechanisms for a given task – for example, deductive reasoning or decision 
making – “which employ different procedures and may yield different, and sometimes 
conflicting, results” (p. 1). Typically, “one of the processes is characterized as fast, effortless, 
automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and undemanding of working 
memory,” while the other is often described as “slow, effortful, controlled, conscious, flexible, 
decontextualized, and demanding of working memory” (Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 1). There 
are many dual-process theories with overlapping ideas (Bucci, 1985; Chaiken, 1980; Epstein, 
1973; Evans & Over, 1996; Goel, 1995; Jung 1964/1968; Leventhal, 1984; Paivio, 1990; Shafir 
& LeBouf, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). As more researchers have 
subscribed to dual-process theories, some have attempted to amalgamate the individual models 
into a unified theory of mind, grouping the processing structures as those with fast-process 
characteristics and slow-process characteristics (Stanovich & West, 2000) and labeling them type 
1 and type 2 processes, and more recently, System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich, 1999). 
In many ways, Leventhal’s earliest parallel process model fits within a dual-process 
framework, where the two pathways, termed “emotional” and “cognitive” and represented either 
experientially or rationally, suggest what are called “System 1” and “System 2” processes 
(Stanovich, 1999). If dual-process theorists are to be believed, something critical has been left 
out of the parallel process model and all subsequent theories built on its foundation. Leventhal et 
al. (2003) seem aware of limitations in reflection, noting that “symptoms represented only one 
type of perceptual information…and the label represented only a small portion of its semantic 




Freud and dual-systems theory. “In which of these systems, then, are we to locate the 
impetus to the construction of dreams? For simplicity’s sake, in the [unconscious]. It is 
true that in the course of future discussion we shall learn that this is not entirely accurate, 
and that the process of forming dreams is obliged to attach itself to dream-thoughts 
belonging to the preconscious system” (Freud, 1900, p. 541). 
For Freud, at the beginning of the 20th century, dreams provided a medium through which to 
contemplate his most current theories of the mind. He conjectured that the origin of dreams could 
be found only in the unconscious, a swirling system of feelings, fantasies, thoughts and drives. 
Nascent dreams were only accessible to the conscious mind via the preconscious, which, rather 
than occupying its own mental space, acted as a kind of liminal border between the partitions. 
Not only did these two spheres hold different contents, they were governed by distinct rules and 
functioned in entirely different ways. In particular, Freud described the unconscious as operating 
according to primary process, characterized by wish fulfillment, displacement, condensation, 
symbolic representation, and association, in contrast to secondary process, the more logical, 
rational realm of the conscious mind (Epstein, 1994). 
Freud was compelled by dreams, but this seemed only a proxy for greater understanding 
of the vast range of human behaviors. Dreams provided a glimpse into a world of irrational 
thought and deviant conduct, along with a reaffirmation of the discovery that humans aren’t 
always in control of their own minds (Epstein, 1994). Freud made sense of this reality by 
dividing the mind into two partitions. Consequently, though he might not have considered 
himself as such, Freud could rightfully be considered a dual-process theorist at this stage in his 
career, long before the term gained popularity about 70 years later.  
Freud was by no means the first dual-process theorist, nor did he invent the idea of the 
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compartmentalized mind. Frankish and Evans (2009) cite the influences of Plato’s divisions of 
the soul, as well as Descartes, Aristotle, and Aquinas’s contention that particular processes 
(which today may be grouped under System 2) separate humans from other animals. Sloman 
(1996) cites Henry James, who theorized two distinct forms of reasoning: associative thought 
and true reasoning. Even Freud’s theory of the dynamic unconscious drew overwhelmingly on 
the work of Pierre Janet, Josef Breuer, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Frankish & Evans, 2009). 
Characterizing Freud’s dual-process theory within a System 1/System 2 framework 
illustrates the utility and limits of both the approach and of Freud’s own work. Though some 
aspects of the unconscious and conscious fit crudely into categories (System 1 roughly 
approximates the unconscious and System 2 corresponds to the conscious), there are other ways 
in which Freud’s theory cannot be simply categorized. For example, Freud does not conceive of 
the unconscious as a reasoning system, in direct contrast to modern dual-systems theorists. 
Furthermore, repression seems to have no place in dual-process theories (Frankish & Evans 
2009). Likewise, there are similarities and inconsistencies between the dual-process approach 
and Freud’s later conception of the mind as made up of the id, ego, and superego, as well (Freud, 
1923). Within this schema, the id and ego roughly correspond to System 1 and System 2 
respectively, but Frankish and Evans (2009) point out that there is no direct analogue for the 
superego, adding that moral codes may be learned by both systems. 
Modern dual-systems theories. Work by Arthur S. Reber (1967) built off of Freud’s 
understanding of the unconscious and Jung’s dual modes of interpreting information (1964/1968, 
as cited in Epstein, 1996). Reber conducted some of the earliest modern studies that support 
dual-process theory. In experiments on grammar and probability learning, he found that subjects 
implicitly absorbed unspoken rules, even thought they could not explicitly state them. In one 
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study, subjects were asked to learn strings of letters that, unbeknownst to them, followed finite-
state grammar rules which could be charted and sequenced according to schematic paths. 
Subjects were then presented with new sequences of letters and were asked to describe the 
strings as either grammatical or ungrammatical. Much more often than random chance, they 
were able to correctly categorize the strings, even without knowing the rules explicitly. 
By way of explanation, Reber developed of the concept of implicit learning, which he 
viewed as an unconscious process that yields abstract knowledge and stood in opposition to 
conscious learning. Furthermore, he imagined the practice of obtaining implicit knowledge as 
“the induction of an abstract representation of the structure that the stimulus environment 
displays” that is “acquired in the absence of conscious, reflective strategies to learn” (Reber, 
1989, p. 219).  
Reber used an evolutionary perspective to further subdivide what he termed the 
“cognitive unconscious” into primitive and sophisticated subgroups. The primitive unconscious 
develops first. Grammar rules, like those that he studied, are functions of the primitive 
unconscious and occur without interpretation or affect, though they influence behavior and are 
necessary for survival. In contrast, the sophisticated unconscious depends “on a rich, abstract 
knowledge base that asserts itself in a causal manner to control perception, affective choice, and 
decision making independently of the conscious” (Reber, 1989, p. 231). Reber experimentally 
showed how information of all types could be acquired outside of consciousness, and that this 
information was richer and more sophisticated than that which could be described. Unconscious 
cognition was primary and dominant when compared to conscious cognition. Reber further 
attempted to legitimize intuition, arguing that it was a “perfectly normal” process that was 
derived from implicit learning experiences (Reber, 1989, p. 232). 
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The extent to which implicit learning is thought of as wholly unconscious remains 
controversial, and there is debate as to whether or not dual-process theories in general should be 
rejected outright (Newstead, 2000; Oberaurer, 2000; Osman, 2004). However, 
neuropsychological evidence supports multiple memory and learning systems in the brain 
(Frankish & Evans, 2009) as well as other evidence of implicit learning in various experimental 
settings (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1993). 
Epstein (1994) developed a dual-process theory that integrated both psychodynamic and 
cognitive theories of the unconscious. The inspiration and starting point for his work was the 
evolutionary limit of Freud’s primary-process system, which Epstein argued failed to foster 
adaptive behavior in real world situations. He valued the idea of the cognitive unconscious, but 
found its conception “bland” (Epstein, 1994, p. 710) and lacking the fire and emotion of Freud’s 
dynamic unconscious. As a result, he theorized a new model, cognitive-experiential self-theory 
(CEST; Epstein, 1973, 1994). CEST is comprised of two modes through which individuals 
comprehend their world, the experiential and the rational. The experiential system “encodes 
reality in concrete images, metaphors, and narratives,” and may be thought of as “holistic,” 
“affective,” “rapid processing,” “slower to change,” “experienced passively and preconsciously,” 
and “self-evidently valid.” By contrast, the rational system, which “encodes reality in abstract 
symbols, words, and numbers,” is “analytic,” “logical,” “slower processing,” quicker to change, 
“experienced actively and consciously,” and requires “justification via logic and evidence” 
(Epstein, 1994, p. 711).  
Epstein compared divergences in the two systems to the choice a young woman might 
face when she is must decide between two admirers, one who provides more pleasure and the 
other who is more faithful, a conflict often described in the literature as occurring between “the 
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heart and the head” (Epstein, 1994, p. 709). Epstein found evidence of conflict between the 
experiential and rational systems in the world around him: in irrational fears, superstitious 
thinking, the omnipresence of religion, and the power of stories and pictures. He also conducted 
several experiments where subjects seemed to defy their own rational understanding of their 
situation when making choices. In one study, which he later named the ratio-bias phenomenon, 
he presented subjects with two bowls of jellybeans, one containing 1 in 10 red jelly beans and the 
other containing 10 in 100 red jelly beans. Subjects attempted to win money by blindly drawing 
the red jellybean from one of the two bowls. Each time they wanted to choose which bowl from 
which to pick the jellybean, they had to pay a dime; otherwise, they were randomly assigned a 
bowl. A considerable portion (no percentage given) paid dimes to draw from the large bowl, 
even as several commented that they knew what they were doing defied their own understanding 
of probability (Epstein, 1992). 
Looking for a way to directly measure the relative contributions of System 1 and System 
2 processes, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) developed a self-report measure, the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), that assessed individual differences in types of thinking. 
Early studies indicated that the two dimensions they were studying, experiential and rational 
thinking, were uncorrelated; that is, they did not occur at opposite ends of a single dimension. 
Because each of the systems was found to be unipolar, the measures were divided into 
independent analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential dimensions (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Epstein et al. (1996) found that a rational thinking style is associated with greater academic 
achievement, self-esteem, openness, and favorable views about the self and world, and inversely 
related to anxiety and depression; the experiential thinking style was shown to be associated with 
spontaneity, and emotional expressiveness, but also naïve optimism and superstitious beliefs. 
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Though other attempts to locate Freud’s repression within a dual-process model have met 
with skepticism, Epstein nonetheless theorizes its place in CEST. He considers Freud’s concept 
of repression, in which inaccessible material strives for expression against the expenditure of 
psychic energy, to be maladaptive. Instead, he argues that individuals fundamentally try to 
assimilate representations of emotionally significant experiences into a coherent whole, and that 
something like repression occurs when this unification cannot occur. In his model, unintegrated 
material repeatedly emerges until it can (if ever) be assimilated (Epstein, 1994). 
Critics argue that Epstein tries to hard to maintain a connection to psychoanalysis, when 
his theories are better suited within a cognitive psychological framework (Tversky & Fox, 1995). 
His work attempts to theorize the implications of dual systems across realms of social, 
developmental, and clinical psychology. By placing greater emphasis on the often-overlooked or 
undervalued experiential systems, he found evidence of mental health contributing to physical 
health (Epstein 1987, 1990; Epstein & Katz, 1992; Epstein & Meier, 1989) and gave explanation 
to practices that are often met with societal skepticism, like faith healing, shamanism, and 
placebo effects (Epstein, 1994). He argued that greater understanding of the dual systems might 
even, one day, influence the course of diseases such as cancer (Epstein, 1989). 
Stanovich and West’s (2000) approach to dual-systems theory also stretches across 
social, developmental and clinical realms, but uses decision-making as a lens through which to 
explain differences in ways of thinking when applied to human reasoning. For example, they 
administered multiple selection tasks in versions that were abstract (relating to numbers and 
colors) and deontic (relating to real-world, moral obligations), theorizing that first, abstract 
reasoning is reliant on System 2 processes and deontic understanding draws from System 1 
processes, and second, that System 2 (and not System 1) differences account for individual 
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differences in general intelligence (Frankish & Evans, 2009). In support of this argument, 
Stanovich (1999) found that those who did better on abstract reasoning tasks consistently had 
higher SAT scores, whereas the relationship disappeared for those who did well on the deontic 
version of the task. 
A number of theorists have maintained that individual differences, experimenter flaws, 
subject misconstrual of a task, computational limitations, and performance errors could account 
for these differences (e.g. Cohen, 1981; Stein, 1996); however, Stanovich and West (2000) 
debunk each of these arguments. They suggest that patterns of covariance can illuminate when 
the wrong norm is being applied or when subjects misunderstand tasks. Furthermore, they 
suggest performance errors are minor influences and that computational limitations are not 
absolute, by citing experiments where cognitive ability scores were and were not related to 
various heuristics (Stanovich, 1999). 
Philosophers also have bipartite theories of the mind, and of the concept of belief in 
particular, that suggest a connection with the dual-process mold. Dennet (1981) distinguished 
between belief and opinion, Cohen (1995) drew contrasts between belief and acceptance and 
Frankish (2007) parsed two kinds of belief (nonconscious basic belief and conscious 
superbelief). Commonalities among these theories illustrate that philosophers and psychologists 
are likely tapping into the same dual-process structure. Frankish and Evans (2009) suggest that in 
these theories “there is one type of belief that is implicit, non-linguistic, and common to humans 
and animals, and another…that is explicit, conscious, language-involving, and uniquely 
human…There is a clear, though not perfect, correspondence here with dual-process theories in 
psychology” (pp. 20-21). 
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Applying dual-process models to health behaviors. Dual-process models provide a 
lens through which to look at existing theories of health, illness, and behavior change. The way 
individuals make sense of their own illnesses, form illness representations, and make decisions, 
lie at the center of the process of behavior change (Johnson & Leventhal, 1974; Lazarus, 1966; 
Leventhal et al., 2012).  
There is reason to believe that nonconscious, automatic System 1 processes have been 
left out of many current theories of behavior change. A meta-analysis of 47 divergent behavioral 
interventions found that medium-to-large changes in understanding or behavioral intentions led 
to only small-to-moderate behavioral changes (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). Furthermore, there are 
great disparities among individuals in their health behaviors (Broadbent, 2010). Some studies 
have shown no link between intention and behavior at all, even if intent to change exists 
(Hardeman et al., 2011). Various researchers are beginning to question whether studies using 
student samples (as opposed to clinical or community samples) have exaggerated the change 
effects observed (Farmer, Kinmonth, & Sutton, 2006; Gardner & Hausenblas, 2004; Johnston et 
al., 2004, as cited in Hardeman et al., 2011). These findings suggest that many of the theories 
that are used to understand any change in behavior may be flawed, incomplete, and not 
generalizable to real-world problems.  
A number of social and cognitive psychologists have hypothesized how dual-process 
theories explain health behaviors (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004, as cited in 
Johnson & Steinman, 2009). However, these methods have rarely been translated to clinical 
practice and have not been applied to research on cancer (Epstein, 1994; Ferreira, Garcia-
Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006).Because the CSM is fundamentally a dual-process theory, 
individuals could be tested for the extent to which they use System 1 and System 2 processes in 
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the formation of illness representations. By extension, the processes of creating illness 
representations and making judgments are fundamental to understanding how behaviors change.  
By applying a dual-systems framework to the Common Sense Model, it may be possible to reify 
existing structures and critically examine potential areas of weakness, with the ultimate hope of 
making modifications that will help researchers better understand what influences health 
behaviors. Consequently, these changes will allow for more precise interventions and more 
meaningful outcomes. 
Before considering theories of behavioral change and how they apply to particular 
illnesses like cancer, it is first necessary to think about the ways in which individuals make 
meaning of their illness, and how the process of meaning-making may be understood in terms of 
dual-process theories. 
Meaning Making of Illnesses 
Illness as metaphor. Leventhal et al. (2012) suggest that understanding illness in the 
form of a representation is a crucial first step to behavior change. Representations come in many 
forms, conscious and unconscious, rational and experiential. Metaphor is one means through 
which people can formulate and express illness representations. Bessie (2006, as cited in 
Wallerstein, 2011) acknowledged great debate over the precise definition and function of 
metaphor, humorously writing, “metaphor is an abstraction, one which it is difficult to define 
without resorting to metaphor” (p. 7). By contrast, Kövecses describes metaphor more 
operationally, as “a figure of speech that implies a comparison between two unlike entities, 
though with linking common features” (2002, as cited in Wallerstein, 2011, p. 90). Siegelman 
(1990) notes that metaphor incorporates past, present, and future experiences.  
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Classical psychodynamic theory suggests that metaphor is the heart or currency of 
psychoanalysis, an essential part of the therapeutic process (Modell, 2005, 2009). And 
Wallerstein (2011) seems to acknowledge dual-systems theory when he argues that metaphorical 
language comes from within our bodies. Whichever definition is most appropriate, metaphors are 
generally acknowledged as ubiquitous in language, fundamentally tied to our thought processes, 
and a potentially powerful means of conveying information (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Metaphorical language is also thought of as neither arbitrary nor ornamental, but central to the 
creation of our ideas and fundamental to our thinking processes (Wallerstein, 2011), though 
some debate that conception (e.g. Kövecses, 2002). 
In a transformative work on understanding metaphor, Lackoff and Johnson (1980) 
theorized, “Metaphors have entailments through which they highlight and make coherent certain 
aspects of our experience” (p. 132). In terms of illness, it follows that that metaphor provides 
both a means of communicating about a particular disease as well as a method for coping with it 
(Charmaz 1995; Gibbs & Franks, 2009).  
Though it has not been studied extensively until recently, scientists and researchers have 
explored the role of metaphor as it pertains to various aspects of cancer diagnosis and treatment 
(Domino & Lin, 1993). Work has focused on the ways that collections or groups of metaphors 
reflect particular patterns of thought in those who have the illness, for example metaphors that 
reflect chaos, battle, or splitting. For example, Domino, Affonso, and Hannah (1991) devised the 
Cancer Metaphors test to compare imagery between cancer patients and healthy people. They 
found differences in metaphors on four scales: cancer patients had lower Future Optimism, 
higher Terminal Pessimism, higher Natural Disaster, and higher Foreign Intruder scores than 
healthy controls. Other research explores cancer metaphors in particular populations, for 
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example the role of metaphorical contradiction in female cancer survivors (Arrington, 2003) and 
metaphors of sexuality in men who have survived prostate cancer (Gibbs & Franks, 2009). 
Researchers note that metaphors are not static, but shift and change with the times (Kraemer, 
2001), and that metaphors are not necessarily stable across cultures (Domino & Lin, 1993). 
Further work has explored how doctors use metaphors in cancer treatment, arguing that 
physicians tend to think about the disease in a limited number ways (e.g., the body as machine; 
illness as a battle; Gibbs & Franks, 2009), and considers how the metaphors that are used affect 
treatment decisions and outcomes (Periyakoil, 2008). 
Metaphor’s role in meaning-making is well established and supported, perhaps most 
famously by Sontag in her book, Illness as Metaphor (1978). Sontag argues that metaphors are 
necessary for making sense of illnesses that cannot be easily fathomed or comprehended – even 
as she suggests that the “healthiest” way of tolerating illness is without metaphor. To her, 
metaphors of cancer and tuberculosis fulfill the essential human need to make sense of death, 
“the thing that cannot be controlled” (p. 55). 
Sontag (1978) connects illness to nonconscious processes with the notion that illnesses 
are psychological. Some people believe that they have gotten sick because they unconsciously 
want to, and they also believe they can will themselves back to health. While the specific points 
are subject to debate, Sontag’s awareness of the use of metaphor as linked to unconscious 
processes has not been overlooked by various psychoanalytic thinkers. Britton (1995, as cited in 
Bergner, 2011) recognizes that fantasy-based beliefs about disease etiology likely reside in the 
unconscious. Modell (2009) theorizes metaphor as the connection between unconscious feeling 
states and articulated speech. Metaphor may serve as a linguistic bridge between the mind and 
the body. In this way, the connection to dual-systems theory becomes clear, with metaphors 
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serving as the link between System 1 and System 2 processes. Wallerstein (2011, p. 99) calls 
metaphors a “royal road” to the unconscious, where unfiltered affect, fantasies, and dreams 
reside, a sentiment that is agreed to by others (Aragno, 2009; Barnett & Katz, 2009; Modell, 
2006). Yet, there is reason to travel this road with caution.  
Although it is tempting to believe that metaphors exclusively serve as pathways into the 
unconscious, there are times when individuals are quite conscious of the metaphorical nature of 
their words or thoughts (Gibbs & Franks, 2002). There is no reason to believe that metaphors and 
the unconscious fantasies that they represent remain separate and distinct as they are evoked and 
uttered; in terms of dual-systems theory, the evocation and utterance of metaphors combines both 
System 1 and System 2 processes. Ferriera et al. (2006) note that it is unlikely that any task is 
“process pure”. Freudian theory (1900) suggests that unconscious thoughts are materially 
transformed as they become conscious; conversely, the metaphor itself is also transformed when 
attached to abstractions. Cassirer (1972, as cited in de Rocha Barros & da Rocha Barros, 2011) 
alludes to these dual metamorphoses in his discussion of symbolism, arguing that symbols are 
not merely containers for information that have been evoked from the unconscious; symbols, 
here in the form of metaphors, additionally bears their own dynamic meaning, which may be 
bent or shaped by unconscious thoughts or fantasies. Wallerstein (2011) cautions against overuse 
of metaphor, arguing that doing so belittles the metaphor’s essential function of turning an 
abstraction into something more comprehensible. This, in turn, may lead to greater likelihood of 
reification and possible misunderstanding. Ultimately, metaphor provides an imprecise method 
for tapping into the unconscious. Yet there is much reason to believe that System 1 processes are 
worth exploring in order to better understand how individuals conceive of their illnesses, both 
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nonconsciously and consciously, and how these representations affect coping strategies and 
adjustment. 
Patients’ drawings. Analysis of patients’ drawings is an approach to understanding the 
influence of nonconscious processes on coping and behavioral decisions. Psychoanalytic thinkers 
acknowledge the importance of non-verbal methods of communication (da Rocha Barros & da 
Rocha Barros, 2011). Drawings may provide “a window into the patient’s psychological world” 
with access to unconscious processes (Broadbent, Ellis, Gamble & Petrie, 2006, p. 913). Di 
Gallo (2001) notes that rarely do individuals consciously draw subjects that cause anxiety or 
stress; nonetheless, he cautions against relying solely on drawings while neglecting conscious 
wishes. Drawings allow for idiosyncratic beliefs, which do not fit within the confines of 
multiple-choice questions or on Likert scales, to emerge (Broadbent, Petrie, Ellis, Ying & 
Gamble, 2004). Additionally, open-ended prompts, such as “draw your disease” minimize 
researcher bias (Reynolds, Broadbent, Ellis, Gamble & Petrie, 2007). More generally and most 
fundamentally, drawings may measure perceptions that are not detected by conventional 
questionnaires (Broadbent et al., 2006). 
Patient beliefs about illness may be greater predictors of disability than other, more 
explicit measures of disease activity; yet, some perceptions may be closely tied into 
nonconscious, automatic processes, which are not even apparent to the patients themselves 
(Broadbent et al., 2004). In one study, patients who had experienced a myocardial infarction 
(MI) were asked to draw their hearts, and researchers attempted to connect elements of the 
drawings to psychological and functional measures; the amount of damage drawn on the heart 
predicted the extent of recovery and the speed of return to work (Broadbent et. al., 2004). 
Another study found that drawings of damage on the heart were associated with depression, 
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negative perceptions of the illness, and poor physical function (Reynolds et al., 2007). A 
longitudinal study found that increasing size in heart drawings predicted increased anxiety and 
complaints of ill health (Broadbent et al., 2006). 
These findings are noteworthy because study participants were not asked to draw damage 
or adhere to particular size guidelines. This could indicate that these elements are outside of the 
patients’ conscious awareness and are closely linked to System 1 processes. Furthermore, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to know whether images or underlying beliefs come first when 
patients create drawings (Harrow et al., 2008). In either case, both System 1 and System 2 
processes coexist and are difficult to separate; as such, it is unclear whether nonconscious and 
conscious thoughts dictate what is drawn or whether the drawing itself transforms thought 
processes. 
Researchers have studied the drawings of various patient populations (e.g. those with 
heart disease, asthma, or chronic pain; Reynolds et al., 2006), but Broadbent et al. (2004) suggest 
that the technique may work better with patients where the affected body part can be easily 
visualized. This logic seems biased toward System 2 thinking, where drawing is conceived of as 
a process for slowly and deliberately concretizing and organizing pre-existing thoughts. 
Conversely, drawing may also give voice to unspoken, nonconscious thoughts, which may or 
may not be formally recognized by the artist at the time of drawing (Harrow et al., 2008), a 
process that is more closely connected to System 1 thinking. Furthermore, those who have 
illnesses that cannot be visualized as easily, because they lack clear, defined symptoms or lack 
tangible evidence of disease, might rely more on System 1 thinking when they create drawings.  
Applying the theories to cancer populations 
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Cancer and the CSM. The CSM has only recently been applied to cancer. Hagger and 
Orbell’s (2003) meta-analysis of the literature on the CSM from 1977-2002 only included one 
study of individuals with cancer (Rees, Fry, & Cull, 2001, as cited in Hagger and Orbell, 2003). 
Browning, Wewers, Ferketich, Otterson and Reynolds (2009) applied the CSM to lung cancer, 
when they utilized the model to help explain the behaviors of recently-diagnosed individuals 
who continued to smoke even after their diagnosis. Focusing on dimensions of illness 
representation, they found that illness identity changed over time; however, they noted that the 
measure (the IPQ-R) did not account for the emotional stress that occurred as those with lung 
cancer attempted to stop smoking. A review by Sivell, Edwards, Elwyn and Manstead (2010) 
drew similar conclusions about the failure of current measures and approaches to capture 
emotions. Examining 26 articles on breast cancer and mapping the inherent constructs onto the 
CSM, they found that cognitive representations of illness and consequences of breast cancer 
partly predicted intention to seek help for breast cancer symptoms. Yet, only 22% of the variance 
was attributable to the CSM. Sivell et al. concluded that a better understanding of the emotional 
component of decision-making might have helped to account for a higher proportion of the 
variance in help-seeking intentions. 
 Cameron and Jago (2008) attempted to account for this shortcoming when they proposed 
an “expanded” CSM that considers emotion regulation strategies. They tested the expanded 
model on women with breast cancer in two separate interventions, a self-regulation writing 
intervention and a 12-week course that focused on emotional regulation training. Those women 
who participated in the writing intervention had better mood states and adjustment in the month 
following the treatment than those who did not write. Similarly, participants in the 12-week 
course reported less anxiety, cancer worry, and greater emotional well-being than controls during 
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treatment, and greater perceived control and reductions in emotional suppression over the 
following year (Cameron & Jago, 2008). Other studies assessing the CSM and emotion 
regulation have reported similar findings (Cameron, Petrie, Ellis, Buick & Weinman, 2005; 
Humphris & Ozakinci, 2008).  
All of these studies suggest that more research is necessary to study the connection 
between cognitive representations and emotion regulation strategies, but fail to question the full 
extent to which affective, experiential processes play a role in regulation or to consider how the 
strength of emotions connects to an increasing reliance on System 2 processes. Researchers’ 
difficulties in placing emotions in the CSM might be the result of using a model that overlooks 
the entirety of System 1 processes.  
Dual-process models, cancer, and the CSM. Dual-process models rarely have been 
considered in conjunction with the CSM, let alone within the context of cancer populations. A 
study on decision-making by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) demonstrated that individuals were 
more likely to make decisions by affect when they had diminished capacity for deliberation. This 
finding might reasonably suggest that individuals rely more heavily on System 1 processes when 
their System 2 processes become overtaxed. In a review that linked cancer, aging, and decision-
making, Peters et al. (2008) sought out a dual-process explanation to account for age differences 
in decision-making ability and then theorized how these differences might apply to a cancer 
population. Peters et al. (2008) specifically linked a diminished capacity for deliberation to those 
who were recently diagnosed with cancer. The distress of the diagnosis and the need for quick 
decision-making are two factors that may particularly overwhelm the system; thus, cancer 
patients are predicted to rely more on affect than nonpatients when making decisions. 
Younger adults with cancer in particular face unique distressors. This might be in part 
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because, for them, the illness is an “off-time” event in their life cycles, interfering with life goals 
and self-representations. Cancer may interrupt the normative developmental trajectory, 
disrupting goals of marriage, parenting, and employment (Revenson, Rubin, Pervil, Marín-
Chollom, & Roberts, 2013; Stanton, Revenson, & Tennen, 2007). Consequently, there is 
evidence to suggest that they experience greater psychological and affective distress and lower 
quality of life than older cancer patients (Avis, Crawford, & Manuel, 2005).  
Thus, understanding System 1 processes as they apply to decision-making is a 
particularly intriguing prospect in cancer patients, whose slow, deliberative processing systems 
have become overwhelmed regardless of age. Peters, one of Leventhal’s students, seems to have 
come full circle in his recognition of the importance of System 1 processes. He finds agreement 
with Epstein (1994) when he writes, “Finally, understanding the balance of affective and 
deliberative processes in judgment and choice is fundamental to the study of decision making. 
Decisions often involve both the head and the heart” (Peters et al., 2008, p. 3564). 
 Applying the models to hematologic cancer. Approximately 14.1 million individuals 
living in America currently have or have had cancer (ACS, 2015). Among them are people 
diagnosed with leukemia and lymphoma, a heterogeneous cluster of malignancies arising from 
abnormalities that occur during the body’s blood-making process (McCoyd & Gruener, 2011). 
Approximately 54,000 individuals are diagnosed with leukemia each year and 81,000 are 
diagnosed with lymphoma; mortality rates vary widely depending on the form of the illness 
(ACS, 2015). 
Though psychosocial research on individuals with HM is rare, there is a large literature 
on quality of life among cancer survivors. Survivors face multiple adaptive tasks that demand 
significant psychological adjustment (Stanton et al., 2007). Adaptation to chronic illnesses such 
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as cancer includes regulating acute psychological distress, managing uncertainty about the 
future, coming to terms with body changes, making complex treatment decisions, re-evaluating 
personal goals, and renegotiating social relationships. Successful adaptation can lead to better 
outcomes, including less anxiety and depression and greater quality of life. 
This dissertation hypothesizes that individuals with HM face different challenges than 
people with other forms of cancer, and that those differences may be, in part, related to the lack 
of palpable tumors or masses among those individuals with HM. More specifically, individuals 
with HM may have greater difficulty coping with cancer than many of those with solid tumors or 
palpable masses. A meta-analysis by Franks and Roesch (2006) suggests that individuals with 
different types of cancer may use different strategies for coping, although it did not include 
people with HM. However, Fadul, Osta, Dalal, Poulter and Bruera (2008) found that those with 
HM had reduced and delayed access to palliative care services than those with solid tumors, in 
spite of the fact that both groups had similar levels of symptom severity. A large study of quality 
of life (QOL) in multiple cancer types (N = 1,429) found that those with hematologic cancer and 
malignant lymphoma had significantly poorer QOL than all other cancer types (head and neck, 
lung, breast, prostate, neurological, and gynecological) except for gastrointestinal cancer. Morris 
and Shakespeare-Finch (2011) found that individuals diagnosed with HM and those with 
colorectal cancer showed less posttraumatic growth than those with breast cancer. 
The vast majority of psychosocial studies of individuals with HM focuses on the effects 
of one particular treatment that only some HM patients receive– hematopoietic stem cell 
transplants (HSCT; see reviews by Cooke, Gemmill, Kravits & Grant, 2009; Mosher, Redd, Rini, 
Burkhalter & DuHamel, 2008). During HSCT, cancer patients receive a combination of 
chemotherapy, radiation, and stem cell infusions to eradicate the cancerous blood cells and 
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replace them with noncancerous cells, which come from themselves (autologous transplants) or 
matched donors (allogeneic transplants). The treatment often requires eradication of an 
individual’s immune system and a prolonged hospital stay. In a review of the literature on 
HSCT, Mosher et al. (2008) found that a significant percentage of individuals experience 
depression and anxiety (5% to over 40%) before, during, and after undergoing HSCTs.  
When a wider range of treatments for HM is considered, the findings are not as 
consistent. A systematic review of literature from 1990-2002 found great variance in health-
related QOL among individuals who have the four most common types of leukemia (Radaelli, 
Stephens, Laskin, Pashos & Botteman, 2003). Two small studies provide a plausible explanation 
for this lack of uniformity (Berterö & Ek, 1993; Berterö, Eriksson & Ek, 1997). Conducting 
qualitative interviews with 15 individuals who had either acute (Berterö & Ek, 1993) or chronic 
(Berterö et al., 1997) leukemia, they found that an individual’s concept of QOL was highly 
personal and idiosyncratic, regardless of the actual symptoms of the illness. These findings 
indicate that either consciously or unconsciously, individuals with HM have differing 
conceptions of their illness, and those differences are not determined by standard symptom report 
measures.  
Patients with HM have vague, generalized, or non-specific symptoms that may not be 
easily recognized by medical professionals and which make the diagnosis a difficult and lengthy 
process (McCoyd & Gruener, 2011). Standard treatments for HM do not require surgery, which 
may be more easily conceptualized than radiation, chemotherapy, or HSCTs; with surgery, the 
cancer (in the form of a tumor) is physically removed. Consequently, making meaning of the 
illness may be especially difficult for those with various forms of HM (Xuiereb & Dunlop, 
2003), particularly in those who do not have a palpable mass or tumor. When making decisions 
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or trying to cope with the cancer, System 2 processes may become overtaxed. As a result, HM 
patients may rely more heavily on affect and on System 1 processes than either healthy 
individuals or those with other forms of cancer (Peters et al., 2008; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). 
Central Hypotheses 
To date, no studies have linked the lack of easily discernable symptoms of cancer to the 
added difficulties that individuals with HM face during the course of their illness. The current 
study attempts to bridge that gap through the lens of dual-process and illness representation 
models. This study theorizes that cancer patients’ tumor status (i.e. whether or not they have 
masses or tumors) as well as their thinking style (i.e. levels of System 1 and System 2 
processing) will be related to illness representations, which, in turn will directly and indirectly 
influence psychological adjustment. The model representing these relationships is depicted in 
Figure 2.  
More specifically, whether an individual with cancer has either a mass or tumor may 
directly affect psychological functioning, as measured by depressive symptoms, cancer-related 
distress, body image, and post-traumatic growth (path a of Figure 2). System 1 and System 2 
processing and the illness representations they form may also affect psychological adjustment 
(paths b and c). Whether or not tumor status and thinking style are related to each other (path d), 
they may independently be related to illness representations (paths e and f). Consequently, illness 
representations may mediate the relationship between these variables and measures of 
psychological functioning. The following hypotheses are derived from Figure 2: 
H1: Individuals with cancer who have either a mass or tumor will have better adjustment 
(i.e. fewer depressive symptoms, less cancer-related distress, better body image, and greater 
post-traumatic growth) than those without either masses or tumors. 
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H2: Individuals with either a mass or tumor will use more System 2 thinking and less 
System 1 thinking than those without masses or tumors. 
H3a: Individuals who have greater System 2 thinking will have better adjustment and 
more growth than those who have less System 2 thinking. 
H3b: Individuals who have less System 1 thinking will have better adjustment and more 
growth than those who have greater System 1 thinking. 
H4: Particular illness representations (stronger illness identity, more acute timeline, more 
chronic timeline, greater belief in consequences) will be associated with worse adjustment and 
less growth, while other representations (greater personal control, treatment control, and illness 
coherence) will be associated with greater adjustment and more growth. 
H5: Illness representations will moderate the relationships between a) thinking style and 
adjustment and growth and b) tumor status (i.e. presence or absence of a mass or tumor) and 






Sample and Recruitment 
Men and women who had been diagnosed cancer were recruited for the study. Cancer site 
was not specified. Eligibility criteria were: 1) between the ages of 20 and 65; 2) a cancer 
diagnosis more than three months prior to participation; and 3) the ability to read and write in 
English. Individuals younger than 20 were excluded because pediatric cancers typically have a 
different treatment course and higher survival rates than adult forms of cancer (ACS, 2015). 
Individuals older than 65 were excluded as they have a much greater incidence of cancer, greater 
probability of comorbidity, and a higher likelihood of mortality (Hamaker, Stauder & van 
Munster, 2014; Yancik, 2005). Participants were recruited at least three months post-diagnosis to 
ensure that initial treatment decisions had been made and treatment had been initiated, and to 
limit the possibility that they were experiencing acute trauma. Participants had to be able to read, 
and write in English in order to understand instructions, sign consent forms, write about their 
cancer, and complete questionnaires. As the study requires individuals to conceptualize their 
illness and to reflect upon their own mental states, individuals who reported active psychiatric or 
cognitive conditions were also excluded. 
Recruitment. A national sample of individuals was recruited through Stupid Cancer, an 
organization that serves the target population of young adults with cancer by creating a 
community of advocacy, research, outreach, and awareness primarily through social media. 
Younger adults with cancer were the focus of recruitment as they tend to exhibit greater distress, 
in part because for them, cancer is an “off-time” event in their life cycles (Stanton et al., 2007; 
Trevino et al., 2012). 
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Multiple recruitment methods were used: 1) posting study announcements on the 
organization’s websites including in chat rooms on Facebook, and on Twitter; 2) sending 
recruitment emails to listservs run by the organization; 3) including recruitment information in 
the organization’s promotional materials, and 4) distributing study brochures at Stupid Cancer 
events. Individuals were encouraged to pass along or repost study information to friends, family, 
health professionals, and colleagues. All recruitment materials can be found in Appendix A. 
All of these recruitment methods directed individuals to a link for the study’s website at 
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com if they met study criteria. This website automatically forwarded 
to a survey address (https://ccnypsych.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_6MzgpguoWatBTud) 
hosted by Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com), a provider of survey collection and data analysis 
software with a comprehensive suite of security features to ensure privacy and confidentiality.  
Procedures 
The consent form was presented electronically once individuals clicked the link. Potential 
participants were informed that they should attempt to complete the survey in one sitting. Once 
individuals agreed to participate, they electronically signed a consent form; a copy can be found 
in Appendix A. 
After consent, they were screened for eligibility once again. (They had previous self-
selected themselves into the study according to the criteria; this screening verified the 
information.) If they did not meet eligibility requirements, they were thanked for their time and 
were automatically exited from the survey. A donation of $1 was made to one of four cancer 
charities (Cancer Care, Cancer Research Institute, Prevent Cancer Foundation, and Stand Up to 
Cancer) for each successfully completed survey based on participants’ selections; additionally, 
participants who completed the survey could choose to enter a raffle to win one of five $75 
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Amazon gift cards as a token of thanks for their participation. A copy of the letter emailed to the 
raffle winners can be found in Appendix A. 
All individuals who gave consent and met eligibility criteria were then able to begin the 
online survey. Surveys were completed in 45 minutes on average (SD = 29.91; range = 10 to 306 
minutes). Though data were skewed, most participants (93.1%) completed the survey in less than 
90 minutes. A printed version of the complete electronic survey questionnaire and all 
experimental materials can be found in Appendix B. 
Optional drawing measure. At the end of the survey, participants were asked if they 
were willing to complete an additional measure by mail. Because this measure required 
participants to draw their cancer, it could not be completed over the internet. Participants were 
told that they would receive an additional raffle entry for completing and returning the measure.  
Those who agreed to complete the drawing measure were given a link to a form, where 
they entered their contact information. This information was stored in a separate website from 
the survey responses to preserve confidentiality. The only connection between the survey and the 
contact information was a 12-digit computer-generated random number. Participants were then 
sent a packet containing instructions, the measure, a box of eight colored pencils, and a postage-
paid envelope to return the measure. Participants were told that the drawing measure could be 
completed in one, 5-10 minute session and were asked to complete the drawing measure within 
24 hours of receiving the packet. Contact information was provided in case individuals were not 
sure how to complete the measure. Those who did not return the completed drawing measure 
within two weeks after the initial packet was sent received a follow-up email, with instructions 
and an offer to send another set of materials. Once the completed packet was returned and 
matched to the survey data, the 12-digit computer-generated random number which linked the 
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contact information to the rest of the survey was deleted to preserve condfidentiality. A copy of 
the drawing measure, the drawing measure instructions, and the follow-up letter can be found in 
Appendix B.  
The decision to use a hybrid of online and mail surveys was made for several reasons: 
sending the entire survey by mail would be costly and was more likely to have a low response 
rate among a young adult population that uses the internet on a daily basis. Furthermore, utilizing 
an online survey allowed the data to be collected in a timely manner and reduced error when 
translating responses into computer databases for analyses.  
Survey Measures 
The survey contained self-report multi-item measures assessing the constructs in the 
theoretical model. The order of the measures within the questionnaire did not vary across 
participants. 
Illness representations. Illness representations were assessed using the Revised Illness 
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ-R; Moss-Morris et al., 2002), a modified version of the Illness 
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris & Horne, 1996). Based on 
Leventhal’s Self-Regulatory Model (Leventhal et al., 1984), the IPQ was designed to assess five 
dimensions of illness representation; the revised version expanded those to include nine 
dimensions; however, one dimension (Causes of Illness) was not designed to be analyzed as a 
scale, but rather as a grouping variable. The remaining eight dimensions (scales) are analyzed 
individually; there is no summed or total scale. Each dimension is described below. With the 
exception of the Illness Identity scale, all other items in the IPQ-R were answered with a five-
point Likert-type response format ranging from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1). 
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 Illness Identity is measured with a “yes/no” symptom checklist that asks individuals to 
endorse the presence of 14 symptoms (e.g., “nausea,” “fatigue,” “headaches”) and then to 
indicate, for each symptom, whether or not they believe that it is related to their illness (in this 
case, cancer). The Illness Identity score is the number of symptoms (0-14) that are reported as 
being related to the illness. Higher scores indicate a greater attribution of illness-specific 
symptoms (that is, more symptoms reported that are attributed to the illness).  
The Timeline (Acute/Chronic) scale includes six items that assess how long individuals 
believe their illness will last (e.g., “My illness is likely to be permanent rather than temporary.”). 
Higher scores indicate greater chronicity. The Timeline (Cyclical) scale is comprised four items 
and measures the degree to which individuals believe their illness is episodic (e.g., “My 
symptoms come and go in cycles.”). Higher scores on the scale indicate belief that the illness is 
more episodic or cyclical. Consequences (six items) measures the expected outcomes derived 
from the illness (e.g., “My illness strongly affects the way others see me.”), with higher scores 
indicating belief in greater consequences of having the illness. Personal Control (six items) 
measures the degree to which an individual believes he or she has efficacy over his or her illness 
(e.g., “The course of my illness depends on me). Higher scores indicate belief in greater personal 
control. The Treatment Control scale (five items), measures the degree to which individuals 
believe that treatment and the course of illness ultimately determines its outcome (e.g., “My 
treatment can control my illness.”), with higher scores indicating greater belief. The Illness 
Coherence scale (five items) measures the extent to which an individual has developed a 
personal understanding of his or her illness (e.g., “I have a clear picture or understanding of my 
condition). Higher scores indicate a greater sense of personal understanding. Emotional 
Representations (six items) measures individuals’ emotional responses generated by their illness 
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(e.g. “My illness makes me feel angry.”) with higher scores indicating stronger emotional 
responses, either positive or negative. 
Causal representations of the illness were measured with a checklist of 18 possible causes 
(e.g., “stress or worry,” “my own behavior,” “alcohol”) rated on a five-point “strongly agree-
strongly disagree” scale. These items were not designed to be combined into a scale. 
 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and internal consistency reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) for the eight IPQ-R scales are presented in Table 1. Internal 
consistency reliabilities were very good on the whole, ranging from .76 to .92.  
Thinking style. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-
Raj, & Heier, 1996) was used to measure System 1 and System 2 modes of cognitive processing. 
The 40-item measure is composed of four 10-item subscales – Experiential Ability, Experiential 
Engagement, Rational Ability, and Rational Engagement – that can be combined into two higher 
order scales: Experiential Average and Rational Average. Experiential Average and Rational 
Average roughly correspond to System 1 and System 2 processes, respectively, and will be used 
in the majority of analyses. 
The REI scales use a five-point, Likert-type format ranging from “completely true” (5) to 
“completely false” (1) in response to a series of “I…” statements. The Experiential Ability 
subscale measures an individual’s capacity for decision-making based on intuition and feelings 
(e.g., “I believe in trusting my hunches.”), with higher scores representing higher ability. The 
Experiential Engagement subscale measures an individual’s dependence upon and personal 
enjoyment in using intuition and feelings to make decisions (e.g., “I tend to use my heart as a 
guide for my actions.”), with higher scores representing greater dependence and enjoyment. The 
Rational Ability subscale measures an individual’s capacity for thinking logically and 
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analytically (e.g., “I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.”), with 
higher scores representing higher ability. The Rational Engagement subscale measures an 
individual’s dependence upon and personal enjoyment in thinking both logically and analytically 
(e.g., “I enjoy intellectual challenges.”), with higher scores representing greater dependence and 
enjoyment. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency reliability for the REI scales and 
subscales are presented in Table 2. Internal consistency reliability for all of the REI-40 scales 
and subscales was very good (Cronbach’s α’s all ≥ .83). 
Depressive symptoms. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression scale (CES-D; 
Radloff, 1977) was used to assess depressive symptomology. The CES-D is one of the gold 
standards for measuring depressive symptoms, demonstrating strong internal consistency 
reliability, and construct validity in both clinical and non-clinical populations (Van Dam & 
Earleywine, 2011). The 20-item measure asks individuals to respond to a series of statements 
with respect to their thoughts and feelings over the previous week, using a four-point response 
format ranging from “rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” to “most or all of the time (5-7 
days)”. Exemplary items include: “I was bothered by things that usually didn’t bother me,” “I 
felt lonely,” and “I felt that people disliked me.” Overall scores can range from 0 to 60, with 
higher scores indicating greater depressive symptoms. A cutoff score of 16 has generally been 
used to indicate the presence of clinical depression in community samples and cancer 
populations (Radloff, 1977). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Internal consistency 
reliability was strong (Cronbach’s α = .93). 
Cancer-specific distress. The revised Impact of Event Scale (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 
1997) assesses symptoms of intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal that can occur in response to 
any traumatic event, and it is often used as a measure of cancer-specific distress (e.g., Baider et 
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al., 2001; Black and White, 2005; Cordova et al., 1995). The measure asks respondents to 
indicate the frequency of their thoughts about cancer during the previous week using a five-point 
“never” to “very often” scale; higher scores indicate greater distress. Exemplary items include: 
“Any reminder of it brought back feelings about it” (intrusion), “I felt as if it hadn’t happened or 
it wasn’t real” (avoidance), and “I felt irritable and angry” (hyperarousal). Descriptive statistics 
and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the IES and its subscales are presented in Table 3. Internal 
consistency reliability for the overall scale was strong (Cronbach’s α = .93).  
Posttraumatic growth. The 10-item short form of the Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory 
(PTGI-SF; Cann et al., 2010) includes the five subscales found in the original scale (i.e., relating 
to others, new possibilities, personal strength, spiritual change, and appreciation of life; Tedeschi 
& Calhoun, 1996). In this study only the total score was used. Higher scores indicate greater 
growth. Descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the PTGI-SF are presented in 
Table 3. Internal consistency reliability was high for the total scale (Cronbach’s α = .89).  
Body image. Body image was measured with three questions from the European 
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer’s quality of life assessment (EORTC; 
Aaronson et al., 1993). Using a four-point response format, participants were asked to rate the 
extent to which they felt physically less attractive and less feminine/masculine as a result of a 
disease or its treatment and whether they were dissatisfied with their bodies. The three items 
were summed; higher scores indicate poorer body image. Internal consistency reliability was 
good (Cronbach’s α = .87). Descriptive statistics for the items are presented in Table 3.  
Demographic variables. Self-report questions assessed age, gender (dichotomous), 
ethnicity (white/Caucasian, Latino, Black or African American, Asian or Pacific Islander, other), 
sexual orientation (heterosexual or straight, bisexual, homosexual), relationship status 
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(married/long-term partner, single, divorced, separated, widowed), number of children, and 
religion (Christian including Catholic, Atheist or Agnostic, Jewish, Other). Employment status 
was assessed as one of seven categories (employed, on medical leave/disability, student, keeping 
house, seeking work, retired, unemployed). Annual income was measured in six categories 
ranging from “less than $25,000” to “more than $150,000”. Education was measured in five 
categories ranging from “some high school or less” to “professional or graduate degree”.  
Medical variables. Participants reported the type/site of their cancer when they were first 
diagnosed and at the time of the survey using a checklist developed by the American Cancer 
Society (ACS, 2015). Time since diagnosis (in months) was calculated as the date the 
questionnaire was completed subtracted from the date of diagnosis. Because the sample 
distribution was positively skewed (skewness = 2.67), a log 10 transformation was applied to 
normalize the distribution, following procedures suggested by Tabachnick and Fidel (2007) and 
Howell (2007). The transformed data was less skewed (skewness = .02), better meeting 
underlying assumptions for statistical tests. The transformed variable was used in all analyses. 
Tumor status: What constitutes a “liquid” or “solid” cancer? In order to test the central 
hypotheses, participants reported whether or not they had a tumor or mass both in the past and 
currently (at the time of the survey). The three response options were “currently have masses or 
tumors,” “had masses or tumors (in the past),” and “never had masses or tumors.”  
A second variable was created that combined self-reported tumor/mass status with cancer 
site. This was done to account for those with lymphoma, who have hematological cancer but also 
may have a mass. Thus, the variable consisted of three categories: 1) individuals with a primary 
diagnosis of leukemia or multiple myeloma who did not report a mass or tumor; 2) individuals 
46 
 
diagnosed with lymphoma who reported a mass; and 3) those with all other cancer diagnoses 
who reported having a mass or tumor.  
Active treatment. Several yes/no variables assessed treatment: whether participants had 
ever received chemotherapy or radiation, and whether they were currently receiving 
chemotherapy or radiation. Those individuals who were currently receiving either chemotherapy 
or radiation were combined to create a dichotomous variable denoting that they were currently in 
active treatment (yes/no). The active treatment group included both those individuals who were 
receiving cancer treatment for the first time as well as those who had relapsed. Whether or not 
participants had undergone surgery was erroneously omitted from the survey questionnaire; 
therefore, these data were not available to include in creation of the variable. 
Drawing One’s Cancer 
The drawing task was based on methods developed by Broadbent et al. (2004) for 
patients who suffered a myocardial infarction. Participants who volunteered for the drawing part 
of the study were mailed two sheets of letter-sized paper and a box of eight colored pencils (red, 
orange, yellow, green, blue, purple, brown, black). Participants were asked to use the pencils to 
create two drawings: “… draw a picture of what you think your cancer looked like when you 
were first diagnosed and another picture of what you think your cancer looks like now.” They 
were also told, “We are not interested in your drawing ability – a simple sketch is fine. If you 
want to start over, please use the back of the page.” It was expected that participants would 
complete their drawings within the box or use the box as a guide, though no explicit instructions 
required them to do so. The drawings were coded on a number of dimensions using ideas and 
procedures adapted from Broadbent et al. (2004); details of the coding procedures are presented 




 Data analysis proceeded in stages. First all questionnaire items were inspected for 
variance and all scales examined for internal consistency reliability. Second, the theoretical 
model was tested with quantitative measures from the questionnaire. Analyses of the drawing 
measure involved both quantitative analyses using the codes and a more qualitative interpretation 
of the data.  
In testing the model presented in Figure 2, each of the paths relating to the theoretical 
model will be examined. First, results will be presented pertaining to the factors that may be 
directly associated with psychological adjustment (paths a, b, and c). ANOVAs and t-tests will 
be used to determine what relationship, if any, exists between tumor status and psychological 
adjustment, while correlations will test the associations between thinking style and adjustment as 
well as illness representations and adjustment. After using ANOVAs and t-tests to determine 
whether there are associations between tumor status and thinking style (path d), associations 
between each of these factors and illness representations will be tested (paths e and f). ANOVAs 
and t-tests will examine the associations between tumor status and illness representations, while 
correlations will test the associations between thinking style and illness representations. Finally, 
in a test of the full model, mediation analyses using the bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004; Preacher & Hayes, 2008) will determine whether illness representations mediate 




Testing the Theoretical Framework  
Participants 
A sample of 305 individuals completed the online survey. Of those, 280 completed the 
writing measure that was included as part of the survey, and 99 returned the optional drawing 
measure. Figure 3 presents the flow chart detailing consent, participation, and exclusion. 
Participants were generally young to middle-aged, white (88.5%), female (86.6%), 
heterosexual (89.8%), and well-educated (74.4% had a college degree or greater). Nearly two-
thirds identified as Christian or Catholic (60.5%) and over half were employed (58.0%). The 
sample was equally divided between those who were married or had a long-term partner and 
those who were not; roughly a third of the sample had one or more children (35.7%). Detailed 
participant characteristics can be found in Tables 4 and 5. 
A sample with a wide range of types of cancer was sought and many cancer sites were 
represented (see Table 6). Breast cancer, lymphoma, and genital cancer diagnoses were the most 
frequent (>10% of the sample each). Over three-quarters of the sample reported that they have or 
have had either a mass or tumor (84.8%). This percentage differed by cancer site. Most 
respondents with non-blood cancers reported having masses or tumors (93.9%); only 16.2% of 
those diagnosed with leukemia or myeloma indicated that they had either masses or tumors, and 
nearly all (98.1%) of those with lymphoma reported having them. Thus, cancer site is not a 
proxy for having had a mass or tumor.  
There was also a wide heterogenity in years since diagnosis: Participants had been 
diagnosed from less than a year to 34 years. The distribution was positively skewed, with over 
half of participants having been diagnosed for 2.5 years or more, and one quarter of the sample 
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diagnosed more than 5 years earlier. Most (79.7%) of the participants had undergone 
chemotherapy at some point for their cancer, and nearly half had radiation (45.6%). Nearly one 
quarter of the sample was currently undergoing active treatment (either chemotherapy or 
radiation).  
Using the 16-point cutoff on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D; Radloff, 1977), slightly more than half of participants (54.8%) met criteria for 
depression. This is far greater than the 21% prevalence rate found in a recent meta-analysis of 
depression rates among inpatient and outpatient oncologic and hemotologic cancer patients 
(Mitchell et al., 2011).  
Covariates 
Multiple demographic and medical variables were examined as possible covariates (see 
Tables 7-10). Few variables were related to the outcome measures and no patterns were found.  
Being in active cancer treatment was related to four of the eight dimensions of illness 
representations (Table 10). Because it was hypothesized that illness representations play a 
critical role as mediators of the relationships between tumor status or thinking style and 
psychological outcome, and because being in active treatment has been related to psychological 
distress in other studies (Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015; review by Mitchell, 2011), active 
treatment was included as a covariate in all mediation analyses. 
Lower post-traumatic growth was reported by participants who identified as atheist or 
agnostic more often than by either those who identified as Christian (including Catholics) or by 
those who identified as other religions; removing two questions on the post-traumatic growth 
measure which explicitly ask about religious growth weakened the magnitude of the effect,  
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(F(2, 298) = 4.81, p = .01), but it was still significant. Because religion was not related to any 
other variables in the study, it was not used as a covariate for mediation analyses. 
Bivariate Associations 
The bivariate associations for each path in the model (Figure 2) will be presented before 
examining meditational models. 
Is tumor status related to psychological functioning (path a)? As presented in Tables 
11-12, no differences between tumor status groups were found on any of the four measures of 
psychological functioning (depressive symptoms, cancer-related distress, body image, and post-
traumatic growth). This finding was consistent with both the respondent’s self-report of a 
tumor/mass and the three-category variable that combined self-reported tumor status with cancer 
site. Thus, those with “more solid” vs. “less solid” cancers did not differ in terms of 
psychological functioning.  
Is thinking style related to psychological functioning (path b)? There were few 
significant associations between System 1 and System 2 thinking and psychological outcomes, 
and the pattern was not consistent (Table 13). System 1 (experiential) thinking was related to 
greater post-traumatic growth but was not significantly related to depressive symptoms, cancer-
related stress, or body image. System 2 (rational) thinking was related to fewer depressive 
symptoms but was not related to the other outcome variables. When the dichotomous variable 
indicating clinical levels of depression was used in place of the continuous scale, System 2 
thinking was no longer significantly related to depression, t(302) = -1.55, p > .05; however, those 
with scores less than 16 had higher System 1 thinking than those who met clinical criteria for 
depression, t(303) = -2.63, p = .01. 
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Exploratory analyses examined whether the interaction of System 1 and System 2 
thinking was associated with the psychological outcome variables. To do this, System 1 and 
System 2 thinking were each divided into “high” and “low” groups using a median split, 
resulting in four resulting groups (i.e. high/high, high/low, low/high, low/low). Although the 
main effects in these analyses of variance replicated the individual findings for System 1 and 
System 2 thinking presented above for all four outcomes, none of the interactions were 
significant (Tables 14-17). 
Are illness representations associated with psychological functioning (path c)? 
Unlike most continuous measures, lower scores on all but the Illness Coherence IPQ scale do not 
indicate less well-defined conceptions of illness. In some cases, such as Consequences and 
Personal Control scales for example, low scores may represent as strongly-held views or clearly 
defined conceptions as high scores, and several of the scales are explicitly bimodal (e.g., 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic). This makes interpretation of correlations difficult so the meanings of 
the associations will be explained in each case.  
Depressive symptoms. All eight IPQ scales were significantly correlated with depressive 
symptoms (Table 18). For five of the IPQ scales (Identity, Consequences, Timeline 
(Acute/Chronic), Timeline (Cyclical), and Emotional Representations), higher IPQ scores were 
related to greater depressive symptoms; for the other three dimensions (Personal Control, 
Treatment Control, and Illness Coherence) higher IPQ scores were related to fewer depressive 
symptoms. That is, individuals who attributed a greater number of their symptoms to their 
illness, had greater belief that the illness would have consequences on self, family, friends, and 
finances, believed their illness was more chronic or cyclical in nature, and whose illness inspired 
greater positive and negative emotional reactions were more likely to report greater depressive 
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symptoms. By contrast, those who had located control of their illness in either themselves or in 
the course of treatment and those who reported a clear understanding of their illness were more 
likely to have lower depression. 
Cancer-related distress. Correlations between the IPQ scales and the cancer-related 
distress measure (IES-R) followed the same pattern as with depressive symptoms (Table 18). 
Examining the three subscales of the IES-R separately, the pattern held for both the Intrusion and 
Hyperarousal subscales, but not the Avoidance subscale, where only three of eight scales showed 
significant correlations, again in the same directions as for depressive symptoms. Specifically, 
the Timeline (Acute/Chronic) and Emotional Representations subscales were related to greater 
avoidance, whereas Illness Coherence was related to lower avoidance.  
 Body image. As shown in Table 18, all eight illness representation scales were 
significantly correlated with body image following the same pattern described previously: Five 
dimensions (Identity, Consequences, Timeline (Acute/Chronic), Timeline (Cyclical), and 
Emotional Representations) were related to worse body image, and three dimensions (Personal 
Control, Treatment Control, Illness Coherence) were related to better body image.  
 Post-traumatic growth. Correlations between the illness representation scales and post-
traumatic growth showed a different pattern: Only half of the four dimensions were significantly 
correlated with post-traumatic growth (see Table 18). Greater Personal Control, Treatment 
Control and Illness Coherence were correlated with greater reports of growth. The Timeline scale 
was negatively related to growth, meaning that a greater belief in the illness’s acuteness (vs. 
chronicity) was correlated with positive growth.  
To what extent do cancer patients who have a mass or tumor differ from those who 
do not in System 1 and System 2 thinking (path d)? Cancer patients who reported a mass or 
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tumor did not differ from those who did not report a mass or tumor with regard to both System 1 
and System 2 thinking (see Table 19). An alternate analysis comparing those individuals with 
leukemia or multiple myeloma who reported no tumors to those with lymphoma (who did report 
masses or tumors) and those with solid tumor cancers also showed no significant differences on 
any REI scales or subscales (Table 20).  
To what extent do cancer patients who have tumors or masses differ from those who 
do not with respect to illness representations (path e)? Comparing survivors with a self-
reported mass or tumor to those without, there was a significant difference in only one of the 
eight illness representation scales: Individuals without a self-reported mass or tumor had higher 
scores on the Treatment Control scale that those with tumors, meaning that those without tumors 
attributed greater importance to the effect of treatment on medical outcomes (see Table 21).  
Comparing patients with leukemia or myeloma with no tumors reported to those with 
lymphoma (with masses) and patients with solid tumor cancers, the finding for Treatment 
Control remained significant, with leukemia/myeloma and lymphoma patients showing higher 
scores than those with solid tumors. A second significant finding emerged for the Timeline 
(Acute/Chronic) scale: Lymphoma patients represented their illness as less chronic than either 
the leukemia/myeloma (with no tumors reported) or solid tumor groups (see Table 22).  
Is thinking style associated with illness representations (path f)? As shown in Table 
23, greater System 1 thinking was positively correlated with two of the eight illness 
representation scales: Personal Control and Treatment Control. These associations largely were 
attributable to scores on the Experiential Engagement subscale rather than Experiential Abilities 
subscale. System 1 thinking was not significantly correlated with Illness Coherence, although the 
Experiential Engagement subscale was. 
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System 2 thinking was positively correlated with only one illness representation, Greater 
Illness Coherence. (System 2 thinking was correlated significantly with both the Rational Ability 
and Rational Engagement subscales; thus, the overall associations were attributable to scores on 
both subscales.)  
Testing the Mediation Models 
 Mediation analyses were used to test the model presented in Figure 2. It was predicted 
that illness representations would mediate the relationships a) between tumor status and 
psychological functioning, and b) between thinking style and psychological functioning. 
Preliminary analyses. An exploratory second order factor analysis with oblique rotation 
was performed on the eight illness representation scale scores in order to create more 
parsimonious measures for multiple reasons. First, the assessed dimensions of illness 
representations were highly inter-correlated. Second, they showed similar patterns of bivariate 
correlations, as described earlier. Third, this would minimize the likelihood of creating type I 
errors with multiple analyses. 
Both the eigenvalues and scree test suggested a two-factor solution, which explained 
49.58% of the common variance. Using a criterion of factor loadings greater than .40, one factor 
was comprised of the Identity, Timeline (Cyclical), Consequences, Illness Coherence (reversed) 
and Emotional Representations scales and the second was comprised of Timeline 
(Acute/Chronic; reversed), Personal Control, and Treatment Control scales. The factor analysis is 
presented in Table 24. The first factor included those scales related to the impacts of the illness 
on self and others (including the emotional consequences), and was named Illness Impact. The 
second factor was comprised of scales relating to locus of control and the acuteness of the 
illness; it was named Control Over Illness. To compute scales, scores were reversed if 
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appropriate, standardized, and summed. The mean of each factor, then, was zero, and the score 
denoted how many standard deviations above or below the mean it was. 
Multiple mediation analyses were conducted according to methods described by Preacher 
and Hayes (2008). This approach to mediation allows for the presence of indirect effects without 
a main effect, and is also able to test two or more mediating variables at once. Furthermore, the 
indirect effect of a specific mediator may be tested with respect to all other mediators in the 
model, and the significance can be considered within the context of the entire model. Indirect 
effects are determined through bootstrapping (Preacher & Hayes, 2008); 5,000 bootstrap samples 
were used and the confidence interval was set at 95%. 
Mediation analyses. The first set of models examined the relationship between the 
dichotomous tumor status variable (i.e., the self-reported absence or presence of a mass or 
tumor) and psychological outcomes, mediated by the two illness representation indices. Four 
separate models were computed, one for each outcome variable. The second set of models was 
identical but replaced tumor status with System 1 and System 2 thinking styles (separately); thus, 
eight meditation equations were computed to test the second model. As previously discussed, 
whether or not individuals were currently undergoing active treatment (i.e. chemotherapy or 
radiation) was used as a covariate in all mediation analyses. 
Preacher and Kelley (2011) suggest a strategy for calculating effect sizes in mediation 
models that considers the indirect effect as a portion of the maximum possible indirect effect 
given the particular variables being analyzed. The obtained value, κ2, may be evaluated in a 
similar fashion to the coefficient of determination, R2, with small medium, and large effect sizes 
regarded as 0.01, 0.09, and 0.25 respectively (Cohen, 1977; Preacher & Kelley, 2011). For those 
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variables with indirect effects, with a sample size of 305, statistical significance set to .05, even 
small effect sizes (κ2 ≈ 0.02) meet the threshold to achieve a statistical power of .80. 
Do illness representations mediate the relationship between tumor status and well-
being? The multiple mediation analyses revealed no significant findings for any of the outcome 
variables in terms of total effects (sum of direct and mediated effects), direct effects (with 
mediating effects removed), or specific indirect effects (through mediating variables). The 
standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships can be found in Figures 4-7 
for depressive symptoms, cancer-related distress, body image and post-traumatic growth, 
respectively. The coefficients for the mediation analyses are presented in Tables 25-28. 
Do illness representations mediate the relationship between thinking style and 
psychological outcomes?  
System 1 (experiential) thinking. Results of meditational analyses for System 1 thinking 
confirmed a significant positive relationship (total effect) between System 1 (experiential) 
thinking and post-traumatic growth (b = 5.65, β = 0.28, SE = 1.14, t = 4.98, p < .001). That is, 
greater use of experiential thinking was related to greater post-traumatic growth. The relationship 
was attenuated slightly when controlling for the illness representation mediators (direct effect), 
but remained statistically significant (b = 5.02, β = 0.25, SE = 1.12, t = 4.49, p < .001; change in 
β = 0.03).  
Tests of indirect effects using bootstrapping procedures found that Control Over Illness 
significantly mediated the relationship between System 1 thinking and depressive symptoms, 
cancer-related distress and post-traumatic growth. (There were no direct or indirect effects for 
the outcome variable of body image.) Through Control Over Illness, System 1 thinking was 
related to lower depressive symptoms, lower cancer-related distress, and greater post-traumatic 
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growth. The standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships can be found in 
Figures 8-11. Full analyses for all four outcome variables are presented in Tables 29-32.  
Given the significant total, direct, and indirect effects of System 1 thinking on post-
traumatic growth, the ratio of the indirect to the total effect indicates the percentage of the total 
effect that is mediated (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993). Using this calculation, Control Over Illness 
mediated approximately 11% of the total effect of System 1 Thinking on post-traumatic growth. 
For those variables with indirect effects, the effect size was determined to be small, κ2 ≈ 0.02. 
System 2 (rational) thinking. Although a significant negative relationship (total effect) 
between System 2 thinking and depressive symptoms was found, multiple mediation analyses 
revealed no indirect effects between System 2 (rational) thinking and any of the outcome 
variables (Tables 33-36). The standardized regression coefficients illustrating these relationships 
for the four outcome measures can be found in Figures 12-15. 
Factors Related to Clinical Levels of Depression 
 Given the high prevalence of depression in the sample population, a discriminant 
function analysis was conducted to differentiate between those who met criteria for clinical 
depression (CES-D score ≥ 16; Radloff, 1977) and those who did not. Multiple variables were 
entered stepwise into the model, including self-reported tumor status, thinking style (System 1 
and System 2), the two illness representation factors (Illness Impact and Control Over Illness), 
demographic variables (i.e. age, income, marital status, and gender), and medical variables (i.e. 
active treatment and time since diagnosis). Using Wilks’ lambda as the selection rule, one 
significant function emerged (χ2 (3) = 78.03; p < .001), consisting of three variables: Illness 
Impact, Control Over Illness, and System 1 thinking. A structure matrix for all variables entered 
into the model is presented in Table 37. 
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The centroid for the clinically depressed group occurs at .52 and for the non-depressed 
group at -.62. Cases that were classified as depressed demonstrated high scores on Illness Impact 
and low scores on Control Over Illness and System 1 Thinking. Conversely, cases that were 
classified as non-depressed demonstrated low scores on Illness Impact and high scores on both 
Control Over Illness and System 1 Thinking. The outcomes replicated findings of the bivariate 
and meditational analyses, and the discriminant function was able to correctly classify 72.7% of 
the cases (Table 38). 
Summary of Analyses 
In this sample of mixed cancer patients, illness representations were strongly related to 
multiple measures of adjustment and growth. One subset of dimensions – a stronger sense of 
illness identity, greater belief in consequences, greater belief in the chronicity or cyclicality of 
one’s illness, and stronger emotional representations – was related to greater depression, more 
cancer-related distress and worse body image. By contrast, another subset – attributing a locus of 
control to either the self or to the cancer treatment, and having a more coherent sense of one’s 
illness – was related not only to less distress but also to positive growth. Believing that the illness 
was acute (vs. chronic) was correlated with positive growth but not with distress. These subsets 
of dimensions largely, but do not entirely, match the two factors of illness representations, 
Control Over Illness and Illness Impact, that were experimentally derived through factor 
analysis. 
Thinking style was related to distress and adjustment, both directly and indirectly. For 
System 1 (experiential) thinking, there was a direct relationship with greater post-traumatic 
growth; for System 2 (rational) thinking, there was a direct association with greater depressive 
systems. Additionally, System 1 thinking was indirectly related to posttraumatic growth, 
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depressive symptoms, and cancer-related distress, mediated by a combined factor of illness 
representations which captures the locus of control and acuteness of the illness. This mediated 
relationship accounted for 11% of the variance of post-traumatic growth. Thus, both System 1 
and System 2 are related to the formation of illness representations and adjusting to illness, 
though the processes operate in different ways by thinking style.  
By contrast, and contrary to predictions, the form and shape of the cancer – whether or 
not an individual has a tumor (both self-reported and as divided by form of cancer) – has little 
relationship to the form of individuals’ illness representations, thinking styles, or levels of 






Participants and Procedures 
The quantitative findings suggest that System 1 and System 2 thinking are related to 
various measures of psychological adjustment and functioning, either directly or indirectly 
through the construction of cognitive illness representations, but what might these 
representations look like? More broadly, how do those with cancer “visualize” their illness? To 
get a more direct measure of the way participants may conceive of their illness, patients’ 
drawings were examined for underlying clues as to how thinking styles or illness representations 
affect the ways individuals conceptualize their illness.  
In all, 99 of the 305 participants (32.4%) completed the drawing measure; all returned 
both drawings. Figure 3 presents the flow diagram including the drawing measure. There were no 
significant differences on any demographic and medical characteristics between those who 
completed drawings and the remainder of the sample.  
Developing the Coding Categories 
 Initial coding of the drawings used both directed and conventional qualitative content 
analysis techniques (Hseih & Shannon, 2005), which were adapted to apply to visual rather than 
written data. Coding categories were generated with an awareness of previous drawing studies in 
patients with chronic illnesses (e.g. Broadbent et. al., 2004; Broadbent et al., 2006; Reynolds et 
al., 2007), whose work examined the size, color, and content of drawings. Content dimensions 
were initially determined principally by the aims of the current research; following central 
hypotheses, they included the presence or absence of a tumor and whether a drawing could be 
rated as abstract (i.e. not easily understood, without an identifiable, concrete object – person, 
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place, thing, event, or circumstance – contained within the drawing), as both were hypothesized 
to be related to illness representations, distress, and adjustment. 
Once initial codes were in place, drawings were examined, and additional categories were 
allowed to emerge from the data using a process similar to open coding (Schreier, 2012; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). Categories were generated by two independent coders (the Principal 
Investigator and an undergraduate assistant), who remained open to unanticipated and emergent 
themes, and adapted the coding process recursively as needed. Emergent categories included 
depictions of people (faces, bodies, and facial expressions), bodies (whole or parts), medical 
objects (e.g. blood and medical equipment), and settings (e.g. grounded in space, inside, or 
outside), as well as the presence or absence of words and their content. 
Drawings were coded without knowledge of the participant’s survey responses (e.g. 
gender, form of cancer, tumor status, etc.). Approximately 15% of all drawings were coded by 
the PI and an undergraduate assistant and checked for inter-rater reliability; disagreements were 
decided by discussion, and modifications were made to the coding scheme as necessary. Cohen’s 
kappa was computed for several key variables (i.e. size of drawing, presence/absence of color, 
abstractness of drawing, presence/absence of blood); kappas ranged from .88 to 1.00. A copy of 
initial coding rules can be found in Appendix C. 
Content of the Drawings 
Drawings were initially analyzed on 15 dimensions. Findings for “your cancer at the time 
of diagnosis” will be discussed first, then “your cancer now” will be discussed, and then 
comparisons will be made between sets of drawings. 
 Cancer at time of diagnosis. The drawings varied widely. Over half the sample (55.8%) 
drew large pictures taking up over half the allotted space, almost all used color (97.0%), and 
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more than half added words (51.5%) to their drawing. Just over half the sample drew people 
(53.5%), though often just a single individual or body parts (84.9% of those who drew people). 
Of those who drew faces (48.5% of the sample), nearly half were rated as sad faces (47.4%), 
while nearly a third of the faces were rated neutral in emotion (28.9%), and very few were rated 
as happy (5.3%). Nearly one third (30.3%) of the drawings were rated as abstract – defined as a 
drawing with no easily identifiable people, places or things; thus, it was impossible to discern 
understanding, events, or circumstances of the drawing. Slightly more than half of individuals 
(65.2%) depicted a tumor or mass; no individuals without a tumor or mass drew one, although 
some who had a tumor did not draw it. Surprisingly, few drew blood (11.7%) or medical objects 
(7.1%) and not a single participant drew a medical professional. The findings for the coded 
variables for this drawing can be found in Table 39. 
Cancer now. Drawings depicting an individual’s cancer at the time of the survey were 
similar to their drawings depicting their cancer at the time of diagnosis, with a few notable 
exceptions. First, in the “cancer now” drawing, significantly fewer individuals depicted a tumor 
(16.7%, as compared to 65.2%; p = .002; two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test). More individuals used 
words (63.6%, as compared to 51.5%; p < .001; two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test). And though 
roughly the same number of participants drew people and faces, more individuals were depicted 
as happy (57.8%) than either neutral (11.1%) or sad (8.9%). (Pearson’s χ2 tests could not be 
conducted to determine significance due to small samples sizes.) Table 40 presents the findings 
for the coded variables for this drawing. 
Comparison of drawings. Pairs of drawings by each individual were compared to 
examine changes between cancer at the time of diagnosis and at the time of the survey. A new 
variable was created that took into account both words and visual content in order to make a 
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determination of perceived change in mood. Drawings were rated for change on multiple 
dimensions including number of words rated as either happy or sad, change in depictions of 
illness symptoms and severity (e.g. change in tumor size), and change in visual content (e.g. 
rainclouds to sunshine). Scores rating change on each of these dimensions were aggregated with 
four possible ratings: 1) negative change; 2) no change (neither worse nor better); 3) positive 
change, with reservations; and 4) positive change, with no reservations. These scores were 
treated as a continuous variable. 
Neither System 1 thinking (r(99) = -.07, p > .05) nor System 2 thinking (r(99) = .05, p > 
.05) was associated with the change variable; similarly, there were no differences between those 
who had self-reported tumors or masses and those who did not (t(97) = -0.31, p > .05). 
In terms of adjustment and well-being, however, greater change (toward more positive 
drawings) between drawings was associated with less cancer related distress (r(98) = -.21, p = 
.03) and greater post-traumatic growth (r(99) = .22, p = .03). Furthermore, those who were in 
active treatment (chemotherapy or radiation) had significantly lower scores (i.e. more negative 
change) than those who were not in treatment (t(40) = -3.11; p = .003).Time since diagnosis was 
unrelated to changes in the drawings.  
Illness Representations through Drawing 
 One of the primary questions in this dissertation is whether cancer patients with a liquid 
vs. solid tumor differ in the way they think about illness and form illness representations. 
Overall, there were few differences between the drawings of those participants who reported 
having masses or tumors and those who reported no masses or tumors. Those with solid cancers 
were more likely to depict masses or tumors in their drawings both at the time of diagnosis and at 
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the time of surgery than those with more liquid cancers, but did not differ on any other variables 
coded in the drawings (see Tables 41-42).  
Similarly, there were few significant associations between the two illness representation 
scales (Illness Impact and Control Over Illness) and any features of the drawings (see Tables 
37-38). On drawings referring to the time of diagnosis (Table 41), those participants who 
perceived greater control over illness had larger drawings and were more likely to add words to 
their drawings. These findings were replicated with the drawing referring to the present time, but 
the effect sizes were smaller (Table 42). There were no significant associations between any of 
the drawing variables and Illness Impact.  
As shown in Tables 41-42, the drawings of those participants who showed greater System 
1 (experiential) thinking differed significantly from those who showed less System 1 thinking on 
several variables. On drawings depicting the time of diagnosis, greater System 1 thinking was 
related to pictures that were medium-sized, (vs. small or large), rated abstract, and contained 
fewer people, faces, and bodies. Additionally, there was a weak negative relationship, (t(67) 
= -1.74; p = .09), between greater System 1 thinking and the likelihood of drawing a tumor or 
mass. For the drawings depicting individuals’ cancer in the present time, greater System 1 
thinking was only related to fewer depictions of people and bodies (and weakly related to fewer 
faces, (t(97) = -1.95, p = .05). For both sets drawings, there were no significant associations 
between any of the drawing variables and System 2 (rational) thinking. 
Interpretation of the Drawings 
The quantitative analyses provided few significant findings when examining the 
differences in cancer drawings between those with solid or liquid tumors. Although the results 
showed differences for those with particular thinking styles, they lacked nuance and explanation. 
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Thus, an interpretative analysis can provide greater depth and detail beyond that which is 
measured through traditional quantitative methods (Ezzy, 2002; Willig, 2001). Building on 
particular questions driven by the quantitative analyses, the following sections examine the use 
of words, the depiction of people, the nature of abstract drawings, and the nature of change. Each 
section begins with an illustrative example and then discusses common themes across the 
sample. 
The meanings of written words in cancer drawings. In Figure 16, two grey clouds with 
devils’ horns loom over a red sky. They have lightning bolts for fangs and red slits for eyes, 
spilling raindrops onto the ground below. Words seem to be hanging in space throughout the 
drawing: “mortality,” “overwhelmed,” “sad,” and “helpless,” among them. On the left, a broken 
tree with the word “blindsided” written on its trunk bends over its fallen branches. A tornado 
with the letters “AML” swirls on the right. Between them, an orange figure of a man, labeled 
“me” says, “Help me!” in a word bubble. 
Words appear everywhere in this depiction of cancer at the time of diagnosis, titled “The 
Raging Storm Within,” by a 34-year-old man who was diagnosed with acute myeloid lymphoma 
only 15 months earlier. Like nearly two-thirds of the sample (64.6%), he used words in his 
drawings despite the fact that the instructions neither explicitly asked for nor recommended that 
respondents use words. And as noted earlier, individuals with higher scores on the IPQ-R scale 
Control Over Illness were more likely to use words in their drawings. In his depiction of his 
cancer, words seem to play multiple roles that help this man convey his thoughts and feelings in 
various ways, as it may for many with cancer. Qualitative content analyses suggest three possible 
functions for words in their drawings. 
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For most of the individuals who added words, the words appeared to serve a labeling or 
naming function (n = 51; 79.7% of those who used words). Individuals labeled internal organs 
(e.g., “liver,” “bile duct,” “kidney”), bodily changes resulting from cancer (e.g., “scar,” 
“[medication] port,” and “thickening due to cancer cells”), as well as the cancer itself (e.g., 
“lymphedema,” “It’s a tumor,” “The [white blood cells] are attacking the cancer cell, if that’s not 
obvious,” and “The red is my cancer. My tumor was 11.1lbs”). On four occasions, participants 
even imbued the cancer with emotion words (e.g., “Angry tumors and cells invading). One 
patient provided the cancer with a name: “Marge, the 16cm ovarian dysgerminoma.” Participants 
also labeled people (e.g. “son,” “husband,” “friends”) and objects (e.g., “bloodwork” and 
“medical bills”). 
More than half of participants who used words used them metaphorically to represent 
feeling states (e.g., love, hope, sadness) or other complex thoughts (n = 35; 54.7%). Sometimes 
question marks were used alone or attached to words (n = 11; 17.2%), possibly to denote fear, 
confusion, or uncertainty. Depictions of feelings sometimes appeared as word clouds (n = 11; 
17.2) – drawings that prominently and centrally feature multiple words and phrases (e.g. 
“Death,” “Not me!” “Worry sometimes, but in God’s hands,” “Scars forever”), in various colors 
and at differing angles. Of those who drew word clouds, drawings were equally divided among 
those from whom words were either completely disconnected from drawings (no pictures), 
connected loosely to simple drawings (e.g., surrounding a mass or individual), or, as in the 
drawing by the 34-year-old man described earlier, more fully incorporated into more complex 
drawings. 
Occasionally, the representation of feelings was depicted as an explicitly extended 
metaphor, where words served to illustrate the metaphor. For example, in drawings of their 
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illness in the present time, five individuals drew pictures of their cancer buried in the ground 
beneath a tombstone on which “RIP” was written; in some cases, words provided the “death” 
date of an individual’s cancer as well. When asked to draw her cancer at the time of diagnosis, a 
26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung cancer 15 months earlier drew a picture of a road 
labeled “road of life,” which curved and led to a tombstone at the top of the page; for her 
drawing of her cancer at the time of the survey, she again drew the “road of life,” though this 
time the road was straight and led to an angel-like figure (Figures 17-18). Another individual 
drew a picture of a forest beside mountains and a sun, with the description, “I must climb a 
mountain full of trees, but I’ll get to that beautiful sunrise.” 
Some individuals used words within thought or dialogue bubbles, as if giving “voice” to 
individuals within the drawings (n = 15; 23.4%). These individuals “spoke” with a range of 
emotions including joy (e.g., “Yahoo”), fear (e.g., “My white blood cells are killing my red 
blood cells! Oh no!), reassurance (e.g., “I will always be here for you”), and displeasure (e.g., 
“This sucks. Game over.”), or need: as the 34-year-old man in the earlier example so simply and 
desperately states, “Help me!” 
The depiction of people in cancer drawings. There is a face in the center of Figure 19, 
but it does not belong to a person; instead, it belongs to cancer. With sharp teeth and angry eyes, 
it looks out menacingly and tauntingly, saying “Muhahahaha”. It is being viewed through a 
screen, possibly an x-ray-like device, and it radiates in multiple colors – purple, yellow, blue, and 
green. By contrast, the body it is attached to almost feels like an afterthought. It is hardly 
depicted at all. The edges of a crude torso are orange, drawn roughly so that lines overlap and 
make out the uneven form of two legs. A simple line indicates a belly button; there are no arms, 
there is no head, there is no human face. This depiction of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 
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24-year-old woman diagnosed with vaginal cancer four years earlier is emblematic of many of 
the representations of people, bodies, and faces found in the drawings. The quantitative analyses 
found an inverse association between System 1 thinking and the number of people, bodies, and 
faces represented in drawings, suggesting that these depictions may be related to the way 
individuals think about their illness. 
Overall, 59 participants (59.6%) drew either bodies or faces of people in their drawings. 
The vast majority of participants who drew people did not depict whole individuals (n = 56; 
94.9%), as in the drawing described earlier. That is, people were instead drawn as body parts 
with missing arms, hands, legs, feet, heads or facial features (e.g. nose, ears). Though drawings 
ranged in level of artistic aptitude, more than a third depicted individuals as stick figures (n = 22; 
37.3%). For those who drew faces in either drawing (n = 48; 48.5%), most depicted at least one 
face with missing features (n = 40; 83.3%).  
When humans were drawn, they were often depicted alone (88.1% of the participants 
who drew people). When groups of people were drawn, the drawings sometimes contained 
unlabeled others, or the people were explicitly labeled as friends or family members. As noted 
earlier, no one participant drew a doctor or medical professional (either explicitly labeled or 
drawn in medical uniform) in either drawing.  
The bodies depicted in drawings often contained both external (e.g. hands, faces) and 
internal (e.g., organs, tumors) elements, just as in the drawing by the 24-year-old woman 
described earlier. Nearly two thirds (n = 37; 62.7%) incorporated both internal and external 
elements, and the nature of these drawings ranged from simple to complex: For example, one 
participant drew a heart symbol over a stick figure, while another drew an intricate illustration of 
magnified breast cancer cells within a female body. 
69 
 
Abstract representations of illness in cancer drawings. In Figure 20, the choice of 
colors seems purposeful, if incomprehensible – brown, black, yellow, green, and red. A network 
of dots interconnect to create a lattice-work that suggests three dimensions. Red lines link a red 
dot to yellow and green. A black dot surrounded in green is connected to reds, and greens, and 
browns along many different colored lines. Colors are on top of colors, indicating the possibility 
of amending or correcting earlier drafts of the figure. And yet the figure itself remains 
mysterious – is it a molecule? A collection of cells? A tumor? The universe? Without words, 
more details or description, clear understanding remains elusive. 
This depiction of cancer in the present time by a 41-year-old man diagnosed with acute 
lymphocytic leukemia more than 25 years earlier, defies easy comprehension. Greater System 1 
thinking was associated with more abstract depictions of illness like his (i.e., those drawings with 
a dearth or absence of easily-identifiable people, places, things such that it is impossible to 
discern understanding, events, or circumstances), suggesting that the form and content of 
drawings may be related to the ways individuals conceive of their illness. A more qualitative 
interpretative analysis of the drawings coded as abstract (n = 34; 34.3%) found few 
consistencies. These drawings varied widely in terms of size, shape, and content. Size ranged 
from very small (pea-sized) to filling the entire drawing space with layers of colors. Shapes of 
objects were both rounded and angular. Abstract objects were both separated and linked together 
with lines. Some drawings incorporated iconography (e.g. objects that looked like hearts, 
lightning, hands, or veins), while others lacked any discernible shapes.  
Depiction of change in cancer drawings. The monster in Figure 21 somehow appears 
both menacing and silly. It has sharp teeth and big hands, yet it is covered in blue fur and is 
making a foolish, child-like smile. The 27-year-old woman diagnosed with bone cancer 12 years 
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earlier who drew it describes the drawing in detail in a description she returned with it. She 
writes, “In the ‘first diagnosed’ picture, the monster is more of a kids’ monster…while it was 
definitely a little bit of scary [then], the beast seemed beatable. Looking back, it seemed almost 
easy that first time.” 
It stands in stark contrast to the monster in Figure 22, which is nearly twice its size and is 
covered with a thick tree-like exoskeleton. Its head is shrunken and yellow, its hand is reaching 
out and crushing something within it. Leaves covering its body seem to rustle and fall. Of this 
monster, of the same woman’s cancer in the present time, the artist writes, “Today’s monster is 
bigger, tougher. With a relapse and a second cancer now at play, I have to fight much 
harder…but if you look closely, his hand is grasping for the growth. He’s losing a few leaves. 
He’s still huge and scary, but there’s hope and a chance that he can be defeated.” 
 These dual depictions of cancer provide an articulate representation of the ways the 
illness can grow and change over the course of a lifetime. The drawings by the 27-year-old 
woman simultaneously reveal the personal aspects of her own journey and common experiences, 
feelings, and fears many cancer patients may share. Drawings like hers and others can be 
examined both in terms of valence (positive or negative) and totality of change (i.e. with or 
without reservation), taking into account both words and content. Based on this scoring system, 
drawings naturally gathered into four categories. As noted earlier, depictions of positive change 
in one’s drawing were associated with both less distress and greater growth; furthermore, those 
in active treatment had fewer depictions of positive change. 
A small minority of those participants who completed drawings (n = 6; 6.1%) illustrated 
a negative change between drawings. In these drawings, the depicted tumors increased in size, 
the stage of the cancer increased (e.g. “stage 4”), or individuals candidly described their 
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worsening illness in words. One respondent poignantly wrote, “All the good things in my life are 
gone except a few friends and my son. I’ve lost everything including who I am…and soon my 
life.” 
Roughly one fifth (n = 18; 18.2%) depicted drawings that did not seem to differ from 
each other in terms of valence. Sometimes, the pair of drawings appeared nearly identical in 
terms of size, color, and content. In others, the size of depicted tumors remained the same. In still 
other cases, the cancer had changed forms, but that did not necessarily equate to a change in 
underlying feelings. For example, one individual drew a picture at the time of diagnosis of a 
headless body filled with spiky red-haired, angry faces with open mouths, labeled “angry tumors 
inside”. In the drawing of cancer in the present, the body was no longer filled with “angry 
tumors”; instead, it was replaced by “scar tissue.” Yet, the “angry tumors” had not disappeared. 
They were now floating in space, taunting the body mercilessly with phrases like, “I’m coming 
back!!” “You’re different” and “I never go away!” among others. 
The vast majority of respondents (n = 75; 75.7%) drew pictures that illustrated positive 
change, with drawings of cancer at the time of the survey containing universal widely-known 
symbols of triumph and happiness (e.g. sunshine, rainbows, finishing lines in races, 
mountaintops, smiles, etc.) and words of joy and hope (e.g. “Remission!” “Life gets better!” 
“Hair growing back,” “Healing”). But for more than half of those individuals (n = 44; 44.4%), 
the drawings of cancer at the time of the survey also depicted reservations or hesitations. Here, 
negative thoughts and feelings were manifest in multiple ways. Sometimes they appeared as 
words of uncertainty, remorse, or frustration (e.g. “Future?????” “Is it lurking, seeking an 
opportunity to return?” “Survivor’s guilt,” and “Bills suck.”); other times they appeared as in 
drawings (e.g. grey clouds over a sunny sky). One respondent articulately depicted a tiny 
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monster with red eyes, peeking out from behind a cracked door in the top corner of the drawing. 
Other individuals used a combination of words and pictures to convey their thoughts (e.g. a dark 
patches/clouds in otherwise bright drawing, with the words “cancer,” “cancer thoughts,” or 






At the heart of this dissertation is the question, “What are ways of thinking about illness 
representations of cancer?” It is a question that can be read in at least two ways. The first 
considers how individuals with cancer think about their illness, which has been at the theoretical 
center of the work. It considers how several factors, including thinking styles and physical 
manifestations of the illness (i.e. whether or not an individual has a tumor), may relate to the 
ways individuals conceive of their illness. Furthermore, it wonders whether individuals who 
think about their cancer differently from one another – believing they have more personal control 
over their illness or feeling that their illness will last forever – may be associated with differing 
outcomes in terms of adjustment, coping, vitality, and well-being. Here, illness representations 
provide the nucleus of a complex of related factors that are all involved in the process of 
understanding illness.  
Just as meaningfully, the central question may be read in a second way. This reading 
considers the ways researchers might understand and interpret the ways individuals make sense 
of their illnesses, which has been at the methodological center of the work. In one line of 
thinking, illness representations may be understood quantitatively and can be reduced to a 
number of discrete dimensions. Years of research have altered the number and content of these 
dimensions (Moss-Morris et al., 2002), a trend that is likely to continue as individuals attempt to 
understand, define, and include more aspects of illness in both cognitive and emotional realms. 
Qualitative analysis – here, in the form of drawings – provides evocative insights and hypotheses 
in the places where quantitative understanding and existing theory are limited. Working in 
tandem, quantitative and qualitative analyses bring together a narrative of understanding that is 
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greater than the sum of parts, bringing more understanding, depth, and richness than either 
methodology alone. 
Both the methodological and the theoretical come together to provide new ways to think 
about illness representations of cancer in the following discussion. The discussion begins by 
attempting to reconcile the personal, individual interpretations those with cancer have about their 
illness with the widely-held, common understanding those with cancer all share. Given these 
competing interpretations, the second section considers the multiple forms that individuals’ 
illness representations may take, with a conversation about whether particular interpretations of 
cancer may be harmful or beneficial or both. The third section attempts to understand how 
individuals thinking styles – System 1 (experiential) or System 2 (rational) thinking – may be 
related to the ways they make sense of their illness, and wonders whether one particular thinking 
style is advantageous over another. The final sections acknowledge the limits of the current 
research and consider future directions and possibilities. 
Cancer, Above All Else 
A shared understanding. In Illness as Metaphor, Sontag (1978) describes cancer in 
myriad metaphorical terms – as an invader, a revolt, and a form of self-expression, among others. 
Her conceptions are nearly as diverse as the cancer population itself, made up of individuals of 
all ages, colors, religions, and sexual orientations, as well as those who are rich and poor, single 
and married, unemployed and employed, relatively unschooled and highly educated. Yet, despite 
all of this seeming variety, results of the quantitative analyses in this study found no systematic 
differences in the ways individuals with cancer conceive of their illness across a wide range of 
demographic and medical variables, including age, gender, marital status, number of children, 
education level, annual income, time since diagnosis, and perceived survivability. Contrary to the 
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original primary hypothesis, even the physical form that cancer takes seems to have little 
connection to one’s illness representation, whether individuals have cancers with “liquid” tumors 
(as with leukemia or myeloma), masses (as with lymphoma), or tumor-based cancers. 
This does not mean that individuals with particular forms of cancers fail to have deeply-
held beliefs about their illness. Indeed, they may have strong representations and strong attitudes 
that underlie them. Furthermore, these results suggest that despite the range of metaphorical 
identities that cancer may take and the unique characteristics of those diagnosed with cancer, a 
common, shared understanding of “cancer” underlies all representations and supersedes most 
individual differences. Cancer is, well, cancer. 
Individual differences. The fact that a commonly-held conception of cancer exists does 
not suggest that individual differences are erased. For example, those with lymphoma (masses) 
were more likely to believe their illness was acute than either those with blood cancer or tumor-
based cancers, while those with tumor-based cancers were less likely to believe that the 
treatment course would determine the outcomes of their illness. Those who were older were 
more likely to believe that their cancer will be a chronic (life-long) rather than an acute 
condition. This finding suggests a potential explanation for the higher rates of suicide in older 
adults with cancer (Cole et al., 2014). Individuals with children understandably had a greater 
belief in consequences arising from their illness, while those who had a greater time since 
diagnosis had less of a belief in those consequences. Perhaps having the experience of living 
with cancer (or living cancer-free) for a time changes the ways individuals consider the impact of 
the illness on their lives and on the lives of others around them. 
Alternatively, it may be related to whether or not individuals are in active treatment. 
Across a number of dimensions, those who were in active treatment (that is, those patients who 
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are currently undergoing chemotherapy and radiation) did have some differing representations of 
their illness from those who were not in active treatment. Specifically, those in treatment 
attributed fewer symptoms to their cancer and were more likely to believe that their illness was 
more acute, less cyclical, and had fewer consequences. These results indicate that those currently 
undergoing active treatment may be dealing with unique challenges not experienced by the rest 
of the cancer population, findings already suggested by multiple cancer researchers (Holland, 
2002; Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015). Thus, more work should be done to understand and help 
those individuals with cancer while they undergo treatment. 
What cancer looks like. An examination of shared illness representations only provides 
a rough approximation of the ways those with cancer think about their illness. Overall, their 
illness representations are more often coherent than not; that is, those with cancer have found 
ways to make sense of their illness, even if those ways differ from person to person. Despite this 
understanding, as a group, they believe their illness is likely to stir up difficult feelings and 
emotions. Perhaps this is because, among other things, they have a strong belief that their illness 
will lead to consequences for themselves or others, particularly family and friends. Their sense of 
their illness timeline is wide-ranging: They are equally likely to believe that their illness will be 
either acute or chronic, cyclical or invariable. Finally, they are more likely to assign a locus of 
control to their illness than not. That is, they believe that their own actions or their treatment will 
determine the course of their illness. These findings differ somewhat from Moss-Morris et al.’s 
(2002) sample of those with chronic pain, in that scores for chronicity of the illness were 
generally lower, while coherence of illness representations and treatment control were higher. 
Though these data provide meaningful insights, they somehow fail to capture the depth 
and magnitude of a cancer diagnosis. There are multiple reasons to believe that cancer is a 
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significant, life-altering event that requires multiple coping strategies for a wide range of 
individuals, regardless of the form that cancer takes (Low, Beran, & Stanton, 2007). Most 
strikingly, as a population, more than half the sample meets criteria for depression, far greater 
than both depression rates in the general population and among other studies of cancer 
populations (Mitchell et al., 2011). Other indicators of individuals’ experiences of cancer, 
including drawings of their cancer, can provide even greater insight, perhaps even tapping into 
unconscious fantasies, fears, and beliefs about the illness. 
The isolation that is a part of cancer is perhaps most eloquently and concretely illustrated 
through cancer drawings. In them, a cancer diagnosis is generally depicted as both a lonely and 
solitary experience, in accordance with other cancer literature on the subject (e.g. Friedman, 
Florian, & Zernitsky-Shurka, 1989; Wells & Kelly, 2008). Though individuals are sometimes 
represented with friends or family at the time of diagnosis, far more often, they are drawn alone. 
Notably, neither doctors nor any other medical professionals were depicted in any of the 
drawings. Furthermore, the distress words that appear in many of the drawings seem to function 
as attempts to call out to others, who may or may not be present, supportive, or understanding. 
The significant negative correlation between the presence of words and Control Over Illness 
supports this assertion.  
Taken together, these findings suggest that for many, a cancer diagnosis is an isolating 
event. There are multiple reasons why this may be so: Among them, newly-diagnosed 
individuals may feel like they have been singled out from the rest of their social world, having 
contact with few individuals who are in precisely the same situation as they are. A diagnosis 
inevitably leads to some disruption in usual social ties, including an inability to perform the same 
work-related tasks or take part in the same social engagements, replaced instead with doctor and 
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hospital visits and home care. Society’s general stigma over discussing cancer and shame related 
to the illness may prevent individuals from disclosing their illness, causing them to feel further 
segregated. The treatment course itself may literally isolate individuals from others (e.g. stem-
cell and bone marrow transplants). Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, expressions of 
loneliness may be manifestations of an individual’s profound fear of death, the ultimate isolation. 
Other aspects of the drawings speak to a sudden change in identity where the illness 
becomes primary, where normalcy is shattered, and where wholeness is lost following a cancer 
diagnosis. In many individuals’ self-depictions of their cancer, they illustrated their bodies as 
transparent. Sometimes, the interior objects – such as bones, cells, and tumors – were drawn with 
greater detail than the external, which somehow seem like an afterthought. Furthermore, bodies 
rarely appeared whole; far more often, they were fragmented, incomplete, or missing features. 
These qualities seem manifestations of the ideas conveyed by anthropologist Susan 
DiGiacomo, who, after being diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, described her own search 
for “continuity and wholeness” by writing about her illness. Her wide-ranging essay Metaphor as 
Illness: Postmodern Dilemmas in the Representation of Body, Mind and Disorder addresses 
changes in bodily and mental representations following a cancer diagnosis. She describes the 
way prevailing biomedical viewpoints reify the transformation of the body “from an integrated 
and functioning adult into a collection of diseased body parts” (DiGiacomo, 1993, p. 120) and 
the subsequent loss of agency. In her conception, individuals becoming “acted-upon objects,” (p. 
122) passive receptacles or petri dishes for disease; agency is instead taken up by doctors who 
detect illnesses and seek cures. This depiction is not so far from the medical model used in the 
earliest theories of health behavior (Diefenbach & Leventhal, 1996). Its appearance in cancer 
drawings serves to show the intransigence of old and outdated paradigms that become deeply 
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ingrained in individuals’ conscious and unconscious representations of illness. The window 
provided by their cancer drawings provides a stark visual depiction of the upheaval, loss of 
wholeness, and subsequent disintegration that she describes. 
Impact on future research. Those who have been diagnosed with cancer have a widely-
shared, collective understanding of their illness, despite some individual differences. Put more 
simply, cancer trumps all. Demographic and medical characteristics, specific diagnoses, and 
treatment courses are secondary to cancer itself and all that it represents. Given that individuals 
with cancer seem to view their illness as both lonely and solitary, it is worth noting that they may 
have more in common with each other than they initially realize. This awareness could lead to 
interventions that might help individuals with cancer feel less alone – for example, changing the 
way the medical field separates those with various forms of cancer and different courses of 
treatment. Those who are seeking support may be encouraged to look farther afield – even to 
those with other forms of cancer – recognizing that many cancer-related experiences and feelings 
may be common or widely-shared. Those with rare forms of cancer and those who get cancer 
“off time” might feel less isolated and part of a larger community.  
The study data bring other facets of this representation to light – among them, the 
emotions cancer evokes, the fears of consequences on self and others, the sense of isolation, the 
potential loss of control, and the shattering of a sense of wholeness. Drawings allow for the 
incorporation of less-conscious representations. Using multiple methodologies begins to tap into 
those aspects of the illness that are difficult to quantify – for example, one’s sense of bodily 
integrity, or one’s ability to make use of available supports – which are underrepresented in 
conventional models of illness (Leventhal et al., 2012; Moss-Morris et al., 2002). Greater 
understanding of the ways these illness representations are formed and may be changed 
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(particularly those representations that negatively impact adjustment and coping strategies) can 
help guide future research. 
Types of Illness Representations 
Representations across the cancer population. Though much research has been done 
examining the relationships between illness representations and outcomes in individuals with 
various ailments, including specific forms of cancer (e.g. Hagger and Orbell, 2003; Leventhal et 
al., 2008; Llewellyn, McGurk, & Weinman, 2007; Stanton et al., 2007), less research has been 
conducted across the entire cancer population. While site-specific cancer studies indeed yield 
meaningful insights, there is also much to be gained by looking at a larger cross-section of those 
with multiple forms of cancer, particularly since it has been shown that the illness 
representations of cancer are widely shared. Results indicate that among those with various 
forms of cancer, illness representations are deeply connected to a range of measures of 
psychological adjustment, including those that are potentially harmful (depression, cancer-
related distress, and body image) as well as those are potentially protective (post-traumatic 
growth). 
Two subsets of representations. Results showed that the eight dimensions of illness 
representations measured by the IPQ-R could be organized into two subsets when associated 
with measures of distress and adjustment. One subset – consisting of a greater attribution of 
symptoms to one’s illness, a greater belief in one’s illness having consequences on self, friends 
and family, a greater belief that the illness is chronic or cyclical, and stronger emotional 
responses to illness – was associated with greater distress and worse adjustment outcomes. The 
other subset – consisting of a greater belief that the course of one’s illness is dependent either on 
self or on treatment, and a more coherent personal understanding of illness – was not only 
81 
 
significantly associated with less distress but also with greater positive growth. These subsets do 
not precisely match the factors of Control Over Illness and Illness Impact that were empirically 
derived through factor analysis; however, these findings are in accordance with other studies, 
including a meta-analysis on illness representations among populations with various illnesses 
(Hagger & Orbell, 2003), and more specifically in several cancer populations (Gould, Brown, & 
Bramwell, 2010; Rozema, Völlink, & Lechner, 2009). 
The subsets found in this dissertation match two subsets of dimensions described by 
Hagger and Orbell (2003) in their meta-analysis. Yet this study adds greater depth of 
understanding to their meta-analysis, which acknowledges the difficulty of making cross-
comparisons because of moderating variables such as “illness type, severity, chronicity, and 
symptomatic characteristics” (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). Even for those with multiple forms of 
cancer, ranging in symptomatology, severity, and chronicity, results of the meta-analysis were 
widely supported.  
To Hagger and Orbell (2003), the driving force behind the first subset of dimensions is 
illness identity. They theorize that those individuals with strong illness identities (that is, those 
who had strong beliefs that symptoms were related to their illness) were more likely to endorse 
greater chronicity/cyclicality and believe in worse consequences. This hypothesis intuitively 
makes sense, and there is now strong, collective evidence across multiple studies to support both 
the claim and the associations between these dimensions.  
Various studies have found a relationship between the second subset of dimensions and 
psychological well-being, vitality, and greater social functioning. It was originally theorized that 
those who had a stronger belief in control over their illness would be more engaged, better able 
to plan, and ultimately, better able to cope with the illness (Hager & Orbell, 2003; Moss-Morris 
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et al., 1996). However, subsequent changes to the IPQ divided the control dimension into two 
components – belief in personal control over illness and belief that treatment course determines 
the outcome – allowing for a more nuanced understanding about the nature of control as it relates 
to function. 
Results from this study showed that both personal control and treatment control were 
related to outcome. Rather than a stronger belief in personal control, it seems that the process of 
ascribing a locus of control either to oneself or one’s treatment may be related to better 
adjustment outcomes. This is congruent with Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaptation to 
illness in which making an attribution for one’s cancer – any attribution – was related to better 
adjustment. 
Moreover, this finding occurs regardless of whether or not an individual is engaged in 
active treatment, in contrast to some other studies (Rozema et al., 2009). In fact, being in active 
treatment was related to four dimensions of illness representations – stronger illness identity, 
greater belief that the illness is either chronic or cyclical, and greater belief in consequences 
arising from the illness – and these four dimensions are generally related to greater distress and 
less growth (Hagger & Orbell, 2003). Yet there were no direct or indirect relationships between 
being in active treatment and measures of adjustment and growth. This reinforces the notion that 
this population faces unique and complicated challenges that are not fully understood and defy 
simple categorization (Holland, 2002; Jacobsen & Andrykowski, 2015). 
Overwhelmingly, research has established that self-generated feelings of control (i.e., 
personal control) are related to better adjustment to illness in a cancer population (Osowiecki & 
Compass, 1998; Taylor, Helgeson, Reed, & Skokan, 1991; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984); 
however, this finding comes with a few caveats: The cross-sectional nature of research – 
83 
 
including this study – makes it difficult to find causality, and there is no consensus about 
whether the attribution of control is directly related to outcomes or whether the relationship is 
moderated by circumstantial factors (e.g. illness severity, prognosis, etc.).  
Furthermore, research has found considerable disagreement about whether internal or 
external attributions of control are more beneficial for psychological adjustment to illness 
(Andrykowski & Brady, 1994). Taylor et al., (1991) theorize that vicarious control, a belief in 
powerful others who have the ability to control difficult events in a individual’s life, may be akin 
to personal control in terms of benefits. For those with cancer, this may be equivalent to belief in 
the medical establishment’s ability to treat the illness (i.e., treatment control). However, 
prognosis may play a large role in whether vicarious control is related to greater adjustment, 
meaning those with a poor prognosis do not benefit from this kind of control. Put simply and 
bluntly, vicarious control only “may be adaptive only when there is, in fact, something that can 
be controlled” (Taylor et al., 1991, p. 106). 
Taylor et al.’s (1991) belief that control over illness and illness severity are linked is 
supported by findings in the current study. A factor analysis of illness representations generated 
the variable Control Over Illness, comprised of the dimensions of personal control, treatment 
control, and timeline (acute/chronic, reversed). Here, the timeline dimension may serve as a 
proxy for either illness severity or prognosis, though it is noteworthy that one’s beliefs do not 
have to match the actual survival rates for a particular type of cancer. Thus, individuals with 
greater attributions of control, either in self or in the course of treatment, and those who believe 
that their illness is more likely to be acute (shorter in duration) are those with greater Control 
Over Illness, and those who are more likely to have better adjustment outcomes.  
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Locating emotions and meta-cognitions. Though the dimensions of emotional 
representations and illness coherence were not measured in early studies, there are reasons to 
believe that they have always played an important role in the ways that individuals conceive of 
their illness. For example, in a chronic fatigue syndrome population, the first subset of 
dimensions (not accounting for emotional representations) has been associated with greater 
venting of emotions, perhaps long serving as a proxy for this latent dimension; similarly, the 
second subset of dimensions (not accounting for illness coherence) has long been associated with 
cognitive reappraisal and planning (Moss-Morris et al., 1996).  
The meta-analysis (and most early studies) does not fully account for variables that 
consider the emotional pathway of the common sense model (CSM; Leventhal et al., 2012) or 
meta-cognitions of illness. This study, by contrast, illustrates how emotional and meta-cognitive 
variables may fit into the model. Results from the study showed that one subset of illness 
representations consisted of both cognitive variables (except for the control dimensions) and an 
emotional component; the second subset consisted of the control dimension as well as the meta-
cognitive component. 
The fact that these cognitive and emotional constituents are found side-by-side in these 
groupings supports Leventhal et al.’s (2012) original schema, giving additional support to the 
idea that the CSM is a dual-processing model that simultaneously handles both cognitive and 
emotional streams of information. Furthermore, a search for latent variables through factor 
analysis established the dimension of Illness Impact, where cognitive and emotional 
representations work in tandem to explain the multiple ways cancer impacts individuals. 
Future work on illness representations. It now seems established that illness 
representations are deeply connected to various measures of adjustment and well-being among 
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individuals coping with serious illness. Thus, they provide a provocative area of research when 
thinking about ways to affect change in those with illnesses. Yet, much work remains to be done 
to understand how people arrive at particular representations of their illness, whether these 
representations are stable or mutable, and whether particular interventions can change individual 
representations. Furthermore, it is unclear what mediators and moderators may affect the links 
between illness representations and these outcomes. 
Determining to what extent the processes of emotional venting and cognitive reappraisal 
can be attributed to the dimensions of emotional representations and illness coherence is a 
meaningful area for future study. It is worthwhile continuing to understand to what extent 
emotions serve as a proxy for those representations which cannot be easily quantified, such as 
unconscious beliefs or fantasies, and how these representations can be best understood and 
measured.  
Thinking Styles: Two Roads Diverge 
Differing pathways. Results indicated that individuals use both experiential (System 1) 
thinking and rational (System 2) thinking when making sense of their cancer. These thinking 
styles are orthogonal, such that it is possible for individuals to use more or less of either or both 
types of thinking at any given time (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). This conception of thinking styles 
fits precisely within the framework of the CSM, where cognitive and emotional streams are 
processed independently but concurrently (Leventhal et al., 2012). 
More provocatively, the results suggest that the ways individuals make sense of their 
illness differ for those who use either more System 1 or System 2 thinking. Though it was 
originally hypothesized that those who rely more heavily on System 1 thinking would have a 
more difficult time adjusting to their cancer, the data did not support the claim. Instead, System 1 
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thinkers found other ways to make sense of their illness that did not necessarily rely on cognitive 
appraisals or rationalization.  
System 1 thinking was associated with greater post-traumatic growth. This suggests that 
those who rely more on feelings and intuition may be better able to grow after experiencing 
difficult circumstances. Conversely, those who have greater adjustment following trauma might 
be better able to access their feelings and intuitions. Only longitudinal data can untangle this.  
Among those with cancer, System 1 thinking was also related to several outcome 
measures of adjustment including depression, cancer-related distress and post-traumatic growth, 
through indirect pathways. For System 1 thinkers, the pathway from thinking style to adjustment 
was mediated by Control Over Illness. This collection of representations is comprised of 
dimensions that attribute a locus of control either to oneself or to the course of treatment and are 
associated with a stronger belief in the acuity of one’s illness.  
According to the CSM, those who utilize higher levels of System 1 thinking find ways to 
cope by believing that either they or their treatment will affect the outcome of their illness and by 
believing that their illness will not last for a long time. At times, this method of coping may share 
much in common with the defensive strategy of denial. Yet, one could hypothesize that, given 
the severity of the diagnosis, denial could indeed support a greater sense of hope, activity, 
personal control, and less overt distress, all of which could be highly beneficial. It should be 
noted that those who utilized greater levels of System 1 thinking in this study did not report 
fewer depression or less cancer-related distress than those who utilized greater levels of System 2 
thinking. That is, forming these particular illness representations was not more beneficial than 
any other method of processing utilized by those who relied more heavily on System 2 thinking. 
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Perhaps forming these representations is the way that System 1 thinkers with cancer deal with 
their illness as best they can.  
System 2 thinking was directly associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms, 
suggesting that the act of thinking rationally and logically about one’s cancer may help people 
feel better about their illness; however, because the data are cross-sectional, it is also possible 
that those who are less depressed were more likely to exhibit greater levels System 2 thinking. 
Theory suggests that being more depressed may make it harder to process things cognitively, as 
System 2 processing requires greater cognitive abilities than the more elemental and intuitive 
System 1 processing (Peters et al., 2008; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). It follows then that less 
stress on cognitive systems – such as when one feels less depressed – may allow a person to 
better utilize their System 2 processing systems. Leventhal et al. (2012) suggests that both 
scenarios may be correct, and that the process of adjustment is both multidirectional and 
recursive. It is worth noting that System 2 thinking was not directly or indirectly related to the 
other outcomes of cancer-specific distress, body image, or post-traumatic growth. These findings 
may be in part attributable to the preponderance of globally-focused, overtly emotion-based 
items on the measures; those who utilize greater System 2 thinking may be less likely to endorse 
these items under any circumstances. More broadly, the findings imply that the multiple 
processes of coping occur along many different paths in multiple ways, and that System 2 
thinking may only play a limited, if meaningful, role in some forms of adjustment. 
Strikingly, the differences in System 1 and System 2 thinking could be detected in 
individuals’ drawings of their cancer. Those findings suggest that unconscious processes play a 
role in the formation and development of illness representations. Greater System 1 thinking was 
associated with drawings that were more abstract, used fewer words, and were less likely to 
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depict people (and consequently faces and bodies). Despite these commonalities, abstract 
drawings took myriad forms. They were small and large, were generally colorless or included 
wide swaths of color, depicted single and multiple shapes, and connected those objects through 
links or left them separated. These findings are in keeping with commonly-held stereotypes 
about the differences between System 1 and System 2 thinkers (see Evans & Over, 1996; 
Epstein, 1994; Goel, 1995; Shafir & LeBouf, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
In this study, System 1 thinkers were less likely to rationalize their illness by symbolizing it in 
words or making metaphors of it through text or drawings. They were less likely to tether their 
conceptions of their illness to concrete objects like people, places, and things; and they were 
more likely to draw abstract shapes or even formless colors that somehow personally and 
provocatively represented their illnesses. Greater utilization of System 1 thinking did not prevent 
individuals from making sense of their illness. 
All roads lead to Rome. As hypothesized, illness representations were associated with 
positive and negative adjustment outcomes. This suggests that individuals may have multiple 
ways of understanding – some that are more personal and others that are shared. Some survivors 
may use words or pictures as metaphors to describe their cancer, while others rely on feelings 
and abstractions. Sontag’s exhaustive catalog of metaphors may have limits, as some patients 
may not rely on metaphors at all to make sense of their illnesses; study results suggest they may 
make meaning in ways that cannot be described in words or images. If this discussion is to be 
answered definitively, more work will need to be done to find precise ways to assess metaphor 
more fully. 
At first it may seem contradictory that, although there appears to be a widely-held, 
common understanding of cancer among those who have been diagnosed with the illness, those 
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with cancer nonetheless seek to understand their illness using dramatically different methods. 
Perhaps the adage that all roads lead to Rome applies here: Although individuals may make sense 
of their cancer uniquely and personally, they ultimately arrive some level of shared 
understanding, and consequently some common illness representations. Though the process of 
adjusting to cancer is overwhelmingly difficult for all, those with differing thinking styles utilize 
distinct methods in order to adjust to their illness. Despite those differences, these strategies, 
both directly and indirectly related to measures of coping, are equally effective (or ineffective, as 
the case may be) for both groups. Perhaps it is better said that all roads lead to Rome, even if 
some have to ascend mountains to get there. Future research aimed at interventions designed to 
help individuals deal with their illness should be conscious of the cancer population’s 
heterogeneity, not only in terms of its symptoms and treatment, but also in terms of thinking 
styles and illness representations.  
Study Limitations 
 Footfalls echo in the memory 
Down the passage which we did not take 
Towards the door we never opened 
Into the rose-garden (Eliot, 1943, p. 3). 
In his Four Quartets, T.S. Eliot reminds readers and researchers of what might have 
come to fruition had a different path been followed. Such regrets are true even with research, and 
over the course of several years, the myriad decisions made while studying the ways individuals 
with cancer think about their illness offer no exception. Limitations exist in both the study’s 
sample and constructs. 
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First, the study data were collected at one time. Therefore, it is impossible to determine 
directionality of causal relationships between styles of thinking, illness representations and 
adjustment. The decision to have individuals draw their cancer both at the time of diagnosis and 
in the present attempts to mitigate this limitation in one instance, but even that measure only 
roughly imagines and approximates the passage of time. Furthermore, when assessing constructs 
like thinking style and illness representations, it is impossible to know whether these traits are 
relatively stable (as hypothesized) or more amorphous and mutable, and what biological, 
psychological, or social circumstances, if any, may bring about changes. 
A second limitation involves the generalizability of the findings. A decision was made to 
include as wide a range of individuals with cancer as possible – young and old, male and female, 
rich and poor, etc. Doing so provides answers to particular questions about the population at 
large, but at the cost of specificity. The sample was limited by the number of individuals who 
had any particular type of cancer, so comparisons between cancer types were impossible. 
Similarly, the subsamples weren’t large enough to examine the hypotheses for any single type.  
Despite efforts to be as inclusive as possible, the sample is nonetheless homogenous – 
largely female, white, younger, Christian (including Catholic), heterosexual, and well-educated. 
This specificity limits the validity of findings to a general population. These results are likely a 
consequence of recruitment through an online support organization. In general, younger, white 
women are more likely to seek support online (Im et al., 2007), and these attributes likely extend 
to online support communities and social networks (Owen et al., 2010; Owen, Bantum, Gorlick, 
& Stanton, 2015). Because the recruitment source, Stupid Cancer, brands itself as providing a 
community for young people with cancer, the population might have been even younger than 
what was typically anticipated for online recruitment. The decision to recruit a younger sample 
91 
 
of adults who may be more distressed, given that their cancer is an “off-time” event (Revenson et 
al., 2013; Stanton et al., 2007) further limits generalizability across the lifespan. 
A third limitation was the failure to ask individuals whether or not they had or were 
undergoing surgery for their illness; this was nothing more than an error made in adapting some 
questions, but a critical one in light of this study’s central hypotheses. Taking into account 
surgery status might have yielded important insights about illness representations, cancer-related 
distress, and body image in both quantitative and drawing measures. Surgery often results in 
removal of the cancer, or at least a concrete symbol of the cancer, which could have affected 
System 1 and 2 thinking, illness representations, and outcomes Those participants who were in 
active treatment had different illness representations from those who were not. While few might 
have considered surgery as active treatment, it may have shaped illness representations. The 
active treatment variable in this study, however, does tell us about those undergoing adjuvant 
treatment (chemotherapy or radiation) for their cancer and, as such, is valuable. 
Finally, the multi-dimensional structure of several of the variables in the model – 
specifically, the eight measurable dimensions of illness representations – and the finding that the 
mediated effect size was small (rather than small-to-medium, as hypothesized) made it difficult 
to maintain adequate statistical power throughout the study. Though every effort was made to 
increase power by gathering data from a sufficiently large sample size and combining multiple 
variables into single factors where conceptually and theoretically appropriate, nonetheless, the 
possibility of type I errors persists. Hypotheses involving the mediated model were unable to 
withstand tests designed to correct for family-wise error (e.g. Benjamini, Krieger, & Yekutieli, 





This dissertation began with a belief that a clearer understanding of cancer could help 
everyone in the cancer community – patients, family, friends, and doctors, among others – better 
appreciate, speak about, respond to, and treat those in need. The aim is as simple to comprehend 
as the realization of that goal is difficult. It has been long known that cancer is often cryptic, 
inscrutable and enigmatic. Doctors, philosophers, and writers have all made attempts to make 
sense of it, and despite their inevitable failures at simplification and clarification, the aim 
rightfully persists. 
 Results from this dissertation get at some of these core difficulties, as they establish two, 
sometimes contradictory lines of thinking. On one hand, cancer can be an immensely personal, 
lonely, isolating, disruptive, perspective-shattering experience. There is no one who quite has the 
same understanding of cancer as any one individual, and that makes comparisons between 
individuals with cancer impossible. With this in mind, it seems important for those in the 
community to be open to multiple interpretations and understandings, to appreciate the viewpoint 
of the individual, and to make every effort to empathize with views that are different from our 
own beliefs. 
On the other hand, cancer can be understood collectively, regardless of the particular 
form that it takes or the individual whom it strikes. According to this line of thinking, cancer is 
bigger than any individual representation of it, and there is strength and hope that may be gained 
from shared understanding. Consequently, the medical establishment should rightfully wonder 
why those with particular forms of cancer are seen in different hospital wings, and why those 
facing similar struggles are intentionally cordoned off from one another. Likewise, future 
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research should consider the costs and benefits of studying the whole population rather than 
those with any particular form of cancer. 
Sontag also aimed to understand cancer to relieve suffering (Sontag, 1978). She hoped 
that an inventory of metaphors could demystify the illness, so that metaphors would no longer be 
necessary and that cancer could then be spoken of directly (Clow, 2001). This approach, while 
noble, seems myopic and fundamentally limiting of the role of metaphor; nonetheless, her 
shortcoming is indicative of a more widely-held misunderstanding (and one which is sometimes 
even shared in this study): the belief that the ultimate reason for understanding cancer is to 
decrease pain and increase happiness for those in need. What if instead, the goal is not in finding 
a single correct interpretation or quantifying the illness into understandable dimensions, but 
instead in appreciating the process of meaning-making? As Viktor Frankl eloquently states in his 
holocaust memoir, Man’s Search for Meaning, “Man’s main concern is not to gain pleasure or to 
avoid pain but rather to see a meaning in his life” (Frankl, 1962, p. 136). That is, making 
meaning of cancer, either personally or collectively, is fundamental to the experience of having 
cancer. As an end in itself, meaning making is essential to our humanity and to the experience of 
what it means to be alive. This meaning can be found in metaphorical words, symbolic drawings, 
a measure of post-traumatic growth or other sources. It can be found in thoughts and feelings, in 
processes conscious and unconscious, that are much more difficult to symbolize but are equally 
valid. While beautiful in its richness and variety, what we think cancer looks like – the way we 
see it, draw it, think about it, or feel it – may be relatively unimportant; yet, our ability to fathom 




Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Illness Representation 
Illness Representation Mean Median SD Possible Range Actual Range Cronbach’s α 
Illness Identity 6.36 6.00 3.74 0-14 0-14 --a 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) 19.60 20.00 6.66 6-30 6-30 .92 
Timeline (Cyclical) 11.61 12.00 3.71 4-20 4-20 .77 
Consequences 24.84 25.00 3.96 6-30 6-30 .80 
Personal Control 19.78 20.00 4.50 6-30 7-30 .82 
Treatment Control 17.49 18.00 3.65 5-25 5-25 .76 
Illness Coherence 18.52 19.00 4.45 5-25 5-25 .86 
Emotional Representations 21.85 23.00 5.23 6-30 6-30 .89 
Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions 
Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater 
endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness 
representation. 







Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Thinking Style 
Thinking Style Mean Median SD Possible Range Actual Range Cronbach’s α 
System 1 Thinking 3.62 3.65 0.57 1-5 1.85-4.95 .89 
Experiential Abilities 3.65 3.70 0.60 1-5 1.80-5.00 .88 
Experiential Engagement 3.59 3.70 0.61 1-5 1.60-5.00 .86 
System 2 Thinking 3.87 3.90 0.55 1-5 2.10-5.00 .92 
Rational Abilities 3.89 3.90 0.59 1-5 1.80-5.00 .83 
Rational Engagement 3.85 3.80 0.62 1-5 1.60-5.00 .84 






Descriptive Statistics for Measures of Psychological Functioning 
Psychological Functioning Mean Median SD Possible Range Actual Range Cronbach’s α 
CES-D Depressive Symptoms 20.06 18.00 12.38 0 - 60 1 - 56 .92 
IES-R Cancer Related Distress 27.04 25.00 16.93 0 - 88 0 - 80 .93 
Intrusion 1.37 1.25 0.92 0 - 4 0 - 4 .88 
Avoidance 1.17 1.00 0.77 0 - 4 0 - 3.75 .80 
Hyperarousal 1.12 1.00 0.95 0 - 4 0 - 4 .85 
EORTC Body Image 2.76 3.00 0.95 1 - 4 1 - 4 .87 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 30.52 31.00 11.59 0 - 50 0 - 50 .89 
Note. n = 305 for all analyses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event 
Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic 





Participant Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic n % 
Age (n = 298, M = 35.08, SD = 9.37, 
Range = 20 - 63) 
  
Gender (n = 305)   
 Female 264 86.6 
 Male 41 13.4 
Ethnicity (n = 304)   
 White/Caucasian 269 88.5 
 Latino 7 2.3 
 Black or African American 8 2.6 
 Asian or Pacific Islander 5 1.6 
 Multi-ethnic or Other 15 4.9 
Sexual Orientation (n = 305)   
 Heterosexual 274 89.8 
 Bisexual 20 3.6 
 Homosexual 11 6.6 
Relationship Status (n = 305)   
 Married or Long-term Partner 151 49.5 
 Single 131 43.0 
 Divorced 18 5.9 
 Separated 3 1.0 
 Widowed 2 0.7 
Children (n = 300)   
 None 193 64.3 
 1 47 15.7 
 2 40 13.3 
 3 13 4.3 
 4 5 1.7 






Participant Demographic Characteristics (Continued) 
Characteristic n % 
Religion (n = 301)   
 Christian (incl. Catholic) 182 60.5 
 Atheist or Agnostic 95 31.6 
 Jewish 13 4.3 
 Other 11 3.7 
Employment Status (n = 304)   
 Employed 177 58.0 
 On Medical Leave/Disability 59 19.3 
 Student 30 9.8 
 Keeping House (Unpaid) 15 4.9 
 Seeking Work 15 4.9 
 Retired 4 1.3 
 Unemployed 4 1.3 
Total Family Income (n = 294)   
 < $25,000 76 25.9 
 $25,000-49,999 64 21.7 
 $50,000-74,999 58 19.7 
 $75,000-99,999 38 13.0 
 $100,000-149,999 40 13.6 
 > $150,000 18 6.1 
Highest Level of Education (n = 305)   
 Some High School or Less 1 0.3 
 High School Graduate or GED 15 4.9 
 Vocational College or Some College 62 20.3 
 College Degree 120 39.3 






Participant Medical Characteristics 
Characteristic n % 
Time Since Diagnosis (n = 304, M = 52.35,  
SD = 63.74, Range = 3- 410) 
  
Masses or Tumors (n = 294)   
 Currently have a mass/tumor 59 19.9 
 Had a mass/tumor (in the past) 192 64.9 
 Never had a mass/tumor 45 15.2 
Had Chemotherapy (n = 305)   
 Yes 243 79.7 
 No 62 20.3 
Had Radiation (n = 305)   
 Yes 139 45.6 
 No 166 54.4 
Had a Transplant (n = 305)   
 Yes 19 6.2 
 No 286 93.8 
In Active Treatment (n = 305)   
 Yes 71 23.3 
 No 234 76.7 
   






Participants by Cancer Site 
Cancer Type (n = 305) n % 
Breast 65 21.3 
Lymphoma  16.7 
 Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 36 11.8 
 Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma 15 4.9 
Genital System  12.8 
 Ovary 20 6.6 
 Uterine Cervix/Corpus 9 3.0 
 Testis 6 2.0 
 Prostate 2 0.7 
 Vagina and Other Genital, Female 2 0.7 
Leukemia  9.1 
 Leukemia (Acute Lymphocytic; ALL) 14 4.6 
 Leukemia (Acute Myeloid; AML) 11 3.6 
 Leukemia (Chronic Lymphocytic; CLL) 2 0.7 
 Leukemia (Chronic Lymphocytic; CLL) 1 .3 
Endocrine System  7.5 
 Thyroid 17 5.6 
 Other Endocrine 6 2.0 
Digestive System  6.2 
 Colon 13 4.3 
 Anus, Anal Canal, Anorectum, Rectum 3 1.0 
 Pancreas 3 1.0 
Brain and Other Nervous System 11 3.6 
Melanoma 10 3.3 
Soft Tissue (Including Heart) 9 3.0 
Urinary System  2.6 
 Kidney and Renal Pelvis 7 2.3 






Participants by Cancer Site (Continued) 
Cancer Type (n = 305) n % 
Myeloma 6 2.0 
Bones and Joints 5 1.6 
Lung and Bronchus 4 1.3 
Oral  0.6 
 Mouth 1 0.3 
 Pharynx 1 0.3 





Correlations Between Continuous Demographic Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles  
 Age 
(n = 298) 
# of Children 
(n = 300) 
Education 
(n = 305) 
Income 
(n = 294) 
Psychological Functioning     
CES-D Depressive Symptoms .07 -.06 -.07 -.21*** 
IES-R Cancer Related Distress -.10 -.04 -.01 -.09 
EORTC Body Image -.07 .00 -.02 -.04 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth -.08 .06 -.02 -.03 
Illness Representations     
Illness Identity .00 .04 .01 -.04 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) .20*** .06 .01 -.07 
Timeline (Cyclical) -.04 .00 .04 -.12* 
Consequences .04 .13* -.04 -.08 
Personal Control .01 .05 .01 .01 
Treatment Control -.10 -.01 .04 .11† 
Illness Coherence .06 .05 -.02 .12* 
Emotional Representations -.05 .01 .10 .00 
Thinking Style     
System 1 Thinking -.02 .11* -.06 -.12* 
System 2 Thinking .00 -.13* .32*** .18** 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European 
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations 
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher 
raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness 
representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40). 





Associations Between Categorical Demographic Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles  
 Gender 
(n = 305) 
Ethnicity 
(n = 304) 
Sexual Orientation 
(n = 305) 
Marital Status 
(n = 305) 
Parent Status 
(n = 300) 
Religiona 
(n = 301) 
Psychological Functioning       
CES-D Depressive Symptoms -1.79† -1.32 -1.26 -2.03* -0.58 0.09 
IES-R Cancer Related Distress -0.84 -0.94 -1.26 -0.62 0.21 0.64 
EORTC Body Image 1.13 -0.25 -1.64 -0.00 0.43 0.53 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 0.29 -0.29 0.52 1.93† 1.23 11.99*** 
Illness Representations       
Illness Identity 0.53 1.41 -2.58* 1.09 -0.27 1.43 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) 1.11 0.57 -2.79** 0.30 1.21 1.55 
Timeline (Cyclical) 0.16 -0.27 -2.07* -1.66† -0.58 0.16 
Consequences 0.33 0.66 -2.28* 1.27 2.08 0.82 
Personal Control -1.51 -0.31 0.01 0.99 0.98 0.87 
Treatment Control -0.82 0.73 2.24* -0.08 -0.49 0.13 
Illness Coherence 0.16 1.49 0.39 0.11 0.81 0.14 
Emotional Representations -0.17 -0.66 -1.60 0.69 1.16 0.34 
Thinking Style       
System 1 Thinking 0.11 0.18 -1.05 -0.24 1.55 1.44 
System 2 Thinking 0.68 -0.48 -0.98 -0.73 -2.52* 1.53 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European 
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations 
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” 
higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic 
illness representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40). 
aCoefficients for “Ethnicity,” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values. 




Correlations Between Continuous Medical Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles  
 Time Since Diagnosis 
(n = 304) 
Survivability % 
(n = 281) 
Psychological Functioning   
CES-D Depressive Symptoms -.06 -.04 
IES-R Cancer Related Distress -.22*** -.06 
EORTC Body Image -.13* .00 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth .01 -.10 
Illness Representations   
Illness Identity -.04 -.04 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) .02 -.08 
Timeline (Cyclical) -.03 .02 
Consequences -.14* -.08 
Personal Control -.05 .08 
Treatment Control -.14* .04 
Illness Coherence -.03 .12† 
Emotional Representations -.08 -.05 
Thinking Style   
System 1 Thinking -.09 .00 
System 2 Thinking .06 -.01 
Note. Survivability calculated by matching participants by gender and cancer site with National Cancer Institute Surveillance, Epidemiology 
and End Results (SEER) survivability statistics. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale 
– Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short 
Form. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline 
(Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a 
more chronic illness representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40). 





Associations between Categorical Medical Variables and Psychological Functioning, Illness Representations, and Thinking Styles 
 Mass/Tumor 
(n = 294) 
Had Chemotherapy 
(n = 305) 
Had Radiation 
(n = 305) 
Had Transplant 
(n = 305) 
In Active Treatment 
(n = 305) 
Psychological Functioning      
CES-D Depressive Symptoms -0.55 -0.15 0.83 0.59 0.85 
IES-R Cancer Related Distress -0.96 -1.34 0.10 0.22 0.78 
EORTC Body Image -0.78 2.36* 0.53 1.66† 1.75† 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth -1.17 0.59 -0.21 0.10 0.55 
Illness Representations      
Illness Identity 0.27 1.88† 0.52 1.21 2.57* 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) -1.06 -1.14 0.20 0.51 2.78** 
Timeline (Cyclical) 1.25 1.30 1.79† 0.27 2.95** 
Consequences -0.46 3.15** 0.75 1.28 3.78*** 
Personal Control -0.58 -0.49 0.20 -0.81 1.05 
Treatment Control -2.00* 0.90 -0.06 -0.12 -0.19 
Illness Coherence 1.24 0.64 1.25 -0.78 0.88 
Emotional Representations 0.39 0.28 0.10 -0.50 -0.27 
Thinking Style      
System 1 Thinking -1.07 -0.17 -1.48 0.07 -0.75 
System 2 Thinking 0.87 0.44 -0.53 0.92 -0.68 
Note. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European 
Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. Illness representations 
were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher 
raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness 
representation. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40). 
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† = p ≤ .10, * = p ≤ .05, ** = p ≤ .01, *** = p ≤ .001. 
 
Table 11 
Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Psychological Functioning 
 Tumor Status    95% CI  
Psychological Functioning No Mass/Tumor Mass/Tumor t df p LL UL Cohen’s d 
CES-D Depressive Symptoms 21.00 (11.73) 19.90 (12.50) -0.55 303 .58 -5.04 2.84 -0.09 
IES-R Cancer-Related Distress 29.30 (17.24) 26.66 (16.88) -0.96 299 .34 -0.37 0.13 -0.15 
 Intrusion 1.39 (0.92) 1.36 (0.92) -0.18 301 .86 -0.32 0.27 -0.03 
 Avoidance 1.35 (0.90) 1.13 (0.74) -1.77 300 .08† -0.47 0.02 -0.27 
 Hyperarousal 1.22 (0.95) 1.10 (0.95) -0.77 300 .44 -0.42 0.19 -0.13 
EORTC Body Image  2.86 (1.03) 2.74 (0.94) -0.78 303 .44 -0.42 0.28 -0.12 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 32.38 (12.72) 30.20 (11.38) -1.17 303 .24 -5.86 1.50 -0.18 
Note. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event 
Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – 
Short Form. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 






Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Psychological Functioning 

















CES-D Depressive Symptoms 20.03 (12.15) 20.23 (10.86) 19.98 (12.99) 0.36 2, 282 .70 .00 
IES-R Cancer-Related Distress 29.87 (18.75) 25.40 (16.56) 27.13 (17.00) 0.65 2, 278 .52 .00 
 Intrusion  1.38 (0.90) 1.31 (0.93) 1.38 (0.92) 0.12 2, 280 .88 .00 
 Avoidance  1.34 (1.01) 1.02 (0.62) 1.16 (0.76) 1.63 2, 279 .20 .01 
 Hyperarousal  1.36 (1.05) 1.12 (0.93) 1.11 (0.96) 0.87 2, 279 .42 .01 
EORTC Body Image  3.03 (0.99) 2.69 (0.89) 2.76 (0.94) 1.40 2, 282 .25 .01 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 32.77 (12.16) 28.58 (11.53) 30.75 (11.24) 1.41 2, 282 .25 .01 
Note. Standard Deviations appear in parentheses. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event 







Correlations between Thinking Styles and Psychological Functioning 
  Thinking Style 
Psychological Functioning System 1 System 2 
CES-D Depressive Symptoms -.08 -.15** 
 CES-D Depression Cutoff (>16) -.15** -.08 
IES-R Cancer-Related Distress -.01 -.03 
 Intrusion  .00 -.01 
 Avoidance  -.04 -.02 
 Hyperarousal  .01 -.06 
EORTC Body Image .04 .02 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth .27*** -.02 
Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Thinking Style measured by the Rational Experiential 
Inventory (REI-40). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; IES-
R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research 
and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. 





Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Depressive Symptoms 
 System 2 Thinking     
System 1 Thinking Low n High n F df p η2 
 Low 22.59 (12.97) 79 19.36 (11.44) 73     
 High 20.73 (12.97) 71 17.67 (11.76) 82     
Main effects and interaction on depressive symptoms. 
System 1 Thinking     1.58  1, 301 0.21 .00 
System 2 Thinking     4.98  1, 301 0.03* .02 
System 1*System 2     0.00  1, 301 0.95 .00 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-
40). Depressive symptoms measured by the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). 






Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Cancer-Related Distress 
 System 2 Thinking     
System 1 Thinking Low n High n F df p η2 
 Low 28.15 (18.61) 79 26.25 (15.26) 71     
 High 26.84 (17.18) 70 26.83 (16.62) 81     
Main effects and interaction on cancer-related distress. 
System 1 Thinking     0.04  1, 297 0.85 .00 
System 2 Thinking     0.24  1, 297 0.63 .00 
System 1*System 2     0.23  1, 297 0.63 .00 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-






Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Body Image 
 System 2 Thinking     
System 1 Thinking Low n High n F df p η2 
 Low 2.71 (0.95) 79 2.72 (0.94) 73     
 High 2.73 (0.96) 71 2.85 (0.96) 82     
Main effects and interaction on body image. 
System 1 Thinking     0.43 1, 301 0.51 .00 
System 2 Thinking     0.36  1, 301 0.55 .00 
System 1*System 2     0.23  1, 301 0.63 .00 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-







Factorial Analysis of Variance: Thinking Style on Post-Traumatic Growth 
 System 2 Thinking     
System 1 Thinking Low n High n F df p η2 
 Low 27.49 (11.58) 79 28.04 (11.45) 73     
 High 33.21 (10.33) 71 33.30 (11.73) 82     
Main effects and interaction on post-traumatic growth. 
System 1 Thinking     17.91  1, 301 0.00*** .06 
System 2 Thinking     0.06  1, 301 0.80 .00 
System 1*System 2     0.03  1, 301 0.86 .00 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-
40). Post-traumatic growth measured by the PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form (PTGI-SF). 






Correlations Between Illness Representations and Measures of Psychological Functioning 




























CES-D Depressive Symptoms .22*** .27*** .16** .31*** -.24*** -.30*** -.37*** .56*** 
IES-R Cancer-Related Distress .21*** .21*** .19*** .26*** -.16** -.17*** -.33*** .60*** 
 Intrusion  .20*** .18*** .20*** .29*** -.19*** -.20*** -.31*** .58*** 
 Avoidance  .11† .16** .09 .11† -.09 -.53 -.23*** .45*** 
 Hyperarousal  .25*** .22*** .21*** .26*** -.13* -.19*** -.32*** .56*** 
EORTC Body Image  .24*** .13* .19*** .33*** -.13* -.17** -.12† .37*** 
PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth .03 -.14* -.03 .05 .28*** .21*** .11* -.07 
Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all IPQ 
dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline 
(Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale; IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised; EORTC = European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer; PTGI-SF = 
Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. 






Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Thinking Styles 
 Tumor Status    95% CI  
Thinking Style No Mass/Tumor Mass/Tumor t df p LL UL Cohen’s d 
System 1 Thinking 3.70 (0.53) 3.60 (0.57) -1.07 303 0.28 -0.28 0.82 -0.18 
 Experiential Abilities 3.73 (0.58) 3.63 (0.60) -1.01 303 0.31 -0.29 0.93 -0.17 
 Experiential Engagement 3.67 (0.54) 3.57 (0.62) -1.00 303 0.32 -0.29 0.95 -0.17 
System 2 Thinking 3.81 (0.43) 3.87 (0.57) 0.72 302 0.47 -0.11 0.24 0.12 
 Rational Abilities 3.85 (0.48) 3.89 (0.60) 0.48 302 0.63 -0.14 0.23 0.07 
 Rational Engagement 3.78 (0.54) 3.86 (0.64) 0.81 303 0.42 -0.12 0.28 0.14 
Note. n = 305 for all results. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational Experiential 






Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Thinking Style 

















System 1 Thinking 3.71 (0.60) 3.53 (0.56) 3.62 (0.58) 1.02  2, 282 0.36 .01 
 Experiential Abilities 3.72 (0.64) 3.58 (0.56) 3.65 (0.62) 0.54  2, 282 0.58 .00 
 Experiential Engagement 3.71 (0.58) 3.48 (0.63) 3.60 (0.62) 1.35  2, 282 0.26 .01 
System 2 Thinking 3.83 (0.41) 3.86 (0.52) 3.87 (0.58) 0.10  2, 281 0.91 .00 
 Rational Abilities 3.86 (0.49) 3.85 (0.60) 3.90 (0.60) 0.17  2, 281 0.85 .00 
 Rational Engagement 3.79 (0.50) 3.88 (0.56) 3.84 (0.65) 0.17  2, 282 0.84 .00 
Note. n = 305 for all results. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Thinking style measured by the Rational 







Differences Between Those With and Without a Self-Reported Tumor or Mass on Illness Representations 
 Tumor Status    95% CI  
Illness Representations No Mass/Tumor Mass/Tumor t df p LL UL Cohen’s 
d 
Illness Identity 6.22 (3.94) 6.38 (3.71) 0.27 303 .79 -1.02 1.35 0.04 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) 20.59 (6.36) 19.44 (6.70) -1.06 302 .29 -3.28 0.98 -0.18 
Timeline (Cyclical) 10.96 (3.75) 11.72 (3.70) 1.25 300 .21 -0.44 1.94 0.20 
Consequences 25.10 (3.56) 24.80 (4.03) -0.46 300 .64 -1.57 0.97 -0.08 
Personal Control 20.14 (4.48) 19.71 (4.51) -0.58 300 .57 -1.87 1.02 -0.10 
Treatment Control 18.50 (3.08) 17.31 (3.72) -2.00 301 .05* -2.35 -0.02 -0.35 
Illness Coherence 17.75 (4.19) 18.65 (4.49) 1.24 300 .22 -0.53 2.33 0.21 
Emotional Representations 21.56 (5.32) 21.90 (5.22) 0.39 302 .69 -1.34 2.02 0.06 
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions 
Questionnaire). On all IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of 
the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit.  






Differences Among Those Without a Tumor, With a Mass, and With a Tumor on Illness Representations 



















Illness Identity 5.96 (4.28) 6.47 (3.65) 6.30 (3.73) 0.18 2, 282 .84 .00  
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) 19.43 (6.43) 16.68 (6.34) 20.06 (6.65) 5.53 2, 281 .00** .04 Leuk > Lymph; Other > Lymph 
Timeline (Cyclical) 10.54 (4.14) 11.08 (3.67) 11.83 (3.72) 2.03 2, 279 .13 .01  
Consequences 25.03 (3.94) 24.55 (3.64) 24.89 (4.17) 0.18 2, 279 .83 .00  
Personal Control 19.63 (4.56) 19.36 (3.83) 19.82 (4.72) 0.22 2, 279 .80 .00  
Treatment Control 18.77 (3.04) 18.70 (3.05) 16.93 (3.82) 7.19 2, 280 .00*** .05 Leuk > Other; Lymph > Other 
Illness Coherence 17.13 (3.91) 19.30 (3.90) 18.43 (4.67) 2.22 2, 279 .11 .02  
Emotional Representations 21.85 (5.06) 21.35 (5.65) 22.14 (5.14) 0.48 2, 281 .62 .00  
Note. Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Illness Representations measured by the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ); all IPQ 
dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic)”, higher raw scores equal greater endorsement of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” 
higher scores indicate a more chronic illness representation. Post-hoc analyses were conducted using Tukey’s HSD; differences indicated where p 
≤ .05. 
aPost-hoc comparisons using LSD (p ≤ .05). 






Correlations Between Thinking Style and Illness Representations 
 Thinking Style 
 System 1 System 2 
Illness Representations Average Abilities Engagement Average Abilities Engagement 
Illness Identity .07 .10† .03 .02 .01 .03 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) -.07 -.04 -.10† .04 .03 .05 
Timeline (Cyclical) -.03 -.01 -.05 .01 -.02 .04 
Consequences .09 .08 .08 .04 .00 .07 
Personal Control .12* .08 .15** -.02 .00 -.04 
Treatment Control .13* .10† .14* -.01 .01 -.02 
Illness Coherence .11 .09 .12* .18*** .15** .19*** 
Emotional Representations .01 .01 .01 .03 -.02 .08 
Note. n = 305 for all analyses. Thinking Style measured by the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-
40); Illness representations were measured using the IPQ (Illness Perceptions Questionnaire). On all 
IPQ dimensions except for “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher raw scores equal greater endorsement 
of the construct. For “Timeline (Acute/Chronic),” higher scores indicate a more chronic illness 
representation. 






Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis of Illness Representation Scales With Oblique Rotation 
Illness Representations Illness Impact  Control Over Illness 
Consequences .72 -.02 
Illness Identity .70 .08 
Timeline (Cyclical) .69 .11 
Emotional Representations .58 -.14 
Illness Coherence -.45 .07 
Treatment Control .01 .87 
Personal Control .10 .80 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic) .17 -.67 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Depressive Symptoms 
 CES-D Depressive Symptoms 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
Tumor Status (Total Effect) -0.70 -0.02 2.06 -0.34 .73   
Tumor Status (Direct Effect) -1.39 -0.04 1.72 -0.81 .42   
Active Treatment -0.85 -0.03 1.44 -0.59 .56   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.34 0.01 1.00   -1.56 2.41 
Control Over Illness 0.34 0.01 0.44   -0.43 1.30 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 0.39, p = .67, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Cancer-Related Distress 
 IES-R Cancer Related Distress 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
Tumor Status (Total Effect) -2.22 -0.05 2.80 -0.79 .43   
Tumor Status (Direct Effect) -2.89 -0.06 2.42 -1.20 .23   
Active Treatment -1.53 -0.04 2.03 -0.75 .45   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.44 0.01 1.39   -2.13 3.36 
Control Over Illness 0.23 0.00 0.35   -0.29 1.16 
Note. Model: F (2, 294) = 0.55, p = .58, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Body Image 
 EORTC Body Image 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
Tumor Status (Total Effect) -0.07 -0.03 0.16 -0.46 .64   
Tumor Status (Direct Effect) -0.10 -0.04 0.14 -0.72 .47   
Active Treatment -0.10 0.04 0.12 -0.85 .40   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.02 0.01 0.06   -0.09 0.15 
Control Over Illness 0.01 0.00 0.02   -0.01 0.06 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.71, p = .18, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. EORTC = European Organisation for 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Tumor Status on Post-Traumatic Growth 
 PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
Tumor Status (Total Effect) -2.03 -0.02 1.92 -1.05 .29   
Tumor Status (Direct Effect) -1.65 -0.05 -1.86 -0.89 .37   
Active Treatment 0.91 0.03 1.56 0.58 .56   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.01 0.00 0.12   -0.17 0.38 
Control Over Illness -0.38 0.01 0.48   -1.38 0.55 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 0.70, p = .50, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Depressive Symptoms 
 CES-D Depressive Symptoms 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 1 Thinking (Total Effect) -1.71 -0.08 1.26 -1.36 .17   
System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect) -1.26 -0.06 1.06 -1.18 .24   
Active Treatment -0.75 0.02 1.42 -0.52 .60   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.16 0.01 0.58   -0.99 1.34 
Control Over Illness -0.62 -0.03 0.33  <.05 -1.37 -0.06 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.26, p = .28, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Cancer-Related Distress 
 IES-R Cancer Related Distress 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 1 Thinking (Total Effect) -0.16 0.00 1.73 -0.09 .93   
System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect) -0.10 0.00 1.51 -0.07 .94   
Active Treatment -1.17 -0.03 2.02 -0.58 .56   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact -0.22 0.01 0.83   -1.44 1.79 
Control Over Illness -0.19 -0.02 0.36  <.05 -1.31 -0.04 
Note. Model: F (2, 294) = 0.24, p = .79, Adjusted R2 = -0.01. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised. CI = confidence 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Body Image 
 EORTC Body Image 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 1 Thinking (Total Effect) 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.78 .44   
System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect) 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.97 .33   
Active Treatment 0.12 0.05 0.12 1.00 .32   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.01 0.01 0.04   -0.06 0.08 
Control Over Illness -0.02 0.01 0.02   -0.07 -0.00 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 1.91, p = .15, Adjusted R2 = 0.01. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). EORTC = European Organisation for Research and 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 1 Thinking on Post-Traumatic Growth 
 PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 1 Thinking (Total Effect) 5.65 0.28 1.14 4.98 .001***   
System 1 Thinking (Direct Effect) 5.02 0.25 1.12 4.49 .001***   
Active Treatment 1.40 0.05 1.50 0.94 .35   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact 0.00 0.00 0.07   -0.14 0.16 
Control Over Illness 0.62 0.03 0.35  <.05 0.67 1.47 
Note. Model: F (2, 297) = 12.53, p < .001, Adjusted R2 = 0.07. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. 
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Depressive Symptoms 
 CES-D Depressive Symptoms 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 2 Thinking (Total Effect) -3.32 -0.15 1.30 -2.55 .01**   
System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect) -3.25 -0.14 1.08 -3.00 .00**   
Active Treatment -0.88 -0.02 1.41 -0.62 .53   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact -0.26 -0.01 0.63   -1.50 0.95 
Control Over Illness -0.19 -0.01 0.36   -0.46 0.98 
Note. Model: F (2, 296) = 3.61, p = .03, Adjusted R2 = 0.02. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression 
Scale. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Cancer-Related Distress 
 IES-R Cancer Related Distress 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 2 Thinking (Total Effect) -0.88 -0.03 1.79 -0.49 .62   
System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect) -0.70 -0.02 1.54 -0.45 .65   
Active Treatment -1.39 -0.03 2.01 -0.69 .49   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact -0.33 0.01 0.90   -2.17 1.38 
Control Over Illness 0.15 0.00 0.30   -0.32 0.94 
Note. Model: F (2, 293) = 0.33, p = .72, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). IES-R = Impact of Event Scale – Revised. CI = confidence 






Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Body Image 
 EORTC Body Image 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 2 Thinking (Total Effect) 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.32 .75   
System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect) 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.46 .64   
Active Treatment 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.96 .34   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact -0.02 -0.01 0.04   -0.10 0.06 
Control Over Illness 0.00 0.00 0.01   -0.01 -0.05 
Note. Model: F (2,296) = 1.66, p = .19, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). EORTC = European Organisation for Research and 







Mediation Analysis: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of System 2 Thinking on Post-Traumatic Growth 
 PTGI-SF Post-Traumatic Growth 
      95% CI 
Variable b β SE t p LL UL 
System 2 Thinking (Total Effect) -0.53 -0.02 1.23 -0.43 .67   
System 2 Thinking (Direct Effect) -0.32 -0.02 1.19 0.27 .79   
Active Treatment 1.16 0.04 1.55 0.75 .46   
Bootstrap results of multiple mediation model, controlling for all mediators. 
Illness Impact -0.01 0.00 0.08   -0.25 0.12 
Control Over Illness -0.21 -0.01 0.40   -1.10 0.52 
Note. Model: F (2, 296) = 0.23, p = .79, Adjusted R2 = 0.00. Thinking style measured by the 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI). PTGI-SF = Post-traumatic Growth Inventory – Short Form. 






Structure Matrix of the Discriminant Function Analysis for Clinical Depression 
Independent Variable Function 
Illness Impact .87 
Control Over Illness -.54 
System 1 Thinking -.23 
Active Treatment .12 
Age .07 
Total Family Income -.05 
Gender -.05 
Self-Reported Masses or Tumors .04 
Marital Status .04 
System 2 Thinking .02 
Note. n = 289 for all analyses. Variables in bold were included 
after stepwise analysis using Wilkes’ lambda as the selection 
rule. Illness Impacts is a combined variable consisting of five 
dimensions of illness representation as measured by the Illness 
Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ; Consequences, Identity, 
Timeline (Cyclical), Emotional Representations, and Illness 
Coherence (reversed); Control Over Illness is a combined 
variable consisting of three dimensions of illness representation 
measured by the IPQ (Treatment Control, Personal Control, 
Timeline (Acute/Chronic, reversed)). Thinking style measured 






Classification Results of Discriminant Function Analysis for Clinical Depression 
 Predicted Group Membership  
 
Actual Group Membership 
Depressed 
(CES-D ≥ 16) 
Not Depressed 
(CES-D < 16) 
 
# of Cases 
Depressed (CES-D ≥ 16) 95 (69.9%) 41 (30.1%) 136 
Not Depressed (CES-D < 16) 41 (25.0%) 123 (75.0%) 164 
Total Cases   300 
Note. Depressive symptoms measured using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies 





Descriptive Characteristics for Drawings at Time of Diagnosis 
Characteristic n % 
Rated Size of Drawing (n = 86)   
 Small 15 17.4 
 Medium 23 26.7 
 Large 48 55.8 
Color (n = 99)   
 Drawing contains color 96 97.0 
 Drawing is black and white 3 3.0 
Words (n = 99)   
 Drawing contains words 51 51.5 
 Drawing contains no words 48 48.5 
Rated Abstract (n = 99)   
 Drawing is abstract 30 30.3 
 Drawing is not abstract 69 69.7 
People Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 53 53.5 
 No 46 46.5 
Number of People 
(of those who drew people; n = 53) 
  
 1 45 84.9 
 >1 8 15.1 
Faces Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 61 61.6 
 No 38 38.4 
Rated Facial Expression 
(of those who drew faces; n = 38) 
  
 Sad 18 47.4 
 Neutral 11 28.9 
 Happy 2 5.3 
 Facial expressions not concordant 5 13.2 






Drawing at Time of Diagnosis Descriptive Characteristics (Continued) 
Characteristic n % 
Bodies Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 48 48.5 
 No 51 51.5 
Bodies Associated with Faces 
(of those who drew bodies; n = 48) 
  
 Faces and bodies 31 64.6 
 Only bodies 15 31.2 
 Faces and bodies not concordant 2 5.3 
Medical Professional(s) (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts medical professional(s) 0 0.0 
 Drawing depicts no medical professional(s) 99 100.0 
Tumor or Mass (n = 69)   
 Drawing depicts tumor(s) or mass(es) 45 65.2 
 Drawing depicts no tumor(s) or mass(es) 24 34.8 
Blood (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts blood 11 11.1 
 Drawing depicts no blood 88 88.9 
Medical Objects (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts medical objects 7 7.1 






Descriptive Characteristics for Drawings at Time of Survey  
Characteristic n % 
Rated Size of Drawing (n = 89)   
 Small 19 21.3 
 Medium 21 23.6 
 Large 49 55.0 
Color (n = 99)   
 Drawing contains color 96	 97.0	
 Drawing is black and white 3	 3.0	
Words (n = 99)   
 Drawing contains words 63	 63.6	
 Drawing contains no words 36	 36.4	
Rated Abstract (n = 99)   
 Drawing is abstract 25	 25.3	
 Drawing is not abstract 74	 74.7	
People Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 54 54.5 
 No 45 45.5	
Number of People 
(of those who drew people; n = 54) 
  
 1 41 75.9 
 >1 13 24.1 
Faces Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 45 45.5 
 No 54 54.5 
Rated Facial Expression 
(of those who drew faces; n = 45) 
  
 Happy 26	 57.8	
 Neutral 5 11.1 
 Sad 4	 8.9	
 Faces expressions not concordant 3	 6.7	






Drawing at Time of Survey Descriptive Characteristics (Continued) 
Characteristic n % 
Bodies Depicted (n = 99)   
 Yes 46 46.5 
 No 53 53.5 
Bodies Associated with Faces 
(of those who drew bodies; n = 46) 
  
 Faces and bodies 36 78.3 
 Only bodies 9	 19.6	
 Faces and bodies not concordant 1	 2.2	
Medical Professional(s) (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts medical professional(s) 0	 0.0	
 Drawing depicts no medical professional(s) 99	 100.0	
Tumor or Mass (n = 72)   
 Drawing depicts tumor(s) or mass(es) 12	 16.7	
 Drawing depicts no tumor(s) or mass(es) 60	 83.3	
Blood (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts blood 7	 7.1	
 Drawing depicts no blood 92	 92.9	
Medical Objects (n = 99)   
 Drawing depicts medical objects 3	 3.0	



















Rated size of drawing (n = 99)a 0.44 0.47 5.70**c 3.85*b 0.46 
Words appear in drawing (n = 99) -1.13 0.99 -2.82** 0.68 -0.58 
Rated abstract (n = 99) 0.42 1.19 -0.22 2.42* 0.24 
People depicted (n = 99) 0.26 0.38 -0.68 -2.07* -1.15 
Number of people (n = 53) -0.11 1.45 0.07 -0.93 -0.34 
Faces depicted (n = 99) -0.88 0.21 0.11 -1.73* -1.61 
Bodies depicted (n = 99) -0.11 -0.27 -0.39 -2.64** -1.21 
Tumor or mass depicted (n = 69) 2.45* -0.48 -1.32 -1.74† 0.71 
aCoefficients for “Rated size of drawing” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values. bPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05): 
medium drawing > large drawing; medium drawing > small drawing. cPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05): large drawing > medium 
drawing; large drawing > small drawing. 




















Rated size of drawing (n = 99)a 0.19 0.18 2.46†b 0.92 0.46 
Words appear in drawing (n = 99) -0.23 1.64 -1.66† -1.25 0.05 
Rated abstract (n = 99) 0.72 -0.14 1.20 0.95 0.32 
People depicted (n = 99) -0.28 -0.03 -0.61 -2.08* -1.32 
Number of people (n = 53) -0.29 0.35 -0.78 0.59 0.76 
Faces depicted (n = 99) -0.95 -0.22 -0.17 -1.95† -0.94 
Bodies depicted (n = 99) -0.87 0.01 -0.52 -2.74** -0.98 
Tumor or mass depicted (n = 69) 2.45* 1.13 -1.08 0.62 0.63 
aCoefficients for “Rated size of drawing” are F values; all other coefficients are student’s t values. bPost-hoc (LSD, p ≤ .05): 
large drawing > small drawing. 







Figure 1. The parallel processing model. From “Living with Chronic Illness: A Contextualized, Self-Regulation Approach” by Leventhal, H., 
Halm, E., Horowitz, C., Leventhal, E., & Ozakinci, G., 2008, in S. Sutton, A., Buam, & M. Johnston (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Health 















Figure 2. Theoretical model of the relationships between tumor status, thinking styles, illness representations, and psychological functioning. 
Tumor Status





























Figure 3. Flow of participants through recruitment, online survey, and drawing measures. 
	
860 individuals clicked 






35 were diagnosed with 
cancer <3 months prior to 
beginning the survey;
15 did not meet age criteria 
(<20 or >65);
1 was not able to speak, read, 
or write in English;
21 reported an active 
psychiatric or cognitive 




482 began the survey.
305 completed the 
survey.
250 agreed to complete 
the drawing measure.
229 provided contact 
information for mailing.







Figure 4. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on depressive symptoms. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all 


























































Figure 5. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on cancer-related distress. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all 


























































Figure 6. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on body image. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *** = p 


























































Figure 7. Mediation model of self-reported tumor status on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all 
































































Figure 8. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on depressive symptoms. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * = 






















































Figure 9. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on cancer-related distress. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * = 























































Figure 10. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on body image. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, † = p ≤ .10, * 






















































Figure 11. Mediation model of System 1 thinking on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * 





















































Figure 12. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on depressive symptoms. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * = 





















































Figure 13. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on cancer-related distress. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, * 





















































Figure 14. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on body image. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, *** = p ≤ 





















































Figure 15. Mediation model of System 2 thinking on post-traumatic growth. Values indicate standardized regression coefficients. For all values, 



















































Figure 16. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 34-year-old man diagnosed with acute 




Figure 17. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung 





Figure 18. Drawing of cancer in the present time by a 26-year-old woman diagnosed with lung cancer 15 





Figure 19. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 24-year-old woman diagnosed with vaginal 





Figure 20. Drawing of cancer in the present time by a 41-year-old man diagnosed with acute lymphocytic 





Figure 21. Drawing of cancer at the time of diagnosis by a 27-year-old woman diagnosed with bone 














Long Script, Suitable for Email or Listserv Posting 
 
Tell us what you are thinking! 
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com 
 
Please join us for a research project considering the ways individuals think about their 
cancer. Your participation may benefit others like you who are facing the physical and 
psychological challenges of the disease. 
 
Individuals who choose to participate will take a 30-45 minute online survey and will have the 
option to answer an additional question by mail. The survey will ask you about your thoughts 
and feelings about your cancer. You may also be asked about you how you have been feeling 
both physically and emotionally.  
 
If you choose to participate, you can enter a raffle to win one of five $75 Amazon Gift 
Cards after you complete your survey. If you answer an additional question by mail, you’ll get 
another raffle entry. Also, whether you win or lose, a $1 donation will be made to a cancer 
charity of your choice once you have completed the survey. Taking part in this project will not 
cost you any money and does not include medication. Your decision to participate, or not to 
participate, will not impact any medical care you receive. 
 
To take part in the project, you must be:  
• 20 years or older  
• diagnosed with cancer more than 3 months ago  
• able to speak, read, and write in English  
 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you have the right to stop at any time by simply 
closing the browser window. All information from you will remain strictly confidential.  
 
Log on to www.thinkingaboutcancer.com. For more information or to ask any questions, 
please call the Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 or email support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. Problems 
that may result from participation in this study can be directed to Sarah Leon, Human Research 
Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu at Hunter College 




Medium Script, Suitable for Website Posting Where Space is Limited 
 
Tell us what you are thinking! 
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com 
 
 If you are 20 years or older, able to speak, read, and write in English, and were diagnosed with 
cancer more than 3 months ago, then consider joining us for a research project studying the 
ways individuals think about their cancer. Participants will take a 30-45 minute online survey 
and, after completing it, will have the chance to enter a raffle to win one of five $75 Amazon 
Gift Cards. Log on to www.thinkingabout cancer to participate, or email 
support@thinkingaboutcancer to learn more. 
 
Short Script, Suitable for Website Blurb or Link 
 
Tell us what you are thinking! 
 
If you are 20 years or older, able to speak, read, and write in English, and were diagnosed with 
cancer more than 3 months ago, then consider joining us for a research project studying the 
ways individuals think about their cancer. Log on to www.thinkingabout cancer to participate, 














Congratulations! You have won one of five $75 Amazon Gift Cards for your participation in a 
study about the ways that individuals think about their cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com). 
Our records indicate that you successfully completed your online survey and gave us this e-mail 
address at that time. 
 
Please email us back and let us know that how you would like to claim your prize. You may 
receive the $75 gift card in one of two ways: 
 
1) The easiest way to claim your prize is by email. Just reply to this email and let us know that 
you want to claim your prize; we’ll then send you a link directly from Amazon so that you can 
credit your online Amazon account. 
 








Please note that this information will only be used to send you the gift card. Once we have sent 
the card to you, we will permanently delete this email and will not retain any of your contact 
information. 
 
If you have any questions about claiming your prize or are worried about the validity of this 
email, please contact Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 or email support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. 
 









The Graduate Center of the City University of New York 
Doctoral Program in Psychology  
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
Project Title: Ways of Thinking about Illness Representations of Cancer 
Principal Investigator: Ian Z. Pervil, M.A., The Graduate Center of the City 
University of New York 
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Tracey Revenson, Ph.D., Hunter College of the City 




You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. Research studies include only people 
who voluntarily choose to take part in them. In order to decide whether or not you agree to 
participate, you should know enough about a study’s risks and benefits in order to make a sound 
judgment. This process is known as informed consent.  
 
The next page will give you detailed information about the research study. Please feel free to 
take your time before making your own decision about whether or not you’d like to participate; 
you may discuss your decision with your family and friends if you choose.  
 
Once you understand the study, its risks, and its benefits, you will be asked below to indicate 
your consent. 
 
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey. Before clicking ahead, be 
sure that you have adequate time to finish it. If you don't have enough time now, you may close 
your browser window and start again when you feel you do have enough time to complete the 
survey. If you close the browser window in the middle of your survey, you will not be able to 
return to it. 
  
Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel 
you have privacy, and where you won't be distracted. If you are in a public place, be sure to 









The purpose of this study is to consider the different ways that people with cancer think about 
their illness. The results of this study may allow doctors and psychologists to better understand 
their patients’ experiences with cancer and help them do a better job of talking to their patients 
about their illness. You are being asked to participate in this study because you are an adult who 
has been diagnosed with a form of cancer more than three months ago. Approximately 300 people 
will take part in this study. 
 
PROCEDURES 
If you decide to be in this study, your part will involve the following:  
 
• You will be asked to complete a web survey of approximately 200 questions about your 
thoughts and feelings about your cancer. You may be asked about you how you have 
been feeling both physically and emotionally. 
 
• You will also be asked to provide some information about yourself, such as your age, 
ethnicity, income, and medical history.  
 
• The entire survey will take about 30-45 minutes to complete. 
 
If you choose to do so, once you complete the Internet survey, you will have the option to 
compete an additional task that cannot be completed on the Internet but on paper. The additional 
task will be mailed to you. You do not have to complete the additional task and still complete 
this survey. As with this survey, your participation is entirely voluntary. The additional task, 
which involves drawing, will take approximately 5-10 minutes to complete. You will then mail 
your answer back in a postage-paid envelope, which we will provide. Being in the study means 
taking a survey for 30-45 minutes and, if you choose, completing an additional drawing task 
which will take 5-10 minutes and will be mailed to you. 
 
POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
The following risks/discomforts may occur as a result of you being in this study: 
 
• There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts associated with your participation in this 
study, though it is possible that answering questions about your experience with cancer 
might upset you for a short time. 
 
• If you do feel upset and would like to speak to a counselor, you can contact the Cancer 
Hope Network (1-800-552-4366; www.cancerhopenetwork.org), a non-profit 
organization that offers free and confidential treatment to cancer patients and their 
families. Also, the American Cancer Society (1-800-227-2345; www.cancer.org) 
provides 24-hour information on treatment, literature, services, and support.  
 
• Further, if you do feel distressed or have any concerns about the study, please feel free to 






There are no direct benefits as a result of participating in this study; however, this research may 
help others with cancer in the future. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to participate without 
prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may stop filling 
out the survey at any time or skip any questions. 
  
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPENSATION 
Participation in this study will involve no costs to you. For completing the online portion of the 
study, a $1 donation will be made to one of three cancer charities of your choice. Once the online 
portion is complete, you will also have the opportunity to enter a raffle to win one of four $75 
Amazon.com Gift Cards. The raffle will occur once the data have been collected, but no later 
than December 2014, whichever comes first. You will be able to enroll in the raffle even if you 
skip any question(s). You must reach the end of the survey in order to enter the raffle; however 
you will be able to enroll in the raffle regardless of the number of question(s) that you skip. 
 
If you choose to complete the additional drawing task by mail, you will have the opportunity to 
enter the raffle a second time. Your additional task must be received by the Principal Investigator 




We will take steps to help make sure that all the information we get about you is kept private. 
Your name will not be used in any conference presentations or written articles. All data will be 
identified with a participant ID number only. Any identifying information that you provide will 
be kept separate from your answers to this survey. Only the Principal Investigator and his advisor 
will have access to both data and participant information from this study. This information will 
be kept on a single password-protected computer file. 
 
Data will be stored for a minimum of three years, and may be used in the future for other human 
subjects research at The City University of New York. By consenting now, you are saying that 
this data may be used for these purposes in the future. Data from the online surveys will be 
stored in a password-protected folder on a computer in the PI’s advisor’s (Dr. Tracey Revenson) 
research suite, and the drawing measures will be stored in a locked file cabinet in her research 
suite. If you choose to provide your contact information, it will be kept in a separate password-
protected file apart from all other data.  
 
We want to make sure that this study is being done correctly and that your rights and welfare are 
being protected. For this reason, we will share the data we get from you in this study with the 
study team, The CUNY University-Integrated IRB, applicable Institutional officials, and certain 
federal offices.  
 
Once all data has been collected for this study, any participant information on file (name, contact 
information) will be destroyed. Participants are encouraged to protect their own confidentiality 
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by completing this survey in a private setting. 
 
Any published report that uses data from this study will not include any information that could 
identify individual participants. If you have any questions about confidentiality, you can contact 
the principal investigator at 212-817-1911 or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. 
 
CONTACT QUESTIONS/PERSONS 
If you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the 
Principal Investigator, Ian Pervil, at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com, or 
contact his advisor, Dr. Tracey Revenson, at 212-396-6769. If you have any questions 
concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon, Human 
Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu at Hunter 
College of the City University of New York. 
 
STATEMENT OF CONSENT 
“I have read the above description of this research and I understand it. I have been informed of 
the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. 
Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that I may have will also be answered 
by the principal investigator of the research study. I voluntary agree to participate in this study.  
 
“By selecting ‘YES’, I agree that I understand the information stated in this consent document 
and I consent to participate in this study.”  
 





STATEMENT OF CONSENT FOR FUTURE USE 
“I give consent for my data to be used in the future by the principal investigator and his advisor. I 








Thank you in advance for participating in this study. The information you share allows us to 
learn more about how individuals think about cancer. 
 
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study. Research studies include only people 
who voluntarily choose to take part in them. In order to decide whether or not you agree to 
participate, you should know enough about a study’s risks and benefits in order to make a sound 
judgment. This process is known as informed consent. 
 
The next page will give you detailed information about the research study. Please feel free to 
take your time before making your own decision about whether or not you’d like to participate; 
you may discuss your decision with your family and friends if you choose. 
 
Once you understand the study, its risks, and its benefits, you will be asked to indicate your 
consent. 
 
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey. Before clicking ahead, be 
sure that you have adequate time to finish it in a single session. If you don’t have enough time 
now, you may close your browser window and start over again when you feel you do have 
enough time to complete the entire survey. If you close the browser window in the middle of 
your survey, you will not be able to return to it. 
 
Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel 
you have privacy, and where you won’t be distracted. If you are in a public place, be sure to 




• Where did you learn about this survey? 
• Do you acknowledge that you are at least 20 years of age? 
• Are you able to read and write in English? 
• Do you have active psychiatric or cognitive conditions that might interfere with your 
ability to participate? 
• Were you diagnosed with cancer more than three months ago? 
 
Overview of Survey 
You will need approximately 30-45 minutes to complete this survey. 
Before clicking ahead, be sure that you have adequate time to finish it. 
 
If you don’t have enough time now, you may close your browser window and start again when 
you feel you do have enough time to complete the survey. If you close the browser window in 




Please complete the survey by yourself. Consider going to a place that is quiet, where you feel 
you have privacy, and where you won’t be distracted. At the end of the survey, you will be able 
to make a $1 donation to one of three cancer charities, and you will also be able to enter the 
raffle for one of five $75 Amazon.com gift cards. 
 
Treatment History 
• What kind of cancer has your doctor told you that you have?  
• On what date were you diagnosed? (If you don’t remember the exact date, just enter the 
month and year.) 
• Do you or did you ever have any masses or tumors associated with your cancer? 
o Where were they located when you were first diagnosed with cancer? 
o Do you still have any masses or tumors associated with your cancer? 
o If so, where are they located now? 
• Have you had chemotherapy for your cancer? 
o Are you still undergoing chemotherapy? 
o When did you start your current or most recent round of chemotherapy? 
o When did you finish your last round of chemotherapy? 
o Have you had multiple types of chemotherapy? 
o Indicate the number of different types, and list them if you can: 
• Have you had radiation for your cancer? 
o Are you still undergoing radiation? 
o When did you start your current or most recent round of radiation? 
o When did you finish your last round of radiation? 
• Are you scheduled to have a bone marrow or stem cell transplant for your cancer? 
o When are you scheduled to have the transplant? 
o Have you ever had a bone marrow or stem cell transplant for your cancer? 
o Was the transplant autologous (stem cells from your own body) or allogeneic 
(stem cells from a donor)? 
o When did you have the transplant? 
o When were you discharged from the hospital? 
o Have you ever had graft vs. host disease? 
 
Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ) 
Views about Your Illness 
Listed below are a number of symptoms that you may or may not have experienced since your 
illness. Please indicate by marking “Yes” or “No” whether you have experienced any of these 
symptoms since your illness. Then indicate whether whether you believe that these symptoms are 
related to your illness. 
 
• Pain 
• Sore Throat 
• Nausea 
• Breathlessness 
• Weight Loss 
• Fatigue 
• Stiff Joints 
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• Sore Eyes 
• Wheeziness 
• Headaches 
• Upset Stomach 
• Sleep Difficulties 
• Dizziness 
• Loss of Strength 
 
We are interested in your own personal views of how you now see your current illness. Please 
indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about your illness by 




Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly  
Agree 
m m m m m 
 
• My illness will last a short time 
• My illness is likely to be permanent rather than temporary 
• My illness will last for a long time 
• This illness will pass quickly 
• I expect to have this illness for the rest of my life 
• My illness is a serious condition 
• My illness has major consequences on my life 
• My illness does not have much effect on my life 
• My illness strongly affects the way others see me 
• My illness has serious financial consequences 
• My illness causes difficulties for those who are close to me 
• There is a lot which I can do to control my symptoms 
• What I do can determine whether my illness gets better or worse 
• The course of my illness depends on me 
• Nothing I do will affect my illness 
• I have the power to influence my illness 
• My actions will have no affect on the outcome of my illness 
• My illness will improve in time 
• There is very little that can be done to improve my illness 
• My treatment will be effective in curing my illness 
• The negative effects of my illness can be prevented (avoided) by my treatment 
• My treatment can control my illness 
• There is nothing which can help my condition 
• The symptoms of my condition are puzzling to me 
• My illness is a mystery to me 
• I don’t understand my illness 
• My illness doesn’t make any sense to me 
• I have a clear picture or understanding of my condition 
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• The symptoms of my illness change a great deal from day to day 
• My symptoms come and go in cycles 
• My illness is very unpredictable 
• I go through cycles in which my illness gets better and worse 
• I get depressed when I think about my illness 
• When I think about my illness I get upset 
• My illness makes me feel angry 
• My illness does not worry me 
• Having this illness makes me feel anxious 
• My illness makes me feel afraid 
 
Causes of Your Illness 
We are interested in what you consider may have been the cause of your illness. As people are 
very different, there is no correct answer for this question. We are most interested in your own 
views about the factors that caused your illness rather than what others including doctors or 
family may have suggested to you. Below is a list of possible causes for your illness. Please 
indicate how much you disagree or agree that they were causes for you by marking the 




Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly  
Agree 
m m m m m 
 
• Stress or worry 
• Hereditary - it runs in my family 
• A germ or virus 
• Diet or eating habits 
• Chance or bad luck 
• Poor medical care in my past 
• Pollution in the environment 
• My own behavior 
• My mental attitude e.g. thinking about life negatively 
• Family problems or worries caused my illness 
• Overwork 




• Accident or Injury 
• My personality 
• Altered immunity 
 
Of those from the previous question, select the three most important causes for you in order of 





• Tell us a little bit about yourself, both to help us to describe the people who participate in 
the study and to put your own situation in context. 
• What is your gender? 
• In what state do you currently reside? 
• What is your birthdate? 
• How far did you go in school? 
• Are you Hispanic or Latino(a)? 
• What is your race/ethnicity? 
• How do you identify in terms of sexual orientation? 
• What is your relationship status? 
• Do you have children? 
o How many? 
• What is your current religious affiliation? 
• What is your current work status? 
• Estimate of your total family income. 
 
Writing Measure 
Cancer can touch every part of your life -- issues of family, love, anger, career, life and death, 
and even issues about childhood and specific experiences in life. In your writing, let go and 
explore your deepest thoughts and feelings about the issues that you feel are most important to 
you right now. For this task, please try to spend the next ten minutes writing. All of your writing 
will be completely confidential. Don’t worry about spelling, sentence structure, or grammar. 
There are no right or wrong answers; just begin writing, and try to write for ten minutes. 
 
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40) 




   Completely 
True 
m m m m m 
 
• I have a logical mind. 
• I prefer complex problems to simple problems. 
• I believe in trusting my hunches. 
• I am not a very analytical thinker. 
• I trust my initial feelings about people. 
• I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
• I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
• I don’t reason well under pressure. 
• I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 
• Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
• Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 
• I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive. 
• I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
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• I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
• I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. 
• Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 
• I have no problem thinking things through carefully. 
• When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
• I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know. 
• Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. 
• I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer. 
• I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings. 
• I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
• I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
• I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
• I enjoy intellectual challenges. 
• Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points. 
• I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 
• I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions. 
• Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
• I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition. 
• I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking. 
• Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough 
for me. 
• Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
• I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. 
• If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes. 
• I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate. 
• My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people’s. 
• I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
• I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
 
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) 
The next set of questions asks about how you have been feeling during the past week. Use the 
following scale to answer them. 
 
Rarely or None of 
the Time 
(Less than 1 Day) 
Some or a Little of 




of Time (3-4 Days) 
Most or All of the 
Time  
(5-7 Days) 
m m m m 
 
• I was bothered by things that don’t usually bother me. 
• I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
• I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with the help from my family or friends. 
• I felt that I was just as good as other people. 
• I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
• I felt depressed. 
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• I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
• I felt hopeful about the future. 
• I thought my life had been a failure. 
• I felt fearful. 
• My sleep was restless. 
• I was happy. 
• I talked less than usual. 
• I felt lonely. 
• People were unfriendly. 
• I enjoyed life. 
• I had crying spells. 
• I felt sad. 
• I felt that people disliked me. 
• I could not get “going.” 
 
Impact of Events Scale (IES-R) 
Below is a list of difficulties people sometimes have when they are experiencing a stressor in 
their life such as cancer. Please read each item, and then indicate how distressing each difficulty 
has been for you during the past seven days with respect to your cancer. How much were you 
distressed or bothered by these difficulties?  
  
Not at All A Little Bit Moderately Quite a Bit Extremely 
m m m m m 
 
• Any reminder brought back feelings about it. 
• I had trouble staying asleep. 
• Other things kept making me think about it. 
• I felt irritable and angry. 
• I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought about it or was reminded of it. 
• I thought about it when I didn’t mean to. 
• I felt as if it hadn’t happened or wasn’t real. 
• I stayed away from reminders about it. 
• Pictures about it popped into my mind. 
• I was jumpy and easily startled. 
• I tried not to think about it. 
• I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it, but I didn’t deal with them. 
• My feelings about it were kind of numb. 
• I had trouble falling asleep. 
• I found myself acting or feeling as though I was back at that time. 
• I tried to remove it from my memory. 
• I had trouble concentrating. 
• I had waves of strong feelings about it. 
• Reminders of it caused me to have physical reactions, such as sweating, trouble breathing, 
nausea, or a pounding heart. 
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• I had dreams about it. 
• I felt watchful or on-guard. 
• I tried not to talk about it. 
 
European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer Body Image Module 
During the past week… 
 
Not at All A Little Quite a Bit Very Much 
m m m m 
 
• Have you felt physically less attractive as a result of your disease or treatment? 
• Have you been feeling less feminine/masculine as a result of your disease or treatment? 
• Have you been dissatisfied with your body? 
 
Post-Traumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI-SF) 
Listed below are 10 areas that are sometimes reported to have changed after being diagnosed 
with cancer. Please select the appropriate choice beside each description indicating how much 
you feel you have experienced change in the area described.  
 
I Did Not 
Experience 
This Change 























m m m m m m 
 
• I changed my priorities about what is important in life. 
• I have a greater appreciation for the value of my own life. 
• I am able to do better things with my life. 
• I have a better understanding of spiritual matters. 
• I have a greater sense of closeness with others. 
• I established a new path for my life. 
• I know better that I can handle difficulties. 
• I have a stronger religious faith. 
• I discovered that I’m stronger than I thought I was. 
• I learned a great deal about how wonderful people are. 
 
Survey Completion/Raffle Entry 
You’ve finished the survey. Thank you for your participation. We deeply appreciate your 
participation in this research. Your help is invaluable to us. We hope that the information you 
have shared with us in this questionnaire will allow us to make thinking about cancer easier for 




• Please select a cancer charity below, and we will make a $1 donation to them as a way to 
thank you for your time. 
o Cancer Care (www.cancercare.org) 
o Cancer Research Institute (www.cancerresearch.org) 
o Stand Up to Cancer (www.standup2cancer.org) 
o Prevent Cancer Foundation (preventcancer.org) 
• Now, would you like to enter the drawing for one of five $75 gift cards? 
 
Please enter and confirm your email address so that we can notify you if you win the drawing. 
Your email address will not be used for any other purposes without your consent, and it will be 
stored in a secure, password-protected database. 
 
Drawing Measure 
We have an additional question to ask you, but it must be completed by hand and not computer. 
May we mail it to you? When you receive it, it should only take about 5-10 minutes and we will 
pay for all postage. Once we receive the completed portion, you will receive an additional raffle 
entry! Might you be interested in participating? 
 
Thank you for your interest! Once you click the link below, you’ll be able to enter your contact 






DIRECTIONS: Use the colored pencils to draw a picture of what you think your cancer 
looked like when you first were diagnosed and another picture of what you think your cancer 
looks like now. We are not interested in your drawing ability – even a simple sketch is fine. If 
you want to start over, please use the back of the page or another piece of paper for your 
drawing. 
 



























































Thank you once again for agreeing to participate in a research project that considers the ways 
individuals think about cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com). According to our records, you 
agreed to answer an additional question by mail. 
 
In this packet you will find the following: 
• The additional question (two pages; attached to this letter) 
• A pack of six colored pencils for you to use when answering the question 
• A postage-paid return envelope 
 
If you choose to participate, please use the enclosed materials to answer the question. Then mail 
back your completed response to us in the postage-paid return envelope. (You can keep the 
colored pencils!) 
 
We’d appreciate you completing this task in the next 24 hours. 
We’ll look forward to hearing from you! 
 
The Research Team 
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com 
 
Please remember that your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to 
participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If 
you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the Principal 
Investigator, Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. If you have 
any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon, 
Human Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu 








Thank you once again for agreeing to participate in a research project that considers the ways 
individuals think about cancer (www.thinkingaboutcancer.com). According to our records, you 
agreed to answer an additional question by mail, but unfortunately, we have not received your 
response yet. 
 
In case your materials got lost in the mail the first time, or even if you just forgot about the 
survey, we’ve included another packet of materials for you. If you choose to participate now, 
simply answer the enclosed question using the materials provided and mail back your completed 
response to us in the postage-paid return envelope. (You can keep the colored pencils!) 
 
We’ll look forward to hearing from you! 
 
The Research Team 
www.thinkingaboutcancer.com 
 
Please remember that your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to 
participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If 
you have any questions about the research now or in the future, you should contact the Principal 
Investigator, Ian Pervil at 212-817-1911 and/or support@thinkingaboutcancer.com. If you have 
any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact Sarah Leon, 
Human Research Protection Program Coordinator, at 212-650-3053 or bleon@hunter.cuny.edu 





Drawing Coding Rules 
 
Space 
Edges: There is a box where the respondent is asked to draw pictures on the measure. This 
category evaluates whether the respondent’s drawing stays within the limits of the frame. 
• Inside of the frame, the drawing does not cross the edge of the picture frame. 
• Outside of the frame, the drawing crosses the edge of the picture frame at least once. 
 
Size: This is defined as the proportion in which the drawing occupies certain amount of space 
within the frame. 
• Small Sketch: This category should be used when a drawing occupies less than or equal 
to one quarter of the space within the frame. 
• Medium Sketch: This category should be used when a drawing occupies between one 
quarter and one half of the space within the frame. 
• Large Sketch: This coding category should be used when a drawing occupies more than 
one half of the space within the frame.  
• Multiple Objects: This coding category should be used if the drawing is not cohesive, 
but there are two or more discrete objects in different areas of the page, the location and 
position of which do not neatly fall into other categories. 
 
Subject Content 
Person/People: This category determines whether a person or people are depicted in the 
drawing. (If yes, then the following should be coded:) 
• Number of People: This category examines the number of people in the drawing. 
• Facial Expression: This code categorizes the facial expressions of the individuals in 
drawing. For multiple faces, all categories assume multiple faces are concordant unless 
otherwise specified. 
o Neutral Expression 
o Happy 
o Sad 
o Multiple Faces Not Concordant 
• Body/Bodies: This code categorizes whether or not faces are attached to bodies in the 
drawing. If all faces are attached to bodies, the category is marked yes; if none are 
attached to bodies, the category is marked no. If some are, the category is marked “bodies 
not concordant”. 
• Medical Professional(s) This code should be used if a doctor, nurse, or medical 
professional is depicted in the drawing. Determination of whether the picture is of a 
medical professional is determined by context. Is the person wearing a medical coat, 
holding a stethoscope, has the figure been labeled “doctor”, etc. 
 
Tumor/Mass: This code should be used when a tumor or mass is seen in the drawings. Yes 
indicates that a tumor is clearly depicted; No indicates that a tumor is not depicted. Possible 




Blood: This code should be used when blood is pictured in the patient’s drawing. Placement, 
context, and color should be used when determining depiction of blood. For example, blood may 
be determined by depiction of cells, the color red on the body, or by a stream flowing from a 
body.  
 
Medical Objects: This code should be used if any medical devices or equipment are depicted. 
Examples include an IV, a chemo chair, an x-ray, a needle, Band-Aids, etc. 
 
Abstract—Nonconcrete Figure: This code should be used when the patient draws an abstract 
sketch that is not easily understood. There is not an identifiable concrete object (e.g. person, 
place, thing), event, or circumstance contained within the drawing. 
 




Grounded: Use this code to determine if the content of the drawing is grounded in space. A 
grounded drawing will depict lines for the floor or grass, or clouds for the sky. There will be 
some sense of high and low, up and down in space and the individuals are appropriately located 
in space. 
 
Inside/Outside: Are people depicted inside buildings or outside (perhaps in nature)? 
 
Color 
In this category, use (or absence) of color is defined. 
• Black and White: In this category the patient drawing is depicted in black, gray, or 
pencil. 
• Number of Colors: This code counts the number of colors used in the sketch. In the 
color pack that was provided with each measure, there are eight colors. The patient may 
also have used a pencil (grey) of his/her own. This measure will also be condensed to 
determine whether or not the respondent used color. 
 
Words 
Words: This is a yes/no category that evaluates whether or not words were used in the drawing. 
 
Word Content: Words that are written in the drawing are recorded in this category. 
 
Change 
Drawings should be rated for change on three dimensions, including number of words rated as 
either happy or sad, change in depictions of illness symptoms and severity (e.g. change in tumor 
size), and change in visual content (e.g. rainclouds to sunshine). Taking into account change in 
each of these dimensions, each drawing should receive a rating in one of these four categories 
(with examples and explanation for guidance): 
• Negative Change: The picture is darker, the symbols are more ominous, and/or words 
explain that diagnosis has gotten worse, etc. 
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• No Change (Neither Worse nor Better): This category consists of two distinct types of 
drawing sets: 1) drawings do not differ substantially from each other or are nearly 
identical. Similarly, because of abstractness, it is impossible to determine any measure of 
change. Or 2) drawings are different, but the underlying feelings are neither better nor 
worse. The situation may have changed, but the underlying feelings have not. (e.g. 
drawing one contains a tumor or mass; drawing two contains no mass, but freely floating 
cancer cells throughout the body) 
• Positive Change, with Reservations: The picture is lighter, the symbols are less 
ominous, and/or words explain that diagnosis has gotten better, etc. Nonetheless, some 
ominous symbols remain (e.g. dark clouds, tumor cells, etc.) 
• Positive Change, with no Reservations: The picture is lighter, there are no ominous 
symbols, and/or words explain that diagnosis has gotten better. No ominous symbols or 
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